47. Then I ask whether there is any precedent whatever for the House dealing with a Member’s election or his right to sit, except in cases of absolute statutory disqualification, until that Member has taken his seat and the oaths? – So far as I understand the question, I should say that whether the Member has been sworn, or not, the matter of his disqualification, or of his right to sit would be open to the decision of the House.
48. I am not arguing the point at the moment; I am only trying to get at the fact. If you have not looked for it, of course I cannot have it; but is there, so far as you know, any precedent of such a thing ever having happened? – I know of none; but I have not searched for any such precedent.
49. Mr. Attorney General: It would not appear, would it? – I hardly know how it would appear; unless one’s attention were specifically drawn to any case, there would be no means of discovering it.
50. Mr. Bradlaugh (through the Committee): I will ask whether that question was not raised in the case of Wilkes, and whether it was not in the consideration of that case fully discussed, and whether the House did not resolve that any such dealing with a member was subversive of the rights of the whole body of electors of this kingdom? – I do not understand how that case has any bearing upon the present question.
51. There are three cases: one of expulsion, two of election annulled, and then ultimate reversal of the whole of that and expungment by the House? – Yes, but that has no bearing upon the present case. Of course, I am familiar with the case of Wilkes, but not in connection with any matter arising out of the administration of oaths, which is the special matter referred to this Committee.
52. Have you had your attention called to the Journal of the House of Commons, Vol. I., page 460, in which Sir Francis Bacon, the King’s Attorney General, having sworn to his qualification, which was challenged, the House said, “Their oath, their own consciences to look into, not we to examine it?” – That case is not one of the precedents that we have collected.
Mr. Bradlaugh: They are entered extremely curiously, and one can only take the decision. It begins on page 459, “Eligibility of the Attorney General,” and it does not show there that it is Sir Francis Bacon: but I have learnt that by looking up the other records; and there being then a statutory declaration which lasted until a few years ago for all counsel, solicitors, and practising men of the law, it was objected that the King’s Attorney General could not sit; it appears that he had to swear to his qualification, and the question of his oath and of his disqualification, being Attorney General, were put, and the House said, “Their oath, their own consciences to look into, not we to examine it,” and they left him in the House, resolving that no future Attorney General should sit in it.
Chairman: That was the case which was raised as to whether the law officers of the Crown, who had for certain purposes seats in the House of Lords, had seats in the House of Commons.
Mr. Bradlaugh: Not quite that. There was an obsolete statute of the 46th Edward III., which was only repealed eight or nine years ago, but which does not seem to have been attended to, by which all practising barristers and solicitors were disqualified for sitting for counties.
53. Mr. Beresford Hope: Wilkes’s precedent being expunged, is it still legible in the Journal, and could it be produced for historical information? – Certainly.
54. Major Nolan: With regard to the evidence about O’Connell, I think you stated that an Act was passed to enable O’Connell and his co-religionists to sit in Parliament? – Not to enable O’Connell to sit in Parliament, but to enable Roman Catholics to sit in Parliament.
55. O’Connell was not allowed to take advantage of that Act until he was re-elected? – No, because he had been elected prior to the passing of the Act, and the Act was clearly prospective.
56. Was the wording of that particular statute the reason why he was not allowed to take advantage of that Act? – Certainly; distinctly.
57. Would it be possible for the present or any future Parliament to pass an Act which would enable a man who had been elected previous to the passing of the Act to sit in the House? – It is not for me to say what Act of Parliament might be agreed to by Parliament, but that is quite a distinct case. In that case Mr. O’Connell had actually been elected when the Catholic Relief Act was passed, and there was a clause in the Act which made its operation prospective, and therefore distinctly, and, I believe, intentionally, excluding Mr. O’Connell from the benefits of the Act.
58. Then he was only prevented from taking advantage of that Act owing to the particular wording of that particular clause, and not owing to anything inherent in the House of Commons? – Yes; the decision was founded upon a literal construction of the words of the recent statute.
59. Mr. Whitbread: The case of Mr. O’Connell was this: that he declined to take the oath which was required of Members of Parliament elected at the time that he was elected, and that he requested to be allowed to take another form of oath; he was ordered to withdraw, and the House considered his case; is there anything that you have found in the Journals or in the Debates to indicate that if Mr. O’Connell had been willing to take the oath required of him by the House, the House would have objected to his so taking it? – Certainly not; they put it to him whether he would take the Oath of Supremacy, and upon the face of the Journal, it would seem that if he had taken that oath, he would have been admitted.
60. Mr. Bradlaugh (through the Committee): After John Archdale had claimed to affirm, did not the House absolutely order him to attend in his place for the purpose of being sworn, and tender the oaths to him? – Mr. Archdale was ordered to attend, and the House being informed that Mr. Archdale attended according to order, his letter to Mr. Speaker was read. That letter is printed at full length among the precedents. “And the several statutes qualifying persons to come into and sit and vote in this House were read, viz., of the 3 °Car. II., 1 Will. and Mariæ, and 7 & 8 Will. and Mariæ. And then the said Mr. Archdale was called in, and he came into the middle of the House, almost to the table; and Mr. Speaker, by direction of the House, asked him whether he had taken the oaths, or would take the oaths, appointed to qualify himself to be a Member of this House; to which he answered, That in regard to a principle of his religion he had not taken the oaths, nor could take them; and then he withdrew, and a new writ was ordered.”
61. Mr. Serjeant Simon: With reference to what the Honorable Member for Bedford has put to you just now, Mr. O’Connell refused to take the Oath of Supremacy on the ground that it contained matter which he knew to be untrue, and other matter which he believed to be untrue? – Yes, he so stated.
62. Thereupon he withdrew; but is there any precedent among the Journals to show that a Member stating beforehand that what was contained in the oath was untrue, or a matter of unbelief to him, has been allowed to take the oath under such circumstances? – No, this is the only precedent, so far as I know, of that particular character. The others are cases of absolute refusal to take the oath, or a desire to make an affirmation instead of an oath, or to leave out certain words of the Oath.
63. But is there any precedent where, as in the case of Mr. O’Connell, a Member coming to the table of the House, has made a statement such as Mr. O’Connell made, that the oath contains matter which he knows to be untrue, or believes to be untrue, and has been allowed to take the oath afterwards? – There is no case to be found, so far as I know; certainly there is none in any of these precedents.
64. Mr. Secretary Childers: Is the precedent in Mr. O’Connell’s case this; that on the 15th May Mr. O’Connell said that he could not take the Oath of Supremacy, and that, nevertheless, on the 19th, he was asked whether he would take the Oath of Supremacy, although he had previously informed the House that he was unable to take it? – Yes, because he had been heard, in the interval, upon his claim to take the new oath, under the recent Catholic Relief Act.
65. But was not that a precedent for a Member who had already stated that he could not take a certain oath, nevertheless being afterwards asked by the House whether he would take it? – It so appears on the face of the precedents.
66. I