This trajectory also reflects the importance of universal public opinion regarding the achievement of international communication rights in the sense that community ideas are internationally valid and can be shared among all peoples. Globalization strengthens the possibilities for universality and will undoubtedly contribute to universal communication rights. So do different approaches to human rights that link them to human capabilities that are, in turn, made universal by identifying the essentials of human dignity, of what makes us “truly human.”
This is reflected in the successive international declarations, such as the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, the Pact of Costa Rica of 1969, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 1986, and the Arab Charter of Human Rights of 2004. These documents refer to communication in practically the same terms as Article 19 of the UDHR. This highlights the importance of the UDHR in ensuring that countries around the world acknowledge the existence and importance of communication rights and other human rights and the aspiration that societies and political systems continue strengthening their commitment to the protection of these rights by respecting and implementing international and regional human rights treaties.
References
1 Abad, L. (2015). El derecho a la información en los textos universales (estudio del artículo 19 de la DUDH). In: Derecho de la Información. El ejercicio del derecho a la información y su jurisprudencia (ed. I. Bel and L. Corredoira), 49–68. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales.
2 Azurmendi, A. (2015). El proceso de la configuración del derecho y la Información. In: Derecho de la Información. El ejercicio del derecho a la información y su jurisprudencia (ed. I. Bel and L. Corredoira), 31–47. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales.
3 Castro Fariñas, J.A. (1970). De la libertad de prensa. Madrid: Fragua.
4 Desantes Guanter, J.M. (1974). La información como derecho. Madrid: Editora Nacional.
5 Desantes Guanter, J.M. (1977). Fundamentos del derecho de la información. Madrid: Fondo editorial Cajas de Ahorros.
6 Desantes Guanter, J.M. (1999). Francisco de Vitoria, precursor del derecho de la información. Madrid: Imatique.
7 Fernández, R. (ed.) (2003). Los derechos Humanos. Antología de Francisco de Vitoria. Salamanca: Editorial San Esteban.
8 Nussbaum, M. (2003). Capabilities as fundamental entitlements: Sen and social justice. Feminist Economics 9 (2–3): 33–59.
9 Paine, T. (1791). The Rights of Man. London: J. Johnson.
10 Sánchez Ferriz, R. and Corredoira, L. (2017). La compleja configuración de un derecho-libertad poliédrico, el Derecho a la información.: Referencias históricas. Revista de derecho político 99: 11–48.
11 Subedi, S. (2017). The Effectiveness of the UN Human Rights System: Reform and the Judicialisation of Human Rights. London: Routledge.
12 Suksi, M., Agapiou-Josephides, K., Lehners, J.-P. et al. (eds.) (2015). First Fundamental Rights Documents in Europe. Cambridge, UK: Intersentia.
Notes
1 1 See the various studies on Francisco de Vitoria, who promoted human rights in the early sixteenth century. José María Desantes considers him the first precursor of communication rights in his work Francisco de Vitoria, precursor del derecho de la información, 1999, especially pp. 35–68. See also de Vitoria’s work published by Ramón Fernández in 2003, Los derechos Humanos. Antología, particularly pp. 242–243. De Vitoria did not write directly; his legal work Lectiones has been handed down to us from his students.
2 2 See, for example, Suski et al. (2015).
2 Dignity, a Revolutionary Principle in a Cosmopolitan Society
Javier Gomá Lanzón
Dignity is the most revolutionary concept to come out of the twentieth century. It is endowed with such transforming power that the mere mention of it, as if it were a magic word, has been enough to overcome enormous obstacles that have held back the moral progress of humanity. In the past few years, it has advanced dramatically. And yet, in spite of the extraordinary influence of this concept, philosophy, strangely enough, has simply ignored it for the last two centuries. It has never been a subject of philosophical reflection.
It might be said that this omission is strange because this concept escapes the boundaries of philosophy and is present in innumerable aspects of life, including many different legal contexts. Indeed, an in-depth discussion of it as a philosophical concept is particularly pertinent for a volume that focuses on the universalization of rights. For dignity, in addition to being the foundation of equality, is a sine qua non for the enjoyment of freedom. And the concept was incorporated in twentieth-century international law’s most important texts. It can be found, for example, in the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations (1946), the Preamble and Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Preamble and Article 1 of the International Convention of Civil and Political Rights (1966), and the Preamble and Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2002).
In this book, authors such as Corredoira, Bel, and Abad analyze the main international documents that, in the context of communication and the exercise of freedoms, have inspired its subtitle: Seeking Universality, Equality, Freedom and Dignity.
Dignity is the inspiration of countless ethical debates, such as those that arise in the field of bioethics (abortion, euthanasia, genetic manipulation, and cloning). Among many others, it is at the origin of social causes like trade unionism, feminism, or animalism. And, as recently as the present century, it triggered the social movement of the indignados (the indignant), though those involved felt no need to define, even in simple terms, what it was that provoked their wrath and brought them onto the streets in protest.
Schopenhauer summarily dismissed the Kantian concept of dignity and, in doing so, set in motion a tendency that has dominated the world of philosophy from his day to ours and either ignores or disdains the notion. A good example of the former (ignoring the subject) is the Diccionario de filosofía by Ferrater Mora (2009), which makes no mention of the term throughout its four volumes. Neither does the more recent and much more extensive (2800 articles) Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Craig 2000), which is even more surprising. As far as disdain is concerned, examples abound in both the juridical and the bioethical fields, the most eloquent of which could be the strident title of an article which Steven Pinker published in 2008: “The Stupidity of Dignity.”
Years, decades, even centuries go by and dignity continues to be ignored or seen as hollow and lacking any theoretical prestige. Though there has been a certain revival of interest in the concept of dignity over the past decade, particularly in a historical or applied context, it still remains to be defined and is still untouched by philosophical thought.
Perhaps this persistent omission is due to some characteristic that is inherent in the concept and which, if it is not allowed for, makes it unpalatable for philosophers. Petrarch, a fourteenth-century Latinist and humanist, refers to this elusive nature of