This book was completed during the summer of 2021. Since that time, there have been a number of significant developments, many of which (like the US–UK–Australia nuclear submarine deal and Xi Jinping’s recent crackdown on China’s high-tech giants) are not discussed here. Between the writing of this preface (in the fall of 2021) and the publication of the book (spring 2022), there will no doubt be other noteworthy incidents and occurrences.
That said, the overall trajectory of events is already quite clear and, at least for the foreseeable future, nothing seems likely to deflect it. China is moving towards deepening political repression, expanded economic statism, and a more aggressive posture towards the United States, its partners and allies. Albeit belatedly and with an as yet insufficient sense of urgency and common purpose, the democracies have begun to face up to these facts and the dangers they pose, and to start the painful process of hammering out new policies with which to meet them. What remains to be seen is whether they can do so quickly enough to deter overt aggression while better defending their societies and economies against the subtler threats of penetration, manipulation, and exploitation.
As regards China, what has happened over the last several months is consistent with the broad patterns described here and with the overarching explanation offered for them. At home, the Chinese Communist Party brooks no opposition to its rule, claims for itself the authority to exert control over every aspect of social, political, and economic life, and uses that control to tighten its grip on its citizens and to build up the nation’s coercive power on the world stage. Xi Jinping’s recent directives extending ideological indoctrination down to the primary school level, cracking down on video games and pop culture, and reining in Alibaba, Tencent, and other nominally private companies are merely the latest manifestations of the normal functioning of China’s Leninist political system.
Similarly, Beijing’s stepped-up military pressure on Taiwan, dramatic test of a new type of hypersonic missile, and strikingly confrontational approach to dealing with a freshly elected US administration represent a continuation of trends that have become unmistakable over the course of the last two decades. As their assessments of China’s relative strength have grown more positive, its leaders have pushed harder and more openly to reshape the world in ways intended to insure the longevity of their regime, first by reestablishing their country as the dominant state in eastern Eurasia, and ultimately by displacing the United States as the preponderant global power.
In his first year in office, Joe Biden sought to shed some of the crude and counterproductive aspects of Donald Trump’s approach to dealing with China. As of this writing, however, Biden has continued in many respects to follow the main lines of policy laid down by his predecessor. At least in theory, his administration has accepted the need to reexamine the assumptions underpinning the entire US–China economic relationship, leaving in place for the moment most of the tariffs, export controls, and investment regulations that it inherited and even adding a few of its own. Top officials have also stressed the importance of shoring up the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, both by strengthening US military capabilities and by working with allies and partners in the region and beyond.
Together with these positive indications, however, there are also some worrying signs.
Despite growing recognition of the harmful effects of China’s predatory trade and industrial policies, there appears still to be hope in some quarters that these can be changed through the patient application of mild pressure and a few more rounds of what the chief US trade negotiator recently described as “frank conversations” with her counterparts in Beijing.1 While Biden’s advisors struggle to formulate an economic strategy that better serves the nation as a whole, an assortment of industrial and financial groups are hard at work defending their particular interests, lobbying Congress and the executive branch to roll back some if not all of the restrictions put in place over the last several years, and urging Washington to get back to business as usual. Governments in all of the advanced democracies face similar pressures.
Having acknowledged the centrality of an intensifying military rivalry with China, the Biden administration has thus far been reluctant to make the public case for increasing defense budgets rather than holding them steady. This will become even more important as non-defense spending soars and debt rises. The absence of a clearly articulated and widely shared assessment of the nature and severity of the challenge has also contributed to problems in rallying support from other countries for a more unified effort to balance China’s rising power and counter its growing influence. Beijing’s heightened belligerence and Cold War-style “rocket rattling” seem intended in part to intimidate the democracies and discourage closer collaboration among them.
Instead of sounding the alarm, at least some in the new administration have appeared overly eager to improve the tenor of diplomatic exchanges with Beijing, and unduly optimistic about their ability to disaggregate the overall relationship into clearly delineated areas of cooperation and competition. The notion that the two powers can somehow agree on the rules of a more-or-less stable and “responsible” rivalry without first passing through a period of heightened tension and danger understates the intensity of the ideological and geopolitical forces at play.2
All of these concerns point to a deeper problem. Most Western observers now recognize that, despite years of intensive engagement, China today is far from the liberal, open, market-oriented, status quo power that many had expected to emerge. But acknowledging what China is not, and coming fully to grips with what it has in fact become, are two very different things. Without an adequate understanding of why past policies failed to transform the nation’s Leninist political system, and absent a realistic assessment of its current strengths, weaknesses, and intentions, the United States and its allies will struggle to devise effective counter-strategies. Persistent illusions about the depths of the regime’s determination, the extent of its capacity for brutality, and the scope of its ambitions will result in more inadequate half-measures and more lost time. For the better part of the past thirty years, the democracies have gotten China wrong. They can no longer afford that luxury.
Aaron L. Friedberg
Princeton, New Jersey
October 2021
1 1. Remarks as Prepared for Delivery of Ambassador Katherine Tai Outlining the Biden–Harris Administration’s “New Approach to the US–China Trade Relationship,” October 4, 2021.
2 2. “Readout of National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s Meeting with Politburo Member Yang Jiechi,” October 4, 2021.
Acknowledgements
My thanks to Louise Knight of Polity Press for suggesting that I write a book on this topic. Louise and Inès Boxman were helpful and encouraging at every step along the way. Justin Dyer edited the manuscript with a deft touch. Margaret Commander found documents, tracked down citations, and generated graphs with alacrity and precision.
I am extremely grateful to Jacqueline Deal, Richard Ellings, James Mann, Stephen Rosen, Gabriel Schoenfeld, David Shambaugh, and Julian Snelder for taking the time to read the manuscript closely and for providing insightful comments and detailed suggestions. Needless to say, I alone am responsible for any errors of fact or interpretation that remain.
Most of all, I thank Nadège Rolland for her careful reading of every draft, for her help in locating and translating a number of Chinese sources, and for her enduring love, patient encouragement, and unstinting support in all things. I am the luckiest of men.
Portions of Chapter 6 draw from Aaron L. Friedberg, “An Answer to Aggression,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 2020), pp. 150–64. Adapted by permission of Foreign Affairs. Copyright 2020 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. www.ForeignAffairs.com.