“Facebook-friendly” is a phrase we increasingly see in corporate policies and codes of conduct these days. The surfing of one's social media posts, and even one's browsing histories, has become a standard and important element of prescreening procedures for job placement, admission to schools or training programs, or acceptance into government or military service. Such private postings on the public web are also becoming routine elements in employment termination actions. The boundary between “public” and “private” keeps moving, and it moves because of the ways we think about the information, not because of the information technologies themselves.
GDPR and other data protection regulations require business leaders, directors, and owners to make clear to customers and employees what data they collect and what they do with it, which in turn implements the separation of that data into public and private data. As an SSCP, you'll probably not make specific determinations as to whether certain kinds of data are public or private; but you should be familiar with your organization's privacy policies and its procedures for carrying out its data protection responsibilities. Many of the information security measures you will help implement, operate, and maintain are vital to keeping the dividing line between public and private data clear and bright.
Privacy versus Security, or Privacy and Security
It is interesting to see how the Global War on Terror has transformed attitudes about privacy throughout the Western world. Prior to the 1990s, most Westerners felt quite strongly about their individual rights to privacy; they looked at government surveillance as intrusive and relied upon legal protections to keep it in check. “That's none of your business” was often the response when a nosy neighbor or an overly zealous official tried to probe too far into what citizens considered as private matters. This agenda changed in 2001 and 2002, as national security communities in the United States and its NATO allies complained bitterly that legal constraints on intelligence gathering, information sharing, and search and seizure hampered their efforts to detect and prevent acts of terrorism. “What have you got to hide,” instead, became the common response by citizens when other citizens sought to protect the idea of privacy.
It is important to realize several key facets of this new legal regime for the 21st century. Fundamentally, it uses the idea that international organized crime, including the threat of terrorism, is the fundamental threat to the citizens of law-abiding nations. These new legal systems require significant information sharing between nations, their national police and law enforcement agencies, and international agencies such as the OECD and Interpol, while also strengthening the ability of these agencies to shield or keep secret their demands for information. This sea change in international governance started with the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, known as the USA PATRIOT Act. This law created the use of National Security Letters (NSLs) as classified, covert ways to demand information from private businesses. The use of NSLs is overseen by the highly secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which had its powers and authorities strengthened by this Act as well. Note that if your boss or a company officer is served with an NSL demanding certain information, they cannot disclose or divulge to anyone the fact that they have been served with such a due process demand. International laws regarding disclosure and reporting of financial information, such as bank transactions, invoices and receipts for goods, and property purchases, are also coming under increasing scrutiny by governments.
It's not the purpose of this chapter to frame that debate or argue one way or another about it. It is, however, important that you as an information security specialist within your organization recognize that this debate is not resolved and that many people have strongly held views about it. Those views often clash with legal and regulatory requirements and constraints regarding monitoring of employee actions in the workplace, the use of company information or information systems by employees (or others), and the need to be responsive to digital discovery requests of any and every kind. Those views and those feelings may translate into actions taken by some end users and managers who are detrimental to the organization, harmful to others, illegal, unethical, or all of these to a degree. Such actions—or the failure to take or effectively perform actions that are required—can also compromise the overall information security posture of the organization and are an inherent risk to information security, as well as to the reputation of the organization internally and externally.
Your best defense—and your best strategy for defending your company or your organization—is to do as much as you can to ensure the full measure of CIANA+PS protections, including accountability, for all information and information systems within your areas of responsibilities.
Nonrepudiation
The fundamental design of the earliest internetworking protocols meant that, in many cases, the sender had no concrete proof that the recipient actually received what was sent. Contrast this with postal systems worldwide, which have long used the concept of registered mail to verify to the sender that the recipient or his agent signed for and received the piece of mail on a given date and time. Legal systems have relied for centuries on formally specified ways to serve process upon someone. Both of these mechanisms protect the sender's or originator's rights and the recipient's rights: Both parties have a vested interest in not being surprised by claims by the other that something wasn't sent, wasn't done, or wasn't received. This is the basis of the concept of nonrepudiation, which is the aspect of a system that prevents a party or user from denying that they took an action, sent a message, or received a message. Nonrepudiation does not say that the recipient understood what you sent or that they agreed with it, only that they received it.
NOTE You can think of nonrepudiation as being similar to submitting your income tax return every year or the many other government-required filings that we all must make no matter where we live or do business. Sometimes, the only way we can keep ourselves from harm is by being able to prove that we sent it in on time and that the government received it on time.
Email systems have been notorious for not providing reliable confirmation of delivery and receipt. Every email system has features built into it that allow senders and server administrators to control whether read receipts or delivery confirmations work reliably or correctly. Email threads can easily be edited to show almost anything in terms of sender and recipient information; attachments to emails can be modified as well. In short, off-the-shelf email systems do not provide anything that a court of law or an employment relations tribunal will accept as proof of what an email user claims it is.
Business cannot function that way. The transition from postal delivery of paper to electronic delivery of transactions brought many of the same requirements for nonrepudiation into your web-enabled e-business systems. What e-business and e-commerce did not do a very good job of was bringing that same need for nonrepudiation to email.
There are a number of commercial products that act as add-ons, extensions, or major enhancements to email systems that provide end-to-end, legally compliant, evidence-grade proof regarding the sending and receiving of email. A number of national postal systems around the world have started to package these systems as their own government-endorsed email version of registered postal mail. Many industry-facing vertical platforms embed these nonrepudiation features into the ways that they handle transaction processing, rendering reams of fax traffic, uncontrollable emails, or even postal mail largely obsolete.
Systems with high degrees of nonrepudiation are in essence systems that are auditable and that are restricted to users who authenticate themselves prior to each use; they also tend to be systems with strong data integrity, privacy, or confidentiality protection built into them. Using these systems improves the organization's bottom