Criticisms of Reactance
The theory of psychological reactance has been criticized on a number of grounds. First, the theory is difficult to falsify. The emphasis of research has been on situational reactance, with experimental conditions set up to create threats to freedom. Inconsistent findings are easily explained by reference to the situation rather than an exploration of the theory to identify theoretical problems. The lack of explicitly stated propositions and hypotheses provides further insulation of the theory from the systematic assaults of science. However, other theories such as Freud’s psychoanalytical theory and Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory have also been criticized on these grounds.
Second, the concept of reactance is a scientifically vague concept. There is tremendous latitude left to the interpretation of exactly what behavior is reactance or non-reactance.
Premised on the concept of reactance, the magnitude of reactance is discussed. The concept of magnitude assumes some kind of scale or degree distinction between one level of reactance and another. Exactly how to evaluate the magnitude of reactance is not stated in the theory. Therefore, the concept of magnitude of reactance has two ambiguous terms which have implications for scientific measurement of the concept. Reactance cannot be physically observed but is inferred from measures of indicators of reactance which vary from study to study. Third, the theory is parsimonious and can, therefore, explain a wide range of behavior in a variety of social settings. A theory with such versatility loses its efficacy in explaining and creates a diminishing level of confidence.
Fourth, reactance theory is not designed to assess the dynamism of social interaction and exchanges in the movement toward reduction of the psychological tension and achievement of equilibrium. Freedom can only be threatened by a powerful other. The exchanges and power dynamics in reasserting one’s freedom are not examined or articulated in the theory. The magnitude of reactance, the persistence of reduction, the kinds of reduction strategies, and the acceptance or removal of threat to freedom can all be better comprehended if an analysis of the power dynamics complements the theory.
Fifth, the psychological processes involved in internalizing free behaviors are not articulated by the theory (Wicklund, 1997). This is an assumption, a given, at the core of the theory. An elaboration of the dynamics involved in the development of free behaviors will provide a profound understanding of the processes involved in reactance. The cultural contexts and their contribution to one’s sense of freedom need elaboration via cross-cultural research.
Sixth, is reactance a behavioral attempt to demonstrate and project an impression of autonomy and power to others in the interaction situation? In other words, is there a distinction between impression management and reactance? Heilman and Toffler (1976), for example, argue that reduction of reactance was a direct function of balance of power, or the impression of it, in interaction. Baer et al.’s (1980) findings support the view that there is a greater concern with demonstrating the possession of a freedom than concern about the removal of the freedom. Wright and Brehm (1982, p. 616) in being critical of the impression management explanation of reactance, write:
In summary, then, the impression management explanation of reactance, in contrast to reactance theory, predicts no effects when (a) threats to freedom are nonsocial or social threats are unintentional, (b) subjects’ responses are private (nobody who has witnessed the threat will see them, or subjects’ responses cannot be traced back to them individually), and (c) freedom restoration occurs without the agent or an observer being aware of it. We believe that it is doubtful that reactance effects can best be understood as a manifestation of impression management.
Seventh, reactance theory places great emphasis on the cognitive, but minimal emphasis is given to the affect state. The next section proposes the introduction of the affect state into the theory of psychological reactance.
Toward an Affect Arousal Reactance Theory
Philip Cowan, in his preface to Piaget’s Intelligence and Affectivity (1981, p. xi), wrote:
Affect is likened to the gasoline that activates the car, while the engine (cognition) provides structure for the energy and direction of the car’s motion. Affect as “energetics” can combine with cognitive structural schemes to focus the individual’s interest on a specific thing or idea.
Because it influences an individual choice of whether to exert intellectual effort, affect serves as a regulator of action. Because it influences the choice of specific goals, affect also plays a role in determining values (internal interest projected outward so that things and people appear to have a certain worth). By regulating action and determining values, affect influences our tendency to approach or avoid situations.
An understanding of human affect (i.e., emotions and moods) in influencing the magnitude of psychological reactance is crucial to the development of reactance theory, which has comfortably maintained itself as a purely cognitive theory over the last fifty years. Emotions are intense with a relatively short duration, and the cause of the emotion, normally, can be identified. Unlike emotions, moods are lower in intensity and are more enduring. Emotions may influence moods and affect states (George & Jones, 1997; Papousek et al., 2008). Even though reactance theory can be classified within an appraisal theory of emotions, the literature has consistently focused on a cognitive model in the application of the theory. The degree of psychological reactance is moderated by the particular affect state aroused as a result of the cognitive evaluation of a particular threat to freedom. The degree of reactance, therefore, is a function of affect arousal, which, in turn, is influenced by the specific emotion or affect state provoked.
Reactance is unpleasant, and therefore will provoke negative emotions (i.e., primary and secondary) such as frustration, shame, fear, anger, sadness, guilt, contempt, and disgust (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 1987). Some important contributions to the understanding of affect states and emotions and the implications in reactance reduction provide a strong rationale for an Affect Arousal Reactance Theory (AART).
An emotion energizes and prepares the individual to respond and has at least four different aspects – feelings, actions, physiological arousal, and motivational programs (Frijda, 1993; Rosenzweig et al., 2005). As Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (2009) recognize (also see Lazarus, 1991; Rosenberg, 1998), an emotion involves cognitive appraisal, subjective experience, thought-action tendencies, internal bodily changes, and facial expression. Plutchik (1994) identifies eight basic emotions. These emotions are arranged in pairs of opposites: joy/sadness, affection/disgust, anger/fear, and expectation/surprise. However, Smith and Ellsworth (1985) argued earlier that comparing emotions in such pairs is somewhat problematic since, for example, joy is a positive emotion and sadness a negative one, but both anger and fear are negative emotions – these pairs do not exist in comparable continuums from positive to negative but are typologies. Smith and Ellsworth (1985) utilized six dimensions in the description of 15 emotions (primary and secondary emotions). These dimensions are: desirability of the situation (pleasant or unpleasant); anticipated effort in the situation (low effort or high effort); situational certainty (certain or uncertain); attentional activity to the situation (low attention to high attention); degree of control over the situation (self or others); and control attributed to the situation (situational control and human control).
Therefore, emotions (e.g., anger and frustration) would vary depending on the dimensions that are involved in determining the particular emotion.
A major conclusion drawn from their study was (p. 831):
Our results show that people’s emotions are intimately related to their cognitive appraisals of their circumstances. The subjects rated past emotional experiences along six appraisal dimensions, and different patterns of appraisals were strongly associated with different emotions.
Zajonc (1980) puts another light on the expression of emotions. He argues that there are emotions that are grounded on cognitive appraisal (postcognitive emotions) and emotions that emerge before cognitions (precognitive emotions).
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