The theory makes a number of assumptions about human behavior. Brehm (1966, p. 1) notes the following about human behavior: First, freedom of behavior is pervasive. Second, it is an essential aspect of human interaction and living. Third, human beings are goal-oriented and incessantly reflect on themselves and the external environment in assessing what, how, and when they will undertake particular behaviors. He states: “They consider their wants and needs, the dangers and benefits available in their surroundings, and the ways in which they can accomplish various ends” (1966, p. 1).
Many times people undertake behaviors when they are not fully aware of the rationale that drives the behaviors. At other times behaviors are performed while they are fully aware of constraints and lack of freedom in the performance of the behaviors. As a fourth assumption, however, Brehm assumes that most of the time human beings feel relatively free to participate in a range of behaviors.
Fifth, the theory assumes that people engage in or intend to engage in a set of behaviors. These behaviors have been engaged in in the past, are engaged in in the present, and will be engaged in in the future. He refers to such behaviors as the individual’s “free behaviors” and identifies a number of criteria to define a behavior as a free behavior. These include the behaviors being practically achievable, the individual having the physical and psychological capacity to engage in these behaviors, and individuals also being fully cognizant that they can participate in these behaviors. Such awareness of engagement emerges from social norms, customs, legislations, and other kinds of formal agreement and informal interaction. Worchel (2004) elaborates on how particular actions over time are perceived as free behavior. For reactance to occur, an individual must believe in the possession (perceived or actual) of a freedom (Miron & Brehm, 2006). A threat to this freedom creates the arousal – psychological reactance.
Threat
A threat emerges from any power or force that attempts to reduce or eliminate the expression of a specific freedom (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Threats can be explicit or implicit (i.e., subtle by implication). Brehm and Brehm (1981) describe threats to freedom as either external or internal. Internal threats arise out of choices and decisions we make from alternatives, accepting and rejecting among options. On the other hand, external threats have two dimensions – impersonal versus personal and social versus nonsocial. Impersonal threats are not easily perceived, unlike personal threats in which motives and intentions of threats can be identified and have implications for the perception of future threats. Specifically, personal threats will carry more significant consequences for future threats from the same source because of possible future interaction. Impersonal threats, however, create less reactance arousal since they are not directly focused on the individual, and therefore no implications for future threats. However, the term personal, as Brehm and Brehm (1981) indicate, not only refers to interaction with known others but can apply to infrequent interaction with an unfamiliar entity/person.
Impersonal threats can also be derived from persons or institutions that we interact with on a personal level, for example, working for a large corporation or governmental organization. An impersonal threat from such an organization is not directed toward a specific individual, but any threat to freedom would have consequences to individuals in the organization. The depth of future interaction with a threatening source is an important prediction of psychological reactance. Brehm and Brehm (1981) postulate that anticipation of future interaction with a threatening source is likely to increase psychological reactance compared to anticipation that there will be minimal or no future interaction with a threatened source.
Another dimension of threat that Brehm and Brehm (1981) identify is the social versus nonsocial dimension. However, they also postulate that nonsocial exists in degrees, since humans are social and reactance emerges from social interaction, and there will be social interpretations of nonsocial dimensions. The source of threat can emanate from either level. Studies that consider the social dimension expose participants to a socially threatening situation (e.g., one individual directly threatens the freedom of another). The non-social studies created threats via nonsocial interaction (e.g., barriers to toys, removal of choice alternatives).
Magnitude of Reactance
Psychological reactance is influenced by both threat and freedom (Wright et al., 2004). The theory postulates that there are several factors that influence the magnitude of psychological reactance. These include the strength of the threat to one’s freedom; the presence of freedom which emerges from the interruption of free behaviors or barriers preventing their expression; the importance of freedom in the realization of needs; and the extent to which the needs are core to the individual’s existence. There is a direct relationship between reactance and the importance of the threatened. For example, being forced to choose between two valueless alternatives will not create as high a psychological reactance as being forced to choose between attractive alternatives. The relative importance of the freedom, and not only the importance, is a determining factor of reactance. For example, if choice alternatives are of equal cost (e.g., the choice alternative of dining at similar kinds of restaurants), removal of one alternative or the other will lead to relatively the same degree of reactance. However, if the choice alternative included a high-end computer and this alternative was denied, the magnitude of psychological reactance would be relatively much higher because of the relatively higher attractiveness of the computer.
The proportion of threatened freedoms, that is the number of free behaviors at risk as a proportion of the number of free behaviors, influences the magnitude of reactance. Threats that have implications for future threats to free behavior also arouse reactance (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Miron & Brehm, 2006; Wicklund, 1974). Threats may be defined or arbitrary. Defined and specific threats have limits to the threats and are justified (e.g., the denial of entry to any vehicles other than taxis into a particular roadway). This restriction to a free behavior has a physical limit and a rationale that allows for the reduction of traffic congestion. Arbitrary threats are ill-defined (e.g., an office imposing restrictions on casual conversations during working hours). This kind of threat carries high ambiguity and leads to extrapolations and speculations about different kinds of future prohibitions and restrictions. The magnitude of reactance will, therefore, be higher for arbitrary threats than defined threats.
Brehm and Brehm (1981) discuss the aggregated impact of a number of sub-threshold threats from a source that, when collectively combined, is potent enough to be considered a threat to one’s freedom. Each sub-threat on its own does not have the efficacy to constitute a threat. Threats reach an optimum point. Brehm and Brehm (1981, p. 58) write about the threshold of freedom elimination which exists when the “perceived magnitude of threat overshadows the perceived importance of freedom,” and about the optimum point of a threat: “the point at which a threat turns into an elimination of freedom is the point at which the magnitude of reactance is greatest. Additional force (and perceived threat) beyond that point has no effect on the magnitude of reactance.”
The importance of the freedom moderates reactance. In other words, the threat in itself does not produce the psychological reactance. For example, threats to freedoms of low importance, even with high-level threats, would create low levels of arousal and nonexpression of the freedom. However, freedoms of high importance lead to higher reactance with a motivation to express the threatened freedom.
The magnitude of the threat is influenced by the number of freedoms threatened by one or more factors. Time is a moderator here. Reasonable time lapses between one threat and another prime the person to a second threat, and reactance is increased as compared to two or more threats being experienced simultaneously. Primed persons are more likely to express greater psychological reactance (Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Miron & Brehm, 2006). Wicklund (1974) postulates the hydraulic