The Coming of Rome and the Early Provincia Syria
This crisis of royal authority led to an increase in the general insecurity, to the point where the inhabitants of Antioch, as well as those in other cities, sought out effective protectors. Those in Damascus thought they found one in Aretas III of Nabataea, whose kingdom extended all the way to the Hauran, and who occupied the Damascus region (84–72 BCE) to counter the threats of Ptolemy son of Mennaeus, the brigand chief who dominated the interior of Lebanon. The inhabitants of Antioch sought a protector further afield: they did not hesitate to ask Tigranes of Armenia to take control of the entire kingdom, which he did without major difficulties (only Seleucia in Pieria remained impenetrable to him) starting in 83 BCE. Rome could not have been happy to see the son-in-law of her main enemy, Mithridates VI Eupator, king of Pontus, burst into Syria at the very moment she was fighting against the king. But Rome did not have the means to lead both combats at the same time and was obliged to let Tigranes act. Tigranes nevertheless was forced to leave Syria when Lucullus waged war on Armenia (69 BCE). Two Seleucid offspring, Philip II and Antiochus XIII, took advantage of this to reestablish their own power and restart a fratricidal war. The anarchy in Syria seemed destined to begin again.
This is when Pompey intervened. At first, provided with an extraordinary command against the pirates who infested the entire Mediterranean (lex Gabinia, 67 BCE), Pompey had full power on the sea and over a wide strip of the coast. He took action against the brigands, notably in Cilicia and in Phoenicia. But as the commands held by Lucullus were gradually taken away from him, it allowed Mithridates VI of Pontus to reconquer a part of the lost territories. In the winter of 67–66 BCE, Pompey was entrusted by the lex Manilia with the command of the Roman forces against the king of Pontus and, after driving Mithridates out of Anatolia and gaining the submission of Tigranes, Pompey turned to Syria where his legates had already arrived ahead of him. He decided to return land to those who had chased off Tigranes from possessing the country, not to those who had fled and shown themselves to be incapable of fighting against him. So Pompey decided to depose two Seleucid kinglets (Sampsigeramos of Emesa quickly got rid of Antiochus XIII who had taken refuge near him, while Philip II managed to escape from Azizos of Aleppo before being killed, probably during a riot in Antioch) and reduce all that was left of the kingdom to a Roman province.
The new province totally lacked geographic unity, since it essentially brought together the cities and allowed most of the principalities that had sprung up over time to remain. If some brigand chiefs had their heads chopped off (Dionysius of Byblos, the Jewish Silas in Lysias in the Apamena), other dynasts saved their lives and their states by handing over large sums to Pompey (Ptolemy son of Mennaeus) or his legates (Aretas III of Nabataea to Aemilius Scaurus in 62 BCE), or simply because their effective power sheltered them from a Roman military intervention (Abgar II in Edessa, Antiochus I of Commagene, Sampsigeramos in Arethusa). The province presented a strong geographic discontinuity: it consisted of most of North Syria (except the mountainous zones), the Lebanese coast (but not the inland area), and cities dispersed across southern Syria (Damascus, Canatha), Transjordan (most of the cities known as the Decapolis), Galilee (Scythopolis), and even the southern part of Palestine (Gaza). The Hasmonean and Nabataean kingdoms had sworn their allegiance, at least formally. As such, directly or indirectly, all of Syria had become Roman.
The Euphrates marked the edge of the Parthian Empire; neither Sulla’s meeting with the Parthian ambassador of Mithridates II (92 BCE), nor the agreement between Lucullus and Phraates III (70 BCE), renewed in 66 BCE by Pompey and the Parthian leaders, challenged this line of demarcation that was implicitly acknowledged by all. Yet the tension between the two empires remained strong, as neither had renounced the possibility of expanding beyond the line. Although the precise reasons are unknown, but perhaps due to the fear of a Parthian offensive, the Senate entrusted Aulus Gabinius, governor of Syria (57–55 BCE), with the mission of preparing to wage war against them. Although he started a campaign in 55 BCE, Gabinius quickly abandoned this objective in order to reinstate Ptolemy XII to his throne in Alexandria in exchange for a large sum of money. The mission to fight against the Parthians was therefore taken up by his successor in charge of Syria, Marcus Licinius Crassus, named proconsul for five years. Contrary to the theory that for a long time successfully maligned the triumvirate with hostile propaganda, Crassus did not undertake his expedition against the Parthians without orders from the Senate. Nevertheless, underprepared and poorly led, this expedition ended in disaster at Carrhae-Harran (53 BCE) where the principal leaders lost their lives along with 20,000 Roman soldiers, not counting the many prisoners.
The immediate consequence for the Roman province of Syria was a Parthian invasion, with two successive sieges of Antioch in 51 BCE and then in the winter of 51/50 BCE C. Cassius Longinus, one of the survivors of Carrhae, managed to defeat the Parthians (the victory of Antigonea on 7 October 51 BCE), although the enemy did not leave the region. Thanks to the energy of the new governor of Syria, M. Porcius Bibulus, the Parthians were pushed out and Syria was once again Roman (end of 50 BCE).
The Near East during the Civil War
During this time, the organization of Judaea continued to preoccupy the Romans. Pompey had found the country to be deeply divided between the legitimate heir of Alexander Jannaeus (102–76 BCE), Hyrcanus II, who was king and high priest; his younger brother Aristobulus II who contested his brother’s kingly title; and a part of the Jews who wanted neither of them. After the capture of Jerusalem and the Temple in 63 BCE, held by Aristobulus II, Pompey and his successors tried several approaches: Pompey first supported Hyrcanus as sole leader after having significantly reduced the reach of Hyrcanus’s kingdom (almost all the Greek cities along the coast and in Transjordan were taken from the king), then Gabinius divided the country into five autonomous districts, leaving Hyrcanus with only the great pontificate. No real end to the unrest was achieved, but it clearly appeared that the true leader of Judaea from then on was Hyrcanus’s mentor Antipater from Idumaea, assisted by his two sons Phasael and Herod; all three men had become loyal allies of Rome.
Even before the assassination of Caesar (March of 44 BCE), Syria was divided between those who supported Caesar and those who opposed him. In 49 BCE, Pompey’s father-in-law, Metellus Scipio, had been given the government of Syria, which he pillaged in every possible way in order to outfit a fleet for the benefit of his son-in-law. After Pompey’s death (48 BCE), having resolved the situation in Egypt (the war in Alexandria where he received effective help from most of the Syrian client princes), Caesar crossed Syria to fight Mithridates VI Eupator’s son Pharnaces, who had taken up arms against Rome in Anatolia. Caesar took advantage of the opportunity to free Antioch (47 BCE) and bestow some gifts upon that city. Despite this, conflicts still arose between those who supported Caesar (Sextus Julius Caesar, governor of Syria, was assassinated and replaced by Cornelius Dolabella) and those who supported Pompey (Q. Caecilius Bassus). After Caesar’s death, one of the “Liberators,” C. Cassus Longinus, succeeded in establishing himself in Antioch and then controlling most of Syria. That allowed one of the conspirators, Labienus, to get help from the Parthians. When the Parthian troops finally arrived, the cause of the “liberators” was already lost since Cassius and Brutus had been routed at the