Politics of Disinformation. Группа авторов. Читать онлайн. Newlib. NEWLIB.NET

Автор: Группа авторов
Издательство: John Wiley & Sons Limited
Серия:
Жанр произведения: Социальная психология
Год издания: 0
isbn: 9781119743316
Скачать книгу

      From a broader perspective, low-quality content generates data-as-capital as well as reliable information as long as it can attract users (Graham 2017). Under platform guidance, the trustworthiness of the testifier (e.g. journalistic or scientific sources) is irrelevant to the capital accumulation cycle. Social media affordances positively reward content that can trigger high user engagement by sharing, comments, and reaction rates, despite the absence of any informative value. Often this content falls under compelling stories with dramatic appeal. It is for this reason that Nieborg and Poell (2018, p. 9) state, “publishers pursuing platform-oriented distribution strategies are subject to strong direct network effects, as platform sharing practices and algorithmic curation tend to favor viral content.” That is, even when news organizations enter the digital sphere controlled by platform companies, they are subjected to the same productive logic (Bell and Owen 2017).

      More recently (specifically in 2016), Facebook has subtly accepted its editorial role, outsourcing its moderation activities by establishing partnerships with independent fact-checking organizations worldwide to check flagged content that spreads on its platform. Suspicious claims detected as disinformation have their reach diminished and are linked to verification texts written by professional fact-checkers. Not coincidentally, in the same year, Google also launched its program to improve the ranking of fact-checking content in search results and Google News (Graves and Anderson 2020). However, above all, these initiatives are an institutional response of the companies to their alleged improper influence in Western democracies’ elections and referendums. With these programs, they can argue that they are making all feasible efforts to fight fake news, sidestepping discussion of their business models by calling on the principle of journalistic “independence.” As a result, as Nicey and Bigot (2020) have argued, fact-checking organizations have gradually redirected their activities to the very agenda of junk news, which has systematically come up on the digital platforms.

      In addition, several news organizations started employing the same techniques that fake news sites use to attract their audience as soon as they realized the economic logic of platform companies (e.g. “clickbait” stories, Search Engine Optimization techniques). Therefore, low-quality information can spread sufficiently fast to maintain the circulation of data and its subsequent value extraction. In the news media, scholarly literature highlights how the downsizing of newsrooms is one of the outcomes of this new business logic (Figaro et al. 2015). Consequently, reduced staff limits the quality of articles written by the remaining journalists. Besides, the news industry is gradually submitting to social media affordances, unbundling articles to distribute them on many platforms as possible (Bell and Owen 2017). As a result, journalists are increasingly specialized in data analytics to develop strategies to split news stories into attractive formats to “adequately respond to [the] evolving interests of platform users” (Nieborg and Poell 2018, p. 13).

      We could add to this picture that previous fake news depended on the press to gain traction. Misleading stories must be printed by some organizations to circulate in the public sphere. In addition, newspapers were inserted into the former capitalist accumulation model as cultural commodities exchanged for profit making. From a materialist standpoint, we could summarize this previous logic of capital circulation as follows: “the cycle of consumption is motivated by the use-value of a commodity, and it is completed when money is turned into a commodity” (Sadowski 2019, p. 3). Since the use-value of modern newspapers was gradually associated with their public reliability (as we mentioned previously), the continuous publication of fictional stories was not suitable for the news industry. Only tabloid-style newspapers (also known in the US as the “penny press”) were successful in publishing low-quality articles at the expense of their credibility.

      Since the present capital accumulation cycle is marked by data extraction, even cultural commodities are valued by their modularization to platform monetization. As publishers gradually become content developers (Nieborg and Poell 2018), cultural production is now dependent on the data-driven process. The very agenda of digital news platforms is often based on “trending social media topics and popular search terms” (Nieborg and Poell 2018, p. 2). However, even with reduced staff, news organizations have infrastructural costs that fake news producers can simply bypass. Producers of misleading stories can quickly launch a site that mimics the legacy media format, fill it with programmatic advertising banners, and attract the audience via an initial investment in click farms and bots that boost traffic to their web pages.

      Moreover, sometimes, fake news may be more appealing than stories from legitimized testifiers since their producers’ primary concern is the fabrication of content with the best viral impact. Consequently, disinformation frequently generates more data to keep the capital accumulation cycle in place. For this reason, the current surge in fake news could be seen as an unforeseen consequence of our prevalent value-creation logic that will probably not be constrained in upcoming years.

      Conclusion