In this context, one should remember the so-called “Gerasimov Doctrine” when the article by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the RF, First Deputy Defence Minister, Valery Gerasimov, published in February 2013 with the title “The Value of Science Is in Prediction,” in which he presented the concept of “new-generation war,” was interpreted as a revolutionary military theory (Adamsky, 2015). In fact, it was the British political analyst Mark Galeotti who coined the term “Gerasimov Doctrine” as a title for his blog post, in which he published the article by the Russian top military officer. However, later Galeotti (2018) was genuinely surprised that people believed that the tough Chief of the General Staff rather than a theoretician had managed to conceive the doctrine and regretted that his “marketing stunt” had such unintended consequences.
By contrast, the American military expert Michael Kofman (2018) believes that the “Gerasimov Doctrine” is nothing but a myth and that no doctrine exists. In Kofman’s opinion, the article by Gerasimov “offers the interpretation of the American approach to political and military confrontation, which was perceived as formulating a new Russian doctrine of fighting the West.” Such reaction is quite typical of those politicians and members of the military who are looking for simple answers and noticeable details to explain what is going on, the researcher concludes.
The Deputy Director of the Polish Center for Eastern Studies, Jolanta Darczewska (2014), holds the same opinion, making a point that the Russian theory of information warfare has been developed in opposition to the existing concepts of new-generation warfare as a response to the activities against Russia.
This view is supported by the Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation, which mentions “the elaboration by a number of states of the concepts of information wars that envisage the creation of means of dangerous influence on the information spheres of other countries of the world” among other threats to the national security in the information sphere (Institute of Contemporary Development, 2016).
However, the discussion around the article by the Russian general is illustrative of both the relevance of the very phenomenon of new-type warfare and the range of terminological, legal, methodological, and other problems arising out of it. The advent of the information technology age, which has created unprecedented opportunities but, at the same time, caused unforeseen problems, has further complicated the situation. For example, historians have to adopt old research methods while being in entirely new conditions, such as working with sources that are continuously updated and under the ever-present threat of their immediate deletion. Therefore, on the one hand, scholars have to advance their research carefully, scrupulously gathering facts and developing new methods, but on the other hand, they have to adapt to new circumstances quickly. As the famous futurologist Bruce Sterling wittily put it, “by the time you legally define what a “browser” is, the “browser war” is all over.”
One of the least researched but the most popular in the entire range of new-type warfare issues is the role and place of the information component. Specifically, the problem of the use of social media by Russia in its war against Ukraine has been insufficiently studied, although the research into a local event makes it possible to reconstruct a comprehensive system of new techniques for information influence. From this perspective, the operation to annex the AR of Crimea is historically unprecedented. Moreover, the importance of new information and communication technologies is enshrined at the doctrinal level in the RF, and they are considered to be one of the basic “types of weapons,” independent and highly effective.
The updated National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020 (Kremlin, 2009), the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (Kremlin, 2014), and the document entitled Conceptual Views on the Activities of the Russian Armed Forces in the Information Space (Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, 2011) place emphasis on information confrontation capabilities for military-political purposes. Therefore, it is no coincidence that the Minister of Defence of the RF, Sergey Shoygu, called information another armed service while speaking to Russian journalists in 2015 (TV Centre, 2015). Similarly, the Swedish researcher on Russian propaganda war Ulrik Franke (2015) has acknowledged that Russia’s pattern of action during the illegal annexation of the AR of Crimea adhered quite closely to “the official characterisations of information warfare.”
Overall, a significant number of publications by Russian and Western authors are devoted to the main principles of information warfare and Russia’s approaches to it, the adoption of new technologies, and the expansion of the existing arsenal of information confrontation capabilities by the RF (Blank, 2016; Bratersky, 2014; Gerasimov, 2016; Holloway, 2017; Jones, 2014; Kapto, 2013; Kuralenko, 2012; Mandro & Gieber, 2017; Murphy, 2016; Naletov, 2012; Panarin, 2008; Patrushev, 2017; Turovskiy, 2016).
Perhaps for the first time, researchers have been given the opportunity to study the practical aspects of modern warfare comprehensively, which raises a whole series of questions about the definition of terms, the methodology of research, and conceptual approaches. For example, one of the least researched and the most difficult for studying is the issue of using information and communication technologies as one of the key elements in implementing the RF’s plans of external aggression. The magnitude of danger and the effectiveness of the information component of hybrid/nonlinear warfare have been demonstrated during the annexation of the AR of Crimea and the armed aggression in eastern Ukraine.
Almost all researchers recognise the role of social media as a crucial and state-of-the-art “type of weapons,” although it remains the least studied. The situation is complicated by the absence of methodologies for assessing the effectiveness of information influence, which hinders the objective analysis of the role and significance of social media in the Crimean events of 2014. At the same time, the recognition of the information component’s importance has become an indisputable imperative for a wide range of scientific studies. Considering the above, the research into the use of social media by the military-political leadership of the RF in the operation to annex the AR of Crimea is extremely relevant.
The main problem of the existing research on the topic done by national and foreign scholars is that these studies are too theoretical, rely on rather limited sources, tend to use overly general approaches and definitions, and repeat the same facts and conclusions. Consequently, a wide range of practical techniques and methods of Russian information influence have not received sufficient attention.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting the meticulous analysis of the theoretical foundations of the RF’s information warfare, as exemplified by its most revealing Crimean operation: the analysis of goals and objectives, the audience, channels, key themes, methods and techniques, psychological and manipulative techniques applied, the examples of falsification, and historical narratives used. All of this has made a significant contribution to history, psychology, sociology, public relations, information security, and military science.
However, in terms of applying information and communication technologies, the very techniques of their implementation are not elaborated upon: where, by whom, how, when, and in what way they were employed. As a rule, widely made assertions that Russia used social media extensively during the annexation of the AR of Crimea are insufficiently supported by facts. The real mechanism of the functioning of the Russian “information warfare machine” remains unstudied. Thus, the crimes of the Russian information aggression committed during the annexation of the AR of Crimea are not associated with any names and surnames, dates and places, conditions and reasons, which is important not only for the objectivity of scientific understanding of the problem but also for devising effective countermeasures and enabling Ukraine to file cases in international judicial and law enforcement institutions.
While agreeing with Yu. Fedorov (2016) who warns against excessive theorising and deflecting attention away from analysing Russia’s seizure of Crimea and the operation in eastern Ukraine, it’s worth noting that the difficulty of examining the information component of hybrid warfare is largely related to the novelty of the phenomenon. New situations put new issues on the agenda, which have not arisen before; therefore, there is no experience of solving these problems. A notable example is the emergence of a phenomenon that can be called an online mirage, i.e. the illusion of