The government instituted was monarchical, Hung-sui-tshuen (the Tien-wang) being the monarch; the other chiefs, titled Wang, bearing the same relation to him as royal princes, that E-ching-wang, the Prince of Kung, and the Soong-wang (one of the late Manchoo emperor's uncles) do to the Manchoo dynasty.
The five principal leaders, besides their rank of Prince, constituted both the Privy Council and Ministry. Six boards were formed, similar to those of Pekin, with an additional one for Foreign Affairs. Yang, the Eastern Prince, was appointed Prime Minister; Wei, the Northern Prince, President of the Board of War; Fung, the Southern Prince, of the Boards of Justice and Finance; Siau, the Western Prince, of the Civil Office Board and Ecclesiastic Court; and Shih, the Assistant-Prince, of the Board of Public Affairs and the Foreign Office.
The above arrangement was, however, subsequently altered, in consequence of the increasing extent of the revolution. The five princes then resigned their inferior appointments to others, continuing their duties as Privy Council to the Tien-wang, and Supreme Generalissimos of the five military divisions, into which their whole rule and territory were divided. Other chiefs were elected to the dignity of Wang, with a rank secondary to that of the Princes, and the whole formed a sort of parliament. All the important affairs of state, such as the military expeditions to be undertaken, plans of defence, &c., had first to receive the sanction of this parliament, and were then submitted to the Tien-wang for his approval. To a certain extent, the Tien-wang was despotic in his government, for nothing could be undertaken without his special sanction. This rule, although supreme, was still far from constituting a despotism; and the ultimate decisions vested in him, have, singularly enough, never created dissension in council. This is to be accounted for not only by the fact that his subjects regarded him as endowed with theocratical attributes, but also to the wisdom of his mandates.
As it was impossible, during their belligerent state, to give full effect to their Civil Boards or officials, the whole system of government resolved itself into a military one, pending such time as peace should be obtained, when they would be at leisure to cultivate the arts and sciences, and form a legislature upon an entirely civil basis.
The occupation of Nankin has proved fatal to the success of the Ti-pings hitherto. Insurrection, of whatever kind, to be successful, must never relinquish the aggressive movement; directly it acts upon the defensive, unless possessing some wonderful organization, its power is broken. The principal element of revolutionary success is rapidity of action, and when once this is forsaken, the consolidated strength of an established constitution is advantageously brought to bear against rebellion.
The Tien-wang, by settling down at Nankin and commencing to defend his position, committed a vital error, and one that lost him the empire. If, instead of so doing, and affording his enemies time to rally and recover from their wild panic, and concentrate their forces, he had aimed at the one terminal point, Pekin, beyond all doubt, the very éclat of his victorious march would have carried him with an almost resistless triumph into possession of the capital, and the consequent destruction of the Manchoo dynasty would have given him the empire. The very fact that for years afterwards, in spite of this unfavourable re-action, the Ti-pings have been enabled, not only to hold their own against the Imperialists, but to have utterly crushed them—had it not been for the intervention of England—proves how easily they might have followed up their first advantages.
Two courses were open to the Ti-pings, either of which, judging by their career, would have led to the extinction of the oppressive Manchoo rule. The first was, without a pause, to have continued their march upon Pekin, abandoning each city as they seized it, and while enriching themselves from the captured stores and treasuries, and strengthening their forces by the crowds of discontented wherever they might pass, not to have permitted the slightest reduction of their numbers by detaching isolated garrisons.
The second would have been to have abandoned Nankin, and concentrated all their forces in the southern provinces—Kwang-tung, Kwang-se, Kwei-chow, and Fo-keen—a part of China, more than any other, bitterly opposed to the Manchoos, and more important still, the native provinces of the principal Ti-ping leaders. In this case, the whole of the country south of the Yang-tze river could in a short time have been completely wrested from the Manchoos, and then, if unable to obtain the whole empire, they would at least have established a southern kingdom in perfect integrity—and how superior this course of action would have been to the irregular one they pursued!
It was not only a great mistake, but a great absurdity for the Tien-wang to establish a capital, and set up a new dynasty before accomplishing either of the foregoing courses.
Although for several years numbers continued flocking to the Tien-wang's standard, still, they were not of the best material; the wealthier classes, directly they found the revolution paused, paused too, and time showed them that the obnoxious element was the Christian religion. So long as the movement, in the earlier stages of patriotic excitement, was looked upon as a means of overthrowing the foreign dynasty, it was a national and a popular one; but as the foreign derived religious character transpired, the bigoted and proud Chinese naturally began to eye with suspicion a movement so vast, aiming not only at the subversion of the reigning dynasty, but of the time-honoured superstitions, ceremonies, and faith of the nation. The stationary phase, prejudicial to any revolution, was doubly so to the Ti-ping, as it fully displayed that the Christian, or foreign innovation, was as much their profession as the popular anti-Manchoo feeling; but for this, the whole population of China would have risen en masse to throw off the foreign yoke.
Through our Faith the Ti-pings have heroically, and, until the British Government added their weight to the adverse scale, successfully maintained an unequal struggle for years. Should we not then rather have assisted than opposed them? Why should we, who pride ourselves upon our superior freedom, oppose the advance of Christianity, and perpetuate a most corrupt and barbarous government in Asia—a government more foreign to the people whom it crushes than the Russian is to the Poles? Can the British nation sympathize with the rebels to one and not with those to the other, particularly when the latter are endeavouring to propagate the Christian faith? Can the English nation, one of the most Christian and enlightened in the world, deny all sympathy to those carrying on the greatest patriotic struggle on record, a struggle that would, by the admission of many high-minded missionaries, have Christianized more than one-third of the human race?
The Imperialists gained many advantages through the stationary position of the Ti-pings. Whereas, before, they contented themselves with following an advancing and triumphant army, and occupying the towns and districts as they were evacuated, they were now enabled to recover from the demoralizing effects of their numerous defeats, and to concentrate their efforts upon one or two points. The prestige of success, a great element with Chinese troops, was for a time lost to the revolutionists, and the Tartar forces despatched from the north combining with those lately following at a respectful distance in the rear of the Ti-pings, soon invested Nankin and Chin-kiang with apparently overwhelming numbers.
The blockade of Nankin, notwithstanding the strength of the investing forces, was neither close nor effectual. Several expeditionary armies were formed and despatched by the Tien-wang to raise the country in different directions. He seems to have reckoned too much upon the patriotic spirit of his countrymen, besides committing the error of settling down and attempting to consolidate his own power before overthrowing that of the enemy. It is even very probable, if all these expeditionary armies had been combined into one and marched upon Pekin, that that city would have fallen.
In May, 1853, a small army of about seven thousand men crossed to the northern bank of the Yang-tze-kiang, and after defeating a body of Tartar troops who disputed their passage, proceeded rapidly in a north-west direction, through the provinces of Ngan-whui and Ho-nan. Kai-fung, the capital of Ho-nan, the city containing the only tribe of Jews found in China, was unsuccessfully attacked.
Passing rapidly on, the Ti-pings effected the passage of the Yellow River, and attacked the city of Hwae-king. Here they were likewise unsuccessful, and a large army of Imperialists having collected, some from the north, some from the neighbouring garrisons, and united with a considerable force that had been detached in pursuit from the army of observation before Nankin, the siege was raised, and