Originally published in German as Das Ende der Illusionen – Politik, Ökonomie und Kultur in der Spätmoderne © Suhrkamp Verlag Berlin 2019. All rights by and controlled through Suhrkamp Verlag Berlin.
This English edition © Polity Press, 2021
The translation of this work was supported by a grant from the Goethe-Institut.
Figure 2.1 ‘Hausmodell’ from Ralf Dahrendorf: Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland © 1965 Piper Verlag GmbH, München
Figure 3.3 from Maarten Goos and Alan Manning, “Lousy and Lovely Jobs: The Rising Polarization of Work in Britain,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 89:1 (February, 2007), pp. 118–33. © 2007 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Polity Press
65 Bridge Street
Cambridge CB2 1UR, UK
Polity Press
101 Station Landing
Suite 300
Medford, MA 02155, USA
All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.
ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-4569-8
ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-4570-4 (paperback)
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Reckwitz, Andreas, author.
Title: The end of illusions : politics, economy, and culture in late modernity / Andreas Reckwitz ; translated by Valentine A. Pakis.
Other titles: Ende der Illusionen. English
Description: Cambridge, UK ; Medford, MA : Polity Press, [2021] | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Summary: “A leading social thinker examines the key structural features of our disillusioned age”-- Provided by publisher.
Identifiers: LCCN 2021000323 (print) | LCCN 2021000324 (ebook) | ISBN 9781509545698 (hardback) | ISBN 9781509545704 (paperback) | ISBN 9781509545711 (epub) | ISBN 9781509548057 (pdf)
Subjects: LCSH: Social history--21st century. | Social conflict. | Social change. | Populism. | Capitalism--Social aspects. | Culture. | Civilization, Modern--21st century.
Classification: LCC HN18.3 .R43413 2021 (print) | LCC HN18.3 (ebook) | DDC 306--dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021000323
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021000324
by Fakenham Prepress Solutions, Fakenham, Norfolk NR21 8NL
The publisher has used its best endeavors to ensure that the URLs for external websites referred to in this book are correct and active at the time of going to press. However, the publisher has no responsibility for the websites and can make no guarantee that a site will remain live or that the content is or will remain appropriate.
Every effort has been made to trace all copyright holders, but if any have been overlooked the publisher will be pleased to include any necessary credits in any subsequent reprint or edition.
For further information on Polity, visit our website: politybooks.com
Figures and Tables
Figures
2.1 The social structure of West Germany in 1965. Ralf Dahrendorf’s ‘house model’ was originally published in Dahrendorf, Gesellschaft und Demokratie (Munich: R. Piper & Co., 1965, p. 516)
2.2 Percentage of the US population older than 25 who completed high school or college (by age group, 1940–2015). © United States Census Bureau
2.3 The three-class structure of late-modern society
2.4 Socio-cultural milieus according to the SINUS studies and their “translation” into the three-class model (pertaining to Germany in 2018). Published by the Sinus-Institut (www.sinus-institut.de/sinus-loesungen/sinus-milieus-deutschland)
3.1 The development of employment and GDP in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1950–2017
3.2 Technological revolutions since 1770 (a graph based on the work of Carlota Perez)
3.3 The percentage change in employment share by job quality decile in OECD countries, 1979–1999. From Maarten Goos and Alan Manning, “Lousy and Lovely Jobs: The Rising Polarization of Work in Britain,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 89:1 (February, 2007), pp. 118–33
3.4 The development of investment in tangible and intangible capital relative to GDP in Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Great Britain, 1998–2013. From Jonathan Haskel and Stian Westlake, Capitalism Without Capital (Princeton University Press, 2018). © Princeton University Press
3.5 The pyramid of goods
Tables
1.1 Relations between Culturalization I and Culturalization II
5.1 The left–right distinction and political paradigms
5.2 Political paradigms and social problems since 1945
Introduction: The Disillusioned Present
It’s a strange thing. Some events that are retrospectively considered epoch-changing are perceived as merely marginal when they occur, whereas, in the case of others, one can remember precisely – even years later – the moment when “it happened,” and also one’s own feelings of bafflement, helplessness, fear, or incredulous joy in response to something seemingly impossible taking place.
Just as I still have vivid memories of “my” November 9, 1989 (the day the Berlin Wall came down) and “my” September 11, 2001 (the day of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center), the morning of November 9, 2016 is still present in my mind. Like many other people around the world, I felt a growing sense of unease during the months leading up to the American presidential election, which featured the surprising nomination of Donald Trump as the candidate for the Republican Party and his ugly, brutal campaign against Hillary Clinton, the candidate for the Democrats. On that morning, I checked the news on my tablet and was forced to accept that something had happened which, until the very last moment, I had been loath to admit as a real possibility: the populist candidate, who had made the headlines mostly because of his misogynistic and xenophobic demagoguery and his deep distrust of international cooperation and democratic institutions, and who seemed utterly unpredictable, had just been elected as the 45th President of the United States, thereby becoming the commander-in-chief of the leading Western nation.1 My reaction on that morning, and even weeks later, was one of horror. I had the feeling that things could fall apart, without knowing where this might lead: