[15] The second dimension involves the direct clash of Chinese and U.S. interests in the SCS. Despite its non-claimant party status to the dispute, the U.S. regional footprint is profound, not least given its close ties with several claimant countries, substantial troop deployment, its active participation in various regional dialogue formats and institutions, and its leadership role in multiple regional military exercises and operations. In a similar vein, the Obama administration proclaimed its ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy in 2011 with the key objective of maintaining (or even expanding) its prominent position in East- and Southeast Asia. That said, the clash of the world’s two major powers in the SCS region considerably contributes to the dispute’s scope, level of significance and extra-regional relevance. This, too, is all but conducive to effective and sustainable conflict management, let alone conflict resolution.
A third and somewhat interconnected dimension concerns the overall changing balance of regional (but also global) power in favor of China and to the detriment of the United States during the last decades. This shift was facilitated by the 2008 global economic crisis, which hit the U.S. much harder than the PRC. While China has not replaced the U.S. as a regional hegemon just yet, at least not in terms of political or military capacities, it is increasingly challenging the latter’s regional status, thereby increasing the U.S.’ costs of regional cooperation and curtailing Washington’s regional outreach. This development has been further consolidated by the decision of the administration of Donald Trump to withdraw from the Transpacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), a region-wide free trade project with the U.S. in the driving seat (and excluding the PRC), to impose different rounds of trade tariffs on Chinese goods, as well as its general preference for unilateral approaches and policy measures. Both, decisions like these, and the current administration’s growing unpredictability have sparked concerns by U.S. allies and partners about U.S. regional commitment, a development likely to assist the PRC in its endeavors to expand its regional influence. Beijing’s visions to accomplish a “China-ASEAN community of shared future” (PRC Gvt., 2017a) and to propel its Maritime Silk Road project connecting China with Southeast Asia, are two prominent examples already foreshadowing this process. At this stage it is unclear as to whether Washington will approve of, let alone support such developments in the future or whether it will rather do its bit to cling to its previous regional impact and its key position in terms of regional integration and cooperation, a scenario which certainly would not fail to leave its mark on the SCS either.
Fourth, Southeast Asia lacks any kind of multilateral and appropriately institutionalized framework of cooperative security structures in which all relevant SCS stakeholders could jointly discuss sustainable approaches to [16] mitigate the dispute, thereby alleviating the risk of (unintended) conflict escalation by generating trust, establishing clear rules of conduct, fostering cooperation and bridging omnipresent perception gaps. To be sure, a number of formats and institutional frameworks have already been set up in recent years. At the same time, Beijing does no longer categorically reject any debate on the SCS as it used to in the past. It has commenced hosting a seminar on ‘Maritime Risk Management and Cooperation’ within the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) framework, a multilateral dialogue format dealing with preventive diplomacy and confidence building. Similarly, the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting Plus (ADMM) is increasingly tackling issues of maritime security as are the Information Sharing Center (ISC), the China-Southeast Asian Countries Marine Research and Environmental Protection Cooperation Forum and many others. Moreover, a few non-binding mechanisms between the PRC and the U.S. on the prevention of maritime incidents have been launched as well. The majority of these mechanisms and institutions, however, remain mere ‘talk-shops’ (Acharya, 2005) due to their often voluntary, non-binding and ad-hoc nature5 and their mostly reactive and operational instead of future-oriented and comprehensive approach. Additionally, while certain progress has already been made on the path toward a Binding Code of Conduct (BCoC), its adoption is still not in sight6. Equally, China and Vietnam agreed upon the establishment of political high-profile dialogue on the SCS7, albeit this success had already been preceded by several drawbacks8 in bilateral relations. Similarly, Beijing and Manila set up a biannual China-Philippines Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on the South China Sea (BCM) in May 2017. Despite such progress, security cooperation is still by far not keeping up with economic cooperation (Staack, 2016). Likewise, there are still no institutionalized, let alone multilateral and comprehensive, cooperative [17] security structures available that are capable of effectively addressing the omnipresent risk of conflict escalation.
Fifth, a substantial lack of consensus among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), individual ASEAN Member States, the U.S., and China on the desired means and procedure of conflict resolution or conflict management prevails. The U.S. traditionally aims to play a leading role in the matter, several ASEAN states tend to advocate multilateral approaches to conflict management within a framework attended by all relevant parties (including the U.S.) or even compulsory legal arbitration and ASEAN as a regional organization is divided on this issue. The PRC, in turn, is taking a somewhat opposite point of view by strictly preferring to address its various disputes in the SCS in a bilateral manner, essentially by means of dialogue and negotiation with the individual state concerned. At the same time, it opposes any kind of internationalization of the issue in multilateral fora (e.g. the East Asia Summit), seeks to prevent a common position by ASEAN against China and Chinese claims, and widely rejects U.S. participation as well as the introduction of binding measures, sanctions and compulsory arbitration on questions of territorial sovereignty.
In total, these five dimensions mirror the polydimensional character of the SCS dispute, thereby accounting for the fact that, despite some short-term progress on one or two of these levels, the situation continues to be highly complex, intertwined, contested and fragile. Mutual provocations may recur at any time, ultimately capable of triggering policy measures resulting in further undesired and destabilizing political outcomes. Hence, effective and serious dispute management, let alone dispute resolution still remain a pipe dream.
Against this background, this book holds that traditional analytical variables such as security, power and economic objectives neither provide fully-fledged accounts of the increase in tensions in the SCS in the recent decade, nor comprehensively account for China’s modification of its SCS approach as of mid-2012, nor represent a promising and sufficient point of departure with respect to sustainable SCS dispute management in general. Therefore, it is argued, special emphasis should be placed on alternate cognitive variables, the significance and role of respect dynamics in particular. In this vein, it is contended that alleviation of tensions and consolidation of cooperative efforts in the SCS would only be viable if stakeholders involved were to take into closer consideration each other’s respect expectations and related needs9 and, simultaneously, do not perceive their very own respect [18] needs and motives to be violated. While