[41] “That lien and mien-tzu constitute separate concepts is well shown in the difference of reaction to the expressions ‘to have no lien’ and to have no mien-tzu. The former is the worst insult, casting doubt on the integrity of ego’s moral character; the latter signifies merely the failure of ego to achieve a reputation through success in life. Again, ‘to want mien-tzu’ is by no means the opposite of ‘not to want lien’. As explained before, the latter means that society considers ego’s action a deliberate flaunting of moral standards in order to obtain practical advantages […]. As soon as the motive behind ego’s actions becomes apparent in this case, he is shamed by loss of lien” (1944, p. 61).
Despite their rather marginal differences, both terms vastly overlap with and closely relate to one another. For instance, loss of lien, being the loss of moral reputation by society in ego’s character, is unforgivable and will make it significantly more difficult to maintain mien-tzu. However, the significance of both lien and even more so mien-tzu is not constant but contingent on the social status and context of ego. According to Hu, “[a]ll persons growing up in any community have the same claim to lien, an honest, decent ‘face’; but their mien-tzu will differ with the status of the family, personal ties, ego’s ability to impress people, etc.” (1944, p. 62). Similarly, the amount of lien is related to an actor’s social rank or status and the degree to which lien is considered important by the actor itself:
“The higher he ascends the social ladder, the wider the circle of eyes fastened upon his career, the more he must try to impress people. ‘Loss of lien’ must be avoided, of course; a question regarding the integrity of his moral character would cause him to sink low in the esteem of his group“ (1944, p. 63).
Applying these lessons to the collective level of the Chinese political elite, it can be argued that the latter rather depends on lien and can be expected to have more to lose (increased sensitivity) since the average people expect the political elite to behave particularly responsibly, not least as any “irresponsible behavior in ego will arouse doubts as to his competence in maintaining his status” (1944, p. 62). Any allegedly irresponsible politician or government official who does not take his obligations and duties seriously and does not demonstrate integrity is not to be trusted because he does “not have enough concern for lien” (p. 62). Corruption constitutes a practical example thereof. Several surveys and opinion polls44 in recent years have shown that Chinese [42] citizens indeed regard corruption to be one or even the major problem in Chinese politics to date45.
If face is consciously denied or at least not appropriately recognized by another party by adequate face-work, a negative effect on a given actor’s face and, ultimately, its self-worth conception results: As Hu puts it: “Deliberately […] make a person ‘lose lien’ is termed non-consideration for so-and-so’s mien-tzu” (1944, p. 62). Just as discussed in the previous section on the concept of respect, deliberate non-consideration of an actor’s self-evaluated needs is associated with a non-confirmation of its self-worth conception, hence causing strong discontent and adverse cognitive effects that may affect preference formation and response patterns. Likewise, in the absence of both, respect and face, actors may seek to obtain and secure an adequate amount of face/respect, if necessary in a proactive and assertive manner. Qin Yaqing, CIIS author and president of the prestigious China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU), further specifies this dynamic as follows:
“[T]he protection – or saving – of one’s mianzi is extremely important in building and maintaining self-esteem. When a Chinese person feels that they have lost mianzi, their self-esteem will be hurt, and balance in emotion and even in life will also be lost. Therefore, Chinese do not only maintain mianzi passively; they also try to elevate mianzi proactively” (2011, p. 52).
However, unlike deliberate affronts, unintentional non-consideration of an actor’s face needs can be quite difficult to identify by others, particularly by actors from other cultural backgrounds. This is due to the fact that “what a sensitive person feels as ‘loss of lien’ may be regarded as no more than ‘looking bad on his or her mien-tzu’ by an outsider” (1944, p. 62). Qin Yaqing distinctly underscores this argument, thereby also pointing to the dual perception character of Chinese face at large:
“Mianzi is relational in nature for it is significant only in social relations. Mianzi is obtained only when one is socially recognized. It is self-perceiving and other-giving. It is both about how Chinese perceive themselves and how they feel other people perceive them. There is no mianzi without social recognition. Mianzi is very important among Chinese people and within the relational Chinese society. It concerns not only one’s social status in a relational society, but also the possibility of being accepted by others and even the privileges one is entitled to in the social process of interaction” (Qin Yaqing, 2011, p. 52).
Ultimately, both the relevance of face-work in Chinese culture and the close resemblance between face and respect further underpin the prospect that inadequate consideration of Chinese respect needs (and vice-versa) indeed impedes the establishment of trust and cooperation as general political [43] preconditions for effective conflict management in the SCS. Subsequently, the following section outlines the theory-guided hypotheses and elaborates on a number of questions guiding the critical discussion thereof.
2.2 The Hypotheses
As discussed previously, the project accedes to the constructivist and social psychology argument that states’ policy preferences, or role performances46, are shaped by the interplay between self-conceptions and the perception and assessment of external conduct. Accordingly, the main focus of analysis rests on China’s self-evaluation, its assessment of other SCS stakeholders’ conduct and cognitive effects and policy preferences resulting thereof. As such, it is interested in whether or not external behavior, from a Chinese perspective, takes into adequate consideration Beijing’s self-worth conceptions. Such adequate consideration is regarded as respect, the independent variable of this project. Similarly, it intends to scrutinize as to whether the presence or absence of such disrespect experiences can account for Chinese foreign policy preferences (dependent variable) in response to U.S. and Philippine conduct in the SCS region. In order to structure the process of the analysis, three hypotheses are derived from the project’s theory-guided variables and are intended to provide concise answers to the superordinate research question. In the following, these hypotheses are adumbrated in consecutive order.
2.2.1 Hypothesis I: ‘China’s self-ascribed status and identity conceptions were subject to change between 2007 and 2016’
“China’s unique view of itself and its place in the region heavily colours the perceptions and expectations that shape PRC policies“ (Roy, 2013, p. 2).
Focusing on the self-evaluative dimension of Chinese self-perception, Hypothesis I investigates as to whether a change in self-ascribed status and national identity conceptions can be observed in the time period between 2007 and 2016 and as to whether these conceptions correspond to China’s SCS [44] policy. Accordingly, status is regarded as the relative rank China (and Chinese scholars) believes it occupies in the regional and global context. As such, its status is the result of a social transaction as it does not simply derive from China’s capacities and capabilities but requires social recognition by others47. Similarly, identities are not generated from within and by every actor itself but are negotiated through ongoing dialogue