The Nuremberg Trials (Vol.6). International Military Tribunal. Читать онлайн. Newlib. NEWLIB.NET

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of that paragraph which does not occur in the German text:

      “A new situation has arisen through the elections of November the 6th, and at the same time a new opportunity for a consolidation of all nationalist elements. The Reich President has instructed me to find out by conversations with the leaders of the individual parties concerned whether and how far they are ready to support the carrying out of the political and economic program on which the Reich Government has embarked. Although the National Socialist press has been writing that it is a naive attempt for Reich Chancellor Von Papen to try to confer with personalities representing the nationalist concentration, and that there can only be one answer, ‘No negotiations with Papen,’ I would consider it neglecting my duties, and I would be unable to justify it to my own conscience, if I did not approach you in the spirit of the order given to me. I am quite aware from the papers that you are maintaining your demands to be entrusted with the Chancellor’s Office, and I am equally aware of the continued existence of the reasons for the decision of August the 13th. I need not assure you again that I myself do not claim any personal consideration at all. All the same, I am of the opinion that the leader of so great a national movement, whose merits for people and country I have always recognized in spite of necessary criticism, should not refuse to enter into discussions on the situation and the decisions required with the presently leading and responsible German statesman. We must attempt to forget the bitterness of the elections and to place the cause of the country which we are mutually serving above all other considerations.”

      Hitler replied on 16 November 1932 in a long letter, laying down terms which were evidently unacceptable to Von Papen, since he resigned the next day and was succeeded by Von Schleicher. That document is D-634, put in as part of Exhibit GB-238 as it is part of the same correspondence. I need not read from the letter itself.

      Then came the meetings between Papen and Hitler in January 1933, in the houses of Von Schröder and of Ribbentrop, culminating in Von Schleicher being succeeded by Hitler as Reich Chancellor on 30 January 1933. Referring back again to the biography on Page 66 of the document book, there is an account of the meeting at Schröder’s house, the second paragraph on the page:

      “The meeting with Hitler, which took place in the beginning of January 1933, in the house of the banker Baron Von Schröder in Cologne, is due to his initiative”—that means, of course Papen’s initiative—“although Von Schröder was the mediator. Both Von Papen and Hitler later made public statements about this meeting (press of 6 January 1933). After the rapid downfall of Von Schleicher on the 28th of January 1933, the Hitler-Von Papen-Hugenberg-Seldte Cabinet was formed on the 30th of January 1933 as a government of national solidarity. In this cabinet Von Papen held the office of Vice Chancellor and Reich Commissioner for Prussia.”

      The meetings at Ribbentrop’s house, at which Papen was also present, have been mentioned by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe (Document D-472, which was Exhibit GB-130).

      I now wish to introduce into evidence an affidavit by Von Schröder, but I understand that Dr. Kubuschok wishes to take an objection to this. Perhaps before Dr. Kubuschok takes his objection it might help if I said, quite openly, that Schröder is now in custody, and according to my information he is at Frankfurt; so that physically he undoubtedly could be called. Perhaps I might also say at this moment that there would be no objection from the Prosecution’s point of view to interrogatories being administered to Von Schröder on the subject matter of this affidavit.

      DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): I object to the reading of the affidavit of Schröder. I know that in individual cases the Tribunal has permitted the reading of affidavits. This occurred under Article 19 of the Charter, which is based on the proposition that the Trial should be conducted as speedily as possible and that for this reason the Tribunal should order the rules of ordinary court procedure in that respect. Of decisive importance, therefore, is the speediness of the Trial. But in our case the reading of the affidavit cannot be approved for that reason.

      Our case is quite analogous to the case that was decided on the 14th of December with regard to Kurt Von Schuschnigg’s affidavit. Schröder is in the vicinity. Schröder was apparently brought to the neighborhood of Nuremberg for the purposes of this Trial. The affidavit was taken down on 5 December. He could be brought here at any time. The reading of the affidavit would have the consequence that I would have to refer not only to him but also to several other witnesses, because Schröder describes a series of facts in his affidavit which in their entirety are not needed for the finding of a decision. However, once introduced into the Trial, they must also be discussed by the Defense in the pursuance of its duty.

      The affidavit discusses internal political matters, using improper terms. For this reason misunderstandings would be brought into the Trial which could be obviated by the hearing of a witness I believe, therefore, that the oral testimony of a witness should be the only way in which Schröder’s testimony should be submitted to the Tribunal, since otherwise a large number of witnesses will have to be called along with the reading of Schröder’s affidavit and his personal interrogation.

      THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished?

      DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes.

      THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to make any observation?

      MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes, I do, My Lord. The Tribunal has been asked to exclude this affidavit, using as a precedent the decision on Von Schuschnigg’s affidavit. I think I am correct in saying that Von Schuschnigg’s affidavit was excluded as an exception to the general rule on affidavits which the Tribunal laid down earlier the same day when Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit was accepted. Perhaps Your Lordship will allow me to read from the transcript the Tribunal’s decision on the affidavit of Messersmith.

      THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Messersmith was in Mexico, was he not?

      MAJOR BARRINGTON: That is so, My Lord; yes.

      THE PRESIDENT: So that the difference between him and Schuschnigg in that regard was very considerable.

      MAJOR BARRINGTON: In that regard, but what I was going to say was this, My Lord: In ruling on Messersmith’s affidavit Your Lordship said:

      “In view of those provisions”—that is Article 19 of the Charter—“the Tribunal holds that affidavits can be presented and that in the present case it is a proper course. The question of the probative value of the affidavit as compared with the witness who has been cross-examined would, of course, be considered by the Tribunal, and if at a later stage the Tribunal thinks the presence of a witness is of extreme importance, the matter can be reconsidered.”

      And Your Lordship added:

      “If the Defense wish to put interrogatories to the witness, they will be at liberty to do so.”

      Now in the afternoon of that day, when Schuschnigg’s affidavit came up . . .

      THE PRESIDENT: Which day was this?

      MAJOR BARRINGTON: This was the 28th of November, My Lord. It is on Page 473 (Volume II, Page 352) of the transcript, the Messersmith affidavit; and Page 523 (Volume II, Page 384) is the Schuschnigg affidavit.

      Now, when the objection was taken to the Schuschnigg affidavit, the objection was put in these words:

      “Today when the resolution was announced in respect of the use to be made of the written affidavit of Mr. Messersmith, the Court was of the opinion that in a case of very great importance possibly it would take a different view of the matter.”—And then defense counsel went on to say—“As it is a case of such an important witness, the principle of direct evidence must be adhered to.”

      THE PRESIDENT: Have you a reference to a subsequent occasion on which we heard Mr. Justice Jackson upon this subject, when Mr. Justice Jackson submitted to us that on the strict interpretation of Article 19 we were bound to admit any evidence which we deemed to have probative value?

      MAJOR BARRINGTON: My Lord, I haven’t got that reference.

      THE PRESIDENT: Why don’t you call this witness?

      MAJOR BARRINGTON: I say, quite frankly—and I was coming on to that—this witness is in