The History of the World War I. Various Authors

of military, civil, and religious authority which has been dependent in the long run for its support on the army. However, had the subject peoples hated each other less cordially, had they been more capable of organization and willing to compromise, they might have ended the Turkish rule decades ago, army or no army. Some observers, indeed, have thought the Turkish Government an artificial sham kept alive by France and England for their own purposes. Whatever reasons were to be given, the Germans and the Turks saw that Turkey as a nation and Turkey as a state had been, both of them, practically non-existent. Both had been names, not realities. Turkey had appeared on the European maps. A series of so-called statesmen had taken European bribes in Constantinople; numerous incompetent and venal officials had robbed the populace with the help of the soldiers in the provinces, and this Government plus the army was Turkey. Turkey had, indeed, been sick, but that particular kind of illness, the Turks thought, could be cured; and the Germans agreed with them.

      Germany's willingness to assist Turkey.

      Germany's influence in Turkey.

      Reasons for Turkey's joining Germany.

      We must not forget as observers the exceeding importance of German willingness to assist the ambitions of the educated Turks for self-government and for independence from European influence. The English and French control of Turkey was fortuitous and artificial and depended solely upon the control of a little group of men in Constantinople. German influence in Turkey has deep and fundamental roots in a large and significant part of the Turkish population and appeals to their best and highest impulses. We have here in the last analysis the reasons why Turkey has joined Germany in the war. The enlightened Turks see in Pan-Germanism a democratic Turkey with constitutional self-government, a Turkey developing its own resources, a Turkey gradually freeing itself from the fetters of European alliances and becoming gradually but certainly strong enough to take its place in the Pan-Germanic chain as a state of worth, integrity, and importance. They see in the victory of Pan-Germanism the effective promise of the realization of such ideals. They see in the defeat of Pan-Germanism political and national death, the annexation of Turkey by its enemies, and the subjection of the Turks to the rule of the Infidel. For these reasons they joined Germany in the first place. For these deep, fundamental reasons they hold staunchly to their friend. We shall be guilty of quibbling and of shortsightedness if we look for an explanation of Turkish policy in the seizure of warships and the breach of treaties.

      Reorganization of Turkey.

      The reorganization of Turkey was duly observed by the Triple Entente and its purpose thoroughly well understood. Their opposition to it was prompt, and Italy attempted by the Tripolitan War to rob the Turk of one of his distant provinces. Having seized Tripoli with the consent of the Triple Entente, Italy then changed sides, returned to the Triple Alliance and took Tripoli with her. The result was a prompt reversal of the strategic situation in the Eastern Mediterranean and placed England and France in such danger that they saw the moment had probably come when it would be positively to their advantage to gratify Russia's ambition and allow her to seize Constantinople. The Tripolitan War suspended the sword of Damocles over the Turk's head.

      The Balkan War.

      The loss of Macedonia.

      The Balkan War threatened for a time to annihilate him. The prompt aid of Austria and Germany as stout representatives in the international conclave, the mobilization of the Austrian army, the knowledge that Germany was ready to mobilize, saved the Turk. The ambitions of Bulgaria brought her over to the side of the Triple Alliance, which was more than ready to assist her in dominating the Balkans. The second war cost Bulgaria dear but gave back to the Turk Adrianople. Macedonia, however, was lost entirely, and much of Thrace, with Salonika, the key of the Ægean, was also lost and fell into the hands of the Turk's enemy, Greece.

      Little likelihood of attack on Constantinople.

      The reorganized state was now undeniably in great peril; and the probability of an outbreak of a European war in the near future, the knowledge that the Turk must himself defend Constantinople and the Bagdad Railway, urged the Germans and the Turks to great efforts in reorganizing the army and providing equipment. The fleet also received attention; two battleships were building in England and another was purchased from one of the South American states. There would this time be no escape. The death sentence had been passed upon the Turk, and if he waited for his enemies to gather and descend upon him defense would be problematical. It was, of course, realized that in the long run Germany would save Turkey by battles won in France or in Poland, and also that German defeats in Europe would in the long run spell the downfall of Turkey whatever the Turk did. It was, therefore, advisable to postpone action as long as possible. While Russia was exerting herself to the utmost to mobilize an army in Poland, there was small likelihood of an attack on Constantinople, and the Turk might well remain neutral, equip and organize the army, acquire supplies, and choose the moment to take the offensive.

      German cruisers at Constantinople.

      England, on the outbreak of the war, seized the two battleships building in England, and, therefore, weakened the Turkish strength in the Black Sea. The deficiency was supplied by sending two German cruisers to Constantinople and selling them to the Turkish Government. Some weeks ago the Germans judged that the time had come when the Turk must openly join in the war, send his troops to the frontier in order to hold the invader as far as possible from Constantinople. Indeed, action at this time might allow the Turk to accomplish results of the utmost importance. Those who see simply the fact that Russia could easily overwhelm the Turk standing alone, that the Balkan States united might also dispose of him, entirely fail to grasp the possibilities before the Turk at the present moment when Russia is extremely busy in the North, when the Balkan States seem hopelessly divided, and when Italy is maintaining with determination her neutrality.

      Closing of the Black Sea by Turkey.

      Enormous value of oil supplies in the Black Sea District.

      The most important thing the Turk has done for Germany has been the closing of the Black Sea. The sowing of a few mines in the Straits promptly put an end to Russian trade from the Black Sea and dealt southern Russia a great blow commercially. Germany thus struck at England, because a large part of the English food supply has normally come from the Black Sea district, and the desire to protect the grain ships through the Mediterranean has been one of England's chief reasons for maintaining control of that sea. So large were these supplies normally that England has had considerable difficulty in replacing them and is destined soon to experience greater difficulty in furnishing a supply equivalent in volume and accessibility. The Black Sea district also has large oil supplies which would be of enormous value to England and France, now that the extensive use of the automobile in warfare has made gasolene a supply second in importance only to powder and food. If the Turkish navy, augmented by the German cruisers, can dispose of the Russian ships in the Black Sea, and this seems not improbable, the Turk might annex for Germany this supply of oil. That would be a stroke of the utmost consequence.

      Isolation of Russia.

      Importance of Turkey to Germany.

      Closing the Black Sea by the Turk, plus the closing of the Baltic by the German fleet in the North Sea, would also accomplish another extremely important result, the absolute and complete isolation of Russia from contact with all parts of the world except Germany, Austria, and Turkey. The question has often arisen as to the ability of Germany to prolong the war in the face of her inability to export goods to her usual customers. The complete cessation of manufacture in Germany would sooner or later bankrupt the country and bring her to her knees. The Germans point out that the isolation of Russia will have precisely the same effect on that country unless Russia can find some place where her raw products can be exchanged for the manufactured goods which are much more necessary in warfare than the crude products which she always has to sell. The experience of the past has proved again and again that belligerent countries persistently trade with one another when it is profitable. The Germans expect to sell their manufactured goods in Russia in exchange for the raw materials which Russia produces, just as long as their fleet holds the mouth of the Baltic and the Turk controls Constantinople. A brisk trade between Germany, Austria, and Russia is already reported and if it attains the proportions the Germans expect, their commercial problem will have