THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Lawrence): Is Counsel for Gustav Krupp von Bohlen in Court?
DR. THEODOR KLEFISCH (Counsel for Defendant Krupp von Bohlen): Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to make your motion now?
DR. KLEFISCH: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you make your motion?
DR. KLEFISCH: Mr. President, gentlemen: As defense counsel for Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, I repeat the request which has already been made in writing, to suspend the proceedings against this defendant, at any rate, not to carry out the Trial against this defendant. I leave it to this High Court to decide whether it should suspend proceedings against Krupp for the time being or altogether.
According to the opinion of the specialists, who were appointed by this Court for the investigation of the illness of Krupp, Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach is not able, on account of his serious illness, to appear at this Trial without danger to his life. Their opinion is that he is suffering from an organic disturbance of the brain and that mental decline makes the defendant incapable of reacting normally to his surroundings.
From that it follows that Krupp is not capable of informing his defense. Furthermore, the report states that the deterioration of his physical and mental powers has already been going on for several years and that since Krupp was involved in an auto accident on 4 December 1944, he can only speak a few disconnected words now and again, and during the last two months has not even been able to recognize his relatives and friends. On the basis of these facts one can only establish that Krupp has no knowledge of the serving of the Indictment of 19 October. Thus he does not know that he is accused and why.
The question now arises whether, in spite of this permanent inability to appear for trial, in spite of this inability to inform his defense, and in spite of his not knowing of the Indictment and its contents, Krupp can be tried in absentia. Article 12 of the Charter gives the right to the Tribunal to take proceedings against people who are absent, under two conditions: First, if the accused cannot be found; second, if the Tribunal, for other reasons, thinks it is necessary in the interests of justice, to try him in absentia. Since the first condition, impossibility of finding the defendant, is immediately eliminated, it must be examined whether the second condition can be applied, that is, whether it is necessary, in the interests of justice, to try Krupp.
The Defense is of the opinion that justice does not demand a trial against Krupp in absentia, that this would even be contrary to justice. I want to quote the following reasons: The decision on this question must come from the concept of justice in the sense of Article 12 of the Charter. We must take into account here that the 12th Article is purely a regulation concerning procedure. The question arises, however, whether the Trial against Krupp in his absence would be a just procedure. In my opinion, a just procedure is only then given if it is, as a whole or in its particular regulations, fashioned in such a way that an equitable judgment is guaranteed. That is a judgment whereby the convicted defendant will be punished accordingly and the innocent exonerated from guilt and punishment.
Is it possible that a just judgment can be guaranteed if a defendant is tried in absentia, who through no fault of his own, cannot appear and defend himself, who cannot inform his defense counsel, and who does not even know that he is accused and for what reason? To ask this question is to deny it. Even the regulations of the Charter concerning the rights of the defendant in the preliminary procedure and in the main Trial, oblige us to answer this question with “no”.
The following regulations are applicable here:
According to Article 16 (a), the accused shall receive a copy of the Indictment before the Trial.
According to Article 16 (b), the defendant in the preliminary procedure, and in the main Trial, has the right to declare his own position in the face of each accusation.
According to Article 16 (c), a preliminary interrogation of the defendant should take place.
According to Article 16 (d), the defendant shall decide whether he wishes to defend himself or to have somebody else defend him.
According to Article 16 (e), the defendant has the right to submit evidence himself and to cross-examine each witness.
The Defendant Krupp could not make use of any of these rights.
According to Article 24 the same also applies to the special rights, which have been accorded the defendants for the main Trial: The defendant should declare his position in the main Trial, that is, whether he pleads guilty or not.
In my opinion, this is a declaration which is extremely significant for the course of the Trial and of the decision, and the defendant can only do this in persona. I do not know whether it is admissible that Defense Counsel may make this declaration of “guilty” or “not guilty” for the defendant, and even if this were admissible, Defense Counsel would not be able to make this declaration because he had no opportunity to come to any understanding with the defendant.
Finally, the accused, who is not present, cannot exercise his right of a final plea.
The Charter, which has decreed so many and such decisive regulations for the rights of the defendant, thereby recognizes that the personal exercise of these rights which were granted to the accused is an important source of knowledge for the finding of an equitable judgment, and that a trial against such a defendant, who is incapable of exercising these rights through no fault of his own, cannot be recognized as a just procedure in the sense of Article 12.
I should like to go further, however, by saying that the procedure in absentia against Krupp, would be contrary to justice, not only according to the provisions of the Charter but also according to the generally recognized principles of the law of procedure of civilized states.
So far as I am informed, no law of procedure of a continental state permits a court procedure against somebody who is absent, mentally deranged, and completely incapable of arguing his case. According to the German Law of Procedure, the trial must be postponed in such a case (Paragraph 205 of the German Code of Criminal Law). If prohibiting the trial of a defendant, who is incapable of being tried, is a generally recognized principle of procedure (principe général de droit reconnu par des nations civilisées) in the sense of Paragraph 38 (c) of the Statute of the International Court in The Hague, then a tribunal upon which the attention of the whole world is, and the attention of future generations will be directed, cannot ignore this prohibition.
The foreign press, which in the last days and weeks has repeatedly been concerned with the law of the Charter, almost unanimously stresses that the formal penal procedure must not deviate from the customs and regulations of a fair trial, as is customary in civilized countries; but it does not object, as far as the penal code is concerned, to a departure from the principles recognized heretofore, because justice and high political considerations demand the establishment of a new international criminal code with retroactive effect in order to be able to punish war criminals.
I wish to add another point here, which may be important for the decision on the question discussed. This High Court would naturally not be able to acquire an impression of the personality of Krupp, an impression which in such an extraordinarily significant trial is a valuable means of perception, which cannot be underestimated for the judgment of the incriminating evidence. If, in the Charter, trial in absentia is permitted on principle against defendants who cannot be located, then corresponding laws of procedure of all states, and even of the German Code of Criminal Procedure agree to that.
A defendant who has escaped is absolutely different from a defendant who cannot argue his case, because in contrast to the latter, he has the possibility of appearing in court and thus, of defending himself. If he deliberately avoids this possibility, then he arbitrarily makes himself responsible for the disadvantages and dangers entailed by his absence. In this case, naturally, there would be no question of an unjust trial.
The view has been expressed in recent days and weeks that world opinion