The realpolitik view accepts the partisan nature of the process and is likely to also view district-level representation as a critical element in the delicate balance established by the framers of the Constitution. As such, those in this camp are far more likely to be satisfied with solid dyadic representation based on partisan or ideological preferences. Those who wish to take partisanship out of the redistricting process prefer districts to be drawn in ways that will enhance accountability and responsiveness to the entire population, not just a primary electorate. To the extent that the public’s partisan preferences should influence representation, they should be reflected proportionally in the number of seats each party receives statewide.50 After all, it’s the people as a whole who should govern.
At this point, a word about incumbents is probably in order. Much of the previous discussion has concerned partisan gerrymandering. That is, the debate is about whether parties should be allowed to draw district boundaries that benefit only their candidates. However, bipartisan gerrymandering – or incumbent protection gerrymandering – is also controversial. The realpolitik camp is likely to see nothing wrong with protecting incumbents because, ultimately, incumbent protection is still partisan. In order to create districts that are safe for existing incumbents of both parties, the partisanship of districts has to be taken into account. This, from the realpolitik point of view, does not preclude the possibility that incumbents will be held accountable and could be kicked out of office. It’s simply that the primary electorate, or voters within the incumbent’s party, are the ones who hold the incumbent accountable.
It is precisely because incumbent protection is nonetheless partisan that the advocates of civic redistricting oppose it as well. To be sure, some of the opposition from this perspective is motivated by an anti-incumbent attitude. The fear is that incumbents in safe districts are not likely to be challenged by another candidate from their own party in large part because the party organization will discourage it. Even if incumbents were to receive primary challenges, voters in their party are unlikely to turn them out because name recognition has such a powerful impact on the vote. Thus, safe incumbents can stay in office for as long as they want, increasing the possibility that they will become out of touch with their constituents. Ultimately, however, those in the civic redistricting camp dislike bipartisan gerrymandering for the same reason they dislike partisan gerrymandering, namely, that in any given district, it stacks the deck in favor of one party over the other.
Plan of the Book
In the chapters that follow, we will examine gerrymandering in far greater detail. Chapter 2 traces the development and evolution of gerrymandering over time. Gerrymandering dates to the early nineteenth century, though there are examples to be found in the American Colonial period. Initially, legislative districts were coterminous with city, town, or county boundaries. However, politicians eventually realized that they could create electoral districts for partisan advantage by combining jurisdictions in whole or in part. Prior to the ‘reapportionment revolution’ of the 1960s, which will be discussed in detail in chapter 3, legislative districts were not required to have an equal number of people in them. Malapportionment meant that rural areas had far more representation than urban areas but also that the drawing of district lines could be done relatively haphazardly. In addition, those drawing district lines before the 1960s did not have access to computers for use in the process. Thus, after the 1960s, when districts had to contain an equal number of people and, eventually, when technology could be employed to identify voters at the household level, gerrymandering became far more precise.
Chapter 3 reviews the fate of gerrymandering in the courts. It begins by describing the ‘reapportionment revolution’ of the 1960s, which prohibited malapportionment of legislative districts and established the principle of “one-person, one-vote,” or equality of representation. To realize this ideal, legislative districts within states must contain equal populations (or as close to equal as possible). In the years following the reapportionment revolution, the courts and Congress turned attention to the potential for gerrymandered districts to dilute the votes of racial minorities and/or partisans. The creation of ‘majority-minority’ districts was an attempt to address the former but often reduced partisan competition in the process. The most recent legal battles over gerrymandering concern partisan bias in district maps. These battles, as we’ll see, have been won by those defending the practice of partisan gerrymandering.
Chapter 4 begins by providing a more detailed account of the normal redistricting process. It then describes how partisan majorities gerrymander districts for electoral advantage. They do this either by placing as many supporters of the other party as possible into a minimal number of districts, thereby concentrating their voting strength (‘packing’) or by spreading supporters of the other party throughout many districts, thereby diluting their voting power (‘cracking’). The chapter will illustrate these tactics with hypothetical and real-world examples. It will also discuss the use of computer technology in the redistricting/gerrymandering process.
The consequences of redistricting and gerrymandering will be explored in chapter 5. The primary focus will be on the effect of redistricting on candidates and parties, including its influence on the level of competition, partisan advantage, and the incumbency advantage. Redistricting may also affect voters directly, so the chapter considers its impact on voter turnout and vote choice. Finally, gerrymandering is often blamed for increasing levels of polarization. The chapter concludes with a look at the evidence with respect to this claim. In many of these areas, the scholarly research comes to contradictory conclusions and, in general, the results are mixed in terms of whether gerrymandering has significant consequences on elections.
The final chapter of the book will begin with a review of the normative arguments for and against gerrymandering and will make a case for reform of the process. It will then consider several ideas for reforming the redistricting process to eliminate, or constrain, gerrymandering. The most prominent idea is the use of redistricting commissions. Such commissions, which draft district boundaries and are populated by persons who may or may not be elected officials, vary in their independence from legislators. The most radical reform proposal to be considered is the use of multimember districts with proportional election rules. Moving to such an electoral system would greatly reduce the need for redistricting and would more fairly represent the partisan preferences of the electorate.
Conclusion
Redistricting – and gerrymandering specifically – can be exasperating, but it is also a fascinating aspect of American politics. As long as there are electoral districts that don’t correspond to permanent boundaries, district lines will have to be drawn. How, exactly, to do that will inevitably generate debate.
The debate over the redistricting process is not a debate over democratic versus undemocratic procedures. It is a debate between competing visions of how democracy should operate. Is democracy inherently conflictual, with various groups in society struggling to protect their interests through any legal means necessary, or is it potentially conciliatory, with an identifiable common good that can be achieved if neutral rules for politics are in place? One perspective on redistricting – the realpolitik view – is rooted in the former while another – civic redistricting – is based on the latter.
This chapter considered the role of redistricting in realizing two fundamental elements of modern democracy – fair elections and effective representation. What, exactly, is required for elections to be considered fair and what standard are we to use to judge the effectiveness of representation? Should redistricting be considered part of “normal politics”