It would doubtless require a great deal of temerity for a simple farmer to disturb, through bold criticism, the unanimous chorus of praise that welcomed the demands of French trade both inside and outside France. No less would be needed to confirm his decision to do so than a firm conviction, I would even say a certainty, that such petitioning would be as disastrous in its effects on the general interest, and in particular on the agricultural interests of France, as its doctrinal effects would be on the progress of economic science.
In speaking out in the name of agriculture against the customs plans presented by the petitioners, I feel the need to begin by declaring that what
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arouses my complaints in these plans is not the liberal element in their premises, but the exclusive content of their conclusions.
They demand that all protection be removed from primary products, that is to say from agricultural work, but that protection be maintained for the manufacturing industry.
I have come not to defend the protection that they are attacking but to attack the protection that they are defending.
Privilege is being claimed for a few; I come to claim freedom for all.
Agriculture owes its cosseted sales to the monopoly it exercises and its unfairly priced purchases to the monopoly to which it is subject. If it is just to relieve it of the first of these, it is no less so to free it from the second.2
To wish to deliver us to universal competition without subjecting manufacturers to the same situation is to damage our sales without relieving our purchases and to do just the opposite for manufacturers. If this is freedom, may I then have a definition of privilege?
It is up to agriculture to reject such attempts.
I make so bold here as to call upon the petitioners themselves and especially M. Henri Fonfrède. I urge him to refute my complaints or to support them.
I will show:
1 That, between the plan of the petitioners and the government system, there is community of principle, error, aim, and means;
2 That they differ only in one additional error for which the petitioners are responsible;
3 That the aim of this project is to set up an unjust privilege in favor of traders and manufacturers to the detriment of farmers and the general public.
§1. Between the petitioners’ proposals and the protectionist system there is community of principle, error, aim, and means.
What is the protectionist system? Let us hear M. de Saint Cricq’s views on this.
“Work constitutes the wealth of a people, since on its own it has created material things that we need, and because general affluence consists in an abundance of these things.” This is the principle.
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“But it is necessary for this abundance to flow from the nation’s work. If it were based on foreign work, domestic work would stop immediately.” This is the error.
“Therefore, what should a farming and manufacturing country do? Limit its market to the products of its territory and its industry.” This is the aim.
“And to do this, limit through duties, and prohibit as necessary, the products of the territory and industry of other peoples.” This is the means.
Let us compare this approach with that of the petition from Bordeaux.
The petition divides all goods into four categories. The first and second cover food products and raw materials that have not yet undergone any human transformation. In principle a wise economy would require that these two categories not be taxed.
The third category is made up of objects that have undergone some preparatory work. This preparation enables a few duties to be levied on them. It can be seen, therefore, that according to the doctrine of the petitioners, protection begins as soon as national work begins.
The fourth category is made up of finished products that can under no circumstances be useful to national work. We consider these, says the petition, to be the most properly taxable.
Thus the petitioners claim that foreign competition damages national work; this is the error of the protectionist regime. They demand protection for work; this is the aim of the protectionist regime. They make this protection consist of duties on foreign work; this is the means used by the protectionist regime.
§2. These two systems differ through one additional error for which the petitioners are responsible.
However, there is an essential difference between these two doctrines. It lies entirely in the greater or lesser extension given to the meaning of the word work.
M. de Saint-Cricq extends it to cover everything. He therefore wishes to protect everything.
“Work constitutes the entire wealth of a people,” says he. “The protection of the agriculture industry, the entire agriculture industry, the manufacturing industry, the entire manufacturing industry, is the cry that will always resound around this chamber.”
The petitioners regard as work only that which is done by manufacturers, and therefore they accord the favors of protection only to this.
“Raw materials have not yet undergone any human transformation, and
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in principle they should not be taxed. Manufactured objects can no longer be useful to national work; we consider these to be the most properly taxable.”
This gives rise to three questions which require examination: 1. Are raw materials the outcome of work? 2. If they are not something else, is this work so different from the work done by factories that it would be reasonable to subject them to opposing regimes? 3. If the same regime suits all types of work, should this regime be one of free trade or one of protectionism?
1. Are raw materials the outcome of work?
And precisely what are, I ask you, all the articles that the petitioners include in the first two categories of their proposals? What are all types of wheat, flour, farm animals, dried and salted meat, pork, bacon, salt, iron, copper, lead, coal, wool, skins, and seeds, if they are not outcomes of work?
What, it will be said, is an iron ingot, a ball of wool, or a bushel of wheat if not a product of work? Is it not nature that creates each?
Doubtless, nature creates the elements of all these things, but it is human work that produces their value. It is not given to men, to manufacturers, any more than to farmers, to create or make something out of nothing, and if by work you mean creation, all our work would be non productive and that of traders more so than any other!
The farmer therefore does not claim to have created wool, but he does claim to have produced value, by which I mean that through his work and expenditures he has transformed into wool substances that in no way originally resembled wool. What else does the manufacturer do when he converts wool into fabric?
In order for men to clothe themselves in fabric, a host of operations is necessary. Before the intervention of any human work, the true raw materials of this product are air, water, heat, light, and the gases and salts that have to be included in its composition. An initial operation converts these substances into fodder, a second into wool, a third into thread, and a fourth into a garment. Who would dare to say that no part of this operation constitutes work, from the first furrow of the plough that starts it to the final stitch that completes it?
And since, for greater speed in the completion of the end product—the garment—the work is divided among several categories of workers, you wish, through an arbitrary distinction, to determine that the sequence of these tasks should be the reason for their importance, so that the first does not even deserve the title