The Second PART.
Containing a full Answer to all the Objections which may be rais’d against what has bin before demonstrated.
To shew how frivolous an Excuse this is, I shall only endeavor to prove the two following Points: First, That the Means these Gentlemen propose for examining the Truth, is the most unreasonable in the World; Next, That it can be of almost no service in a manner to their Cause, while they <150> keep to those Terms which they seem fully resolv’d to abide by. Let’s explain both these Considerations severally.
All the reasonable part of Mankind, and those who have made the best Observations on the nature of things, and on that of Man in particular, are agreed, that one of the greatest Obstacles in a Search after Truth, is that of the Passions obscuring and disguising the Objects of our Understanding, or making a perpetual diversion of the Forces of the Mind. Hence they so earnestly recommend the getting an intire Command over our Passions, so as to be able to silence and dismiss ’em at pleasure: Hence they suppose it the Duty of a righteous Judg to hear the Reasons o’ both sides in cool blood, and free from all Passion; and even believe him incapable of dispensing exact Justice, without this Disposition. Even Pity and Compassion, Qualitys very useful in Religion and civil Life, they suppose capable of blinding the Judgment, and giving a wrong Biass. It’s certain, where the Mind is calm, and preserving an even and steddy frame, is able to look fixedly on a miserable Object, without those Emotions of Pity, which intender the Soul; ’tis much more capable of sifting out the Truth thro all the Disguises of Artifice and Counterfeit; ’tis plac’d in the true Point of Sight for perceiving the Merits of the Cause. For after all, the Wretch whose melancholy Figure moves Pity, and makes our very Bowels yearn, may have committed the Fact he stands accus’d of: and shou’d there be any thing of a shuffle or slight in the Management, which a dispassionate Judg might be able to see thro, by the Penetration of <151> his Genius; yet he’s utterly disabled, when Pity operates and possesses him with a favorable Opinion of the Accus’d. In a word, nothing is truer than this Maxim of the Roman* Historian; That it behoves those who consult upon things of a doubtful nature, to be free from Hatred, Friendship, Anger and Compassion; for the Mind can’t readily discern the true state of things, where these interfere. I cou’d furnish out twenty Pages with Sentences of the same kind, did I only consult the Polyanthea. But who sees not already how unreasonable the Objection is, which I’m about to confute in this Chapter? It’s not our Intention, say the Convertists, that any one shou’d violate the Lights of his Conscience, to be deliver’d from the Uneasiness we give him: All our aim and all our hopes is, that a Love for the Comforts of Life, and a Dread of Misery will rouze him from his slumber, and put him upon an Examination of the two Religions; being confident that a fair Review can’t fail of discovering to him the Falseness of his own, and the Truth of ours. That is, the business being to pass judgment in a Question of mighty importance, as well with regard to the Reasons o’ both sides, as to the Consequences of a good or a bad Choice; we’l have Men enter upon the Merits of it, not in a state of clear and undisturb’d Reason, when their Passions are calm’d; but under the disadvantage of all those Mists and thick Darkness, which a Conflict of several violent Passions must <152> needs produce in the Soul. Can any thing be more absurd? Were there a difference between two Footmen about three Half-crowns, no body wou’d think it reasonable, that one who was an Enemy to either of ’em, or who fear’d or expected any thing from either, shou’d be the Umpire between ’em: and yet here, where the Glory of God is at stake, and the eternal Salvation of mens Souls, ’tis thought reasonable that the Judges who are to decide between Catholick and Protestant, who is right, and who wrong, shou’d come with Souls full of Resentment, full of worldly Hopes and Fears. It’s thought reasonable, that a Man who is to weigh the Reasons of both sides, instead of applying the whole force of his Facultys in the Inquiry, shou’d be distracted on one hand with the approaching prospect of a Family ruin’d, exil’d, or encloister’d; of his own Person degraded and render’d incapable of all Honors and Preferments, buffeted by Soldiers, and thrust into a loathsom Dungeon; and on the other hand, by the prospect of several Advantages for himself and Family. The Man, you see, is in a fair way of making a right judgment; for if he be strongly persuaded of the Truth of his own Religion, and fears God enough to find a reluctance to the professing a Religion he thinks naught, he’l be but the more confirm’d in his own, by the prejudice he must needs conceive against the other, from the tyrannical methods it employs against him. If he loves the World more than his God or his Religion, one of these two things will undoubtedly follow; either he’l blind himself the best he can, to introduce a dislike of his own Religion; or else <153> quit it abruptly, without troubling his head to examine whether t’other Religion be better or no: he’l determine himself by the temporal Advantages which this offers, and by the Persecutions which that might expose him to. All this is so just, and so obvious to any Man who will but examine himself, and who knows the imperious Sway of our Passions, that I’m afraid People will complain I insist too long upon the proofs of a Point which no body