As for mediation, the literature is somewhat divided on whether it works for or against female disputants. There are studies that argue that mediation is beneficial for female disputants because it saves time and effort, and provides these disputants with the space where they can negotiate creatively for a wider range of legal options that may not be available through a process of litigation structured by fixed codes (Coulson 1983; Fuller 1970; MacCabe 2001; Pearson and Thoennes 1984; Roberts 1983; Sander 1984; Silberman 1982).
Other scholars, however, have questioned whether or not mediation in family courts can overcome the gendered power imbalance that often exists between disputants (Bottomley 1984, 1985a, 1985b). Bottomley, for instance, warns that too much focus on the best interest of children and preservation of amicable family relations, which characterize many mediation practices and pro-mediation literature, leads to undermining the individual rights of female disputants. Bottomley and other critics also point out that alternative mechanisms of dispute resolution that may be perceived as beneficial to women—because of their informality, flexibility, and autonomy—may lack the procedural safeguards to ensure a transparent and just legal process, thus risking women’s loss of the guarantee of equality in front of the law (Bottomley 1985b; Shaffer 1988). There are critics who also found that mediation undermines women’s access to justice, but for a very different reason than previously mentioned. This reason is that mediation in some contexts is too regulated by abstract state laws and procedures, and thus fails to provide the space for female disputants to exercise agency in seeking justice (Abel 1982; O’Donovan 1985).
There is also a considerable body of literature that argues that mediation is particularly detrimental to female disputants in domestic violence cases. A common finding in this literature has been that women in such cases are hindered by the fear of abuse or violence and hence are unable to exercise agency in the mediation sessions (Field 2004; Lerman 1984; Strang and Braithwaite 2002). Some of the studies in this literature also cite particular patterns of familial relations and cultural/societal norms that may function as additional factors that lead women to be passive and deferring to the opinions and advice of others in mediation sessions, hence diminishing mediation as a mechanism of fair and just dispute resolution for women (Picket 1991; Weingarten and Douvan 1985).
In her ethnographic research on mediation-based family courts in Kolkata, India, Srimati Basu also questions whether this new system can facilitate tangible feminist legal reform (Basu 2012). Basu found that the mechanisms of family courts—in the absence of reform in the substantive laws regulating gender relations and rights, as well as in the context of dominant patriarchal cultural norms—could, in fact, undermine women’s pursuit of justice. For instance, the court-based mediators tend to understand ‘conciliation’ not simply as an alternative mode of dispute resolution (to adversarial, litigation-centered approach), but more as the reconciliation of the disputants and the salvaging of marriages. Basu also observed that some judges, again because of their problem-solving roles in these courts, restricted the space for female disputants to exercise agency in the process. Basu’s conclusion was that mediation and problem-oriented mechanisms of family dispute resolution in Indian family courts often reflected and reenforced dominant patriarchal gender norms, even in cases when mediators and judges sided with the female disputants. Basu’s larger point is that while mediation-based family courts may have some benefits for women—such as accessibility and affordability of the legal systems—it is important to be cognizant of the gendered limitations and limits of this legal reform.
Egyptian Family Courts: Pathways to Family Wellbeing, Gender Justice, and Modern State Governance?
It is within this larger global context of the growing but also contested popularity and desirability of specialized, mediation-based family courts that we need to understand Laila Takla’s initiative for the establishment of similar family courts in Egypt. Takla espoused this global model of therapeutic, problem-solving, family-oriented court system. Having done volunteer work as a young lawyer in Egyptian juvenile courts and having closely observed the court circuits for personal status cases, Takla believed that the model of family courts was the much-needed answer to tackle the problem of stressful, contentious, and family-adverse atmosphere and procedures in courtrooms (2004: 104). In fact, Takla begins her book on family courts with a dedication that reads, “To every Egyptian family, for whom family courts are established” (2004: 3). This dedication is a good introduction to Takla’s vision of the new family courts. Takla emphasizes that the establishment of family courts is neither a luxury nor is it simply about modernizing the legal system (2004: 9). Rather, the need for these new courts is based on an understanding that sees the well-being of the family as the central consideration guiding the legal processes in personal status cases. And because family disputes are of a distinct nature, according to Takla, state institutions’ involvement in the resolution of these disputes warrants the establishment of a specialized unified court system. The aim of this new system is first and foremost to resolve family disputes through non-litigation mechanisms, such as reconciliation and mediation, undertaken by well-trained court personnel. If alternative dispute resolution mechanisms fail, then the dispute proceeds to the litigation stage. In this stage, the role of the judge is not merely to adjudicate between disputants in a detached manner and simply grant claimants their legal rights. Rather, the judge is also to assume the role of a problem-solver who aims at resolving the dispute in a manner that protects the best interests of children and maintains healthy family relations as much as possible, regardless of the outcome of the lawsuit.
Takla stresses that the kind of justice provided by the new family courts system is one that “takes off its blinders to see the children and all the parties concerned, to hear what they say, and to feel what they feel” (2004: 11; my emphasis). Hence, it is necessary to have well-trained court personnel who are specialists in family affairs and who understand and espouse the philosophy of this legal system. The rationale for establishing specialized family courts, Takla argues, is not only to support women, but the whole family. This point is strongly made in Takla’s following quote: “family courts are not established for women, but for women and men, for the wife, the husband, the son, the brother, the children, and the relatives” (2004: 12). Takla sees that one of the important strengths of this new courts system is its participatory processes, which create space for disputants and court personnel to partake collectively in the resolution of the dispute. In short, Takla sees the new family courts system as one that provides therapeutic, problem-solving justice, and hence, a system that addresses not only the legal, but also the social aspects of the conflict.
While Takla viewed the new family courts as primarily a mechanism for delivering family-oriented justice, other influential advocates of the new courts system pursued this legal reform for different goals. These advocates were both individual actors and state institutions. The individual actors were a group of prominent women’s rights advocates who adopted the initiative of the new family courts as part of their larger goal of lobbying for a series of legal reforms to address the inequalities and challenges that women faced in the family domain. These advocates pursued their goal through their roles in state institutions. But these institutions also had their own goals for pushing for legal reforms such as the new family courts. For them, the new courts system was part of a state project aimed at realizing the goals of development and modern governance intertwined with state feminism,5 a project influenced in part by factors such as the country’s international standing and its commitments vis-à-vis international organizations, international conventions, and aid donors. These state institutions were the NCW, the NDP, and the NCCM.
Among these prominent women’s rights advocates were Mona Zulficar. Zulficar is a legal expert in investment banking law and the cofounder of and senior partner at the Shalakany Law Office. She served on numerous international committees working on gender and women’s rights. Since the late 1980s, Zulficar had been a key figure in a relatively loose coalition of women’s rights activists, academics, senior legal figures, government officials, and public thinkers who lobbied for a series of new personal status