Here’s the thing: the social “mainstream” is a far, far broader patchwork canopy than liberal and/or progressive opinion can comfortably profess. Mainstream acceptability is delineated by widely shared thresholds of acceptability on either side. Like taboos, these thresholds entail particular attitudinal and behavioural jumps that mark the boundaries of political legitimacy and “truth”. It is against these categorical extremes, Uwe Backes argued, that any “majority society” reflects its supposed normality.13 Yet, relative silence or lack of voting majorities is not sufficient assurance of robust adherence to the mainstream, let alone of positive or moderate approval for its lofty normative declarations. Supported by rooted and robust Foucauldian “regimes of truth”, as argued above, normative mainstream discourses are powerful enough projections to effectively conceal opposition and drown out public expressions of resentment. Whether, however, relative silence can be taken as tacit or passive approval is another matter.
To take a recent example, polls conducted during the Black Lives Matter mobilisation in the US in 2020 have encouragingly revealed significant increases in public support against institutionalised racism.14 Yet, they also typically show ongoing opposition to taking down symbols of the country’s imperialist and segregationist past. Supporting anti-racism when asked does not mean actively opposing racism.15 Protests, especially when they turn violent, can be divisive, pitting ideological support against the (always powerful) “law-and-order” agenda. To declare support for racism publicly remains a very strong taboo; but to invoke “public order”16 or national identity as under threat by such protests is also a powerful existential tool that adds that all-important conditional “but” to potential declarations of support for a cause.
The search for a political “mainstream” is messy, often self-contradictory, fickle, and difficult to access in sufficiently high resolution. It is more reflective of a continuum of more or less acceptable views than of a stable positive majority. For a politician or movement to claim unique and/or privileged access on the supposed “real” mainstream’s behalf is duplicitous hyperbole. But to trust either election results or opinion polls as the more accurate trace of “mainstream” pulse is to put just a bit too much faith on the question asked as well as on the validity of the answers publicly given. The populist claim to give voice to silent majorities is more akin to a call for public insurrection by supposed underdogs against certain existing social and political taboos– and a promise of long-overdue redress.17 Seen from this perspective, it may be easier to comprehend why the populist trope has worked to shock electoral effect too often in recent years; and why it is a mistake to simply brush it aside as a misnomer or as a loud, manipulative social media fad. It is also just a bit closer to an uncomfortable truth that we may wish to admit and act upon: the “mainstream” as a bundle of diverse social majorities (or in electoral parlance, “voting coalitions”) is generally less progressive and more erratic than often assumed.18 Populists may not be supported by “silent majorities”, but their transgressive arguments speak to, legitimise, and then normalise a number of “subjugated knowledges” that have the power to transform the complexion of the “mainstream”.19
Dr Aristotle Kallis is a Senior Fellow at CARR and professor of modern and contemporary history at Keele University.
1 “Recent Polls on Immigration, Public Opinion & Voting: MW 361”, Migration Watch UK, last modified April 7, 2016, https://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-paper/361/recent-polls-on-immigration
2 Aristotle Kallis, “When Fascism Became Mainstream: The Challenge of Extremism in Times of Crisis”, Fascism 4 no. 1 (2015): 1–24.
3 Roch Dunin-Wasowicz, “Long read | Are opinion polls biased towards Leave?”, LSE Blogs, October 29, 2019, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2019/10/29/long-read-are-opinion-polls-pro-leave-biased/
4 Lars Rensmann, “The Noisy Counter-Revolution: Understanding the Cultural Conditions and Dynamics of Populist Politics in Europe in the Digital Age”, Politics and Governance 5 no. 4 (2017): 123-35.
5 Daniele Lorenzini, “What is a ‘Regime of Truth’?”, Le Foucaldien 1 no. 1 (2015), 1.
6 Sarah Thelen, “Mobilizing a Majority: Nixon's ‘Silent Majority’ Speech and the Domestic Debate over Vietnam”, Journal of American Studies 51 no. 3 (2017): 887–914.
7 Jerald Podair, Zach Messitte and Charles Holden, “The Man Who Pioneered Trumpism”, Washington Post, November 15, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2018/11/15/man-who-pioneered-trumpism/.
8 John Keane, “We the People: The Charms and Contradictions of Populism”, The Conversation, November 2, 2016, https://theconversation.com/we-the-people-the-charms-and-contradictions-of-populism-63769.
9 Desirée Schmuck and Michael Hameleers, “Closer to the People: A Comparative Content Analysis of Populist Communication on Social Networking Sites in Pre- and Post-Election Periods”, Information, Communication & Society 23 no. 10 (2020): 1531-48.
10 Mark Mardell, “The Netherlands’ Populist Moment?”, BBC News, February 13, 2017, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-38956740; Megan Galbreath, “An Analysis of Donald Trump and Marine Le Pen”, Harvard International Review 38 no. 3 (2017): 7-9.
11 Harry Enten, “Silent Majorities Are a Misnomer”, CNN, June 6, 2020, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/06/06/politics/trump-silent-majority-analysis/index.html.
12 Cas Mudde, “Populists Aren’t a Silent Majority—They’re Just a Loud Minority”, Guardian, September 6, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/sep/06/populists-silent-majority-loud-minority.
13 Uwe Backes, “Meaning and Forms of Political Extremism in Past and Present”, Central European Political Studies Review IX no. 4 (2007): 242-62.
14 “Poll Shows Strong Public Support for BLM Protests”,