In January 1993, Williams secured UN funding to host an international conference for volcanologists in Pasto, near Galeras. He managed to attract many distinguished experts from around the globe, although Chouet and his team were not able to attend. Williams, something of a showman, planned for the highlight of the conference to be a field trip into the crater, led by himself. He had checked emissions from fumaroles in the crater and was convinced there was no imminent danger of an eruption because sulphur dioxide levels were relatively low. But other volcanologists had begun to detect telltale tornillos since 23 December and questions were raised about the safety of the expedition.
On the eve of the expedition there was a meeting but accounts of the ensuing discussion differ. Colombian volcanologist Fernando Gil, who had previously worked with Chouet, was alarmed: ‘We were concerned by these long-period events and what had happened when we’d seen them before.’ But Williams and his colleagues, who were not seismologists, did not really understand what the problem was. Williams’ associate John Stix admits, ‘There was a concern, but we didn’t really understand what those [long-period] events were telling us.’ Williams claims that there was no consensus about the predictive value of LPEs: ‘... there was no such understanding [that tornillos might presage an eruption]. In the days before our trip into the crater, no one brought the tornillos to my attention or warned that the volcano might be poised to blow ... Based on all available evidence, the consensus at the observatory was that Galeras was safe.’
Cross section through a volcano. Heat and pressure from rising magma forces steam and gas through cracks and vents in the rock known as fumaroles.
TIMELINE
Why was he not aware of the potential significance of Chouet’s work? ‘Unfortunately, Chouet – with whom I did not get along – never sent me a copy of his report,’ he wrote in Surviving Galeras, his 2001 account of the disaster. Would it have made any difference? ‘If I had been down there at the time and I had seen the long-period events I would certainly have voiced my opinion that it was not an appropriate time to go into the crater. But I couldn’t have just jumped in front of them and said, “Over my dead body!” so I don’t know what the outcome would have been,’ points out Chouet.
Into the valley of death
The next morning, 14 January 1993, Williams led a party of nine scientists and three hikers up the mountain and into the caldera, the wide crater atop the volcano within which sits the volcanic cone itself. For several hours they took readings and gathered samples; other scientists watched from the caldera rim. At 1.30pm the volcano blew its top, blasting thousands of tons of rock into the air to rain down on those in and around the crater. Nine people were killed almost instantly, blown away or smashed by falling rocks. Williams himself was horribly injured, his leg mangled and slivers of skull driven into his brain.
Whether Williams was at fault for going ahead with the field trip is debatable but his behaviour after the disaster damned him in the eyes of many. He compounded bouts of apparent memory loss and fantasising with arrogance and contempt for others, in what science journalist Victoria Bruce, author of No Apparent Danger: The True Story of Volcanic Disaster at Galeras and Nevado del Ruiz and one of Williams’ most trenchant critics, called ‘a flagrant grab for fame at the expense of dead colleagues’.
Galeras erupting in 2008. The fatal mountain continues to threaten surrounding communities, but better predictive science has improved the ability of the authorities to evacuate in time.
‘I do not feel guilty about the death of my colleagues. there is no guilt. there was only an eruption.’
STANLEY WILLIAMS, SURVIVING GALERAS, 2001
For instance, in a memo from the period Williams accuses two of the other survivors of being ‘pathetic liars ... jealous of the recognition which I received’ for disputing his account. He now admits that he was ‘playing the survivor’, and some have ascribed his abysmal behaviour to the brain damage he sustained.
In the debate over which heralds of impending eruption – LPEs or elevated sulphur emissions – to heed, Chouet seems to have been vindicated. His 1996 paper on the use of LPEs for eruption forecasting is one of the ten most cited papers in volcanology. When the Mexican volcano Popocatépetl had its biggest eruption in a millennium on 18 December 2000, careful analysis of LPEs meant the authorities were able to give 48 hours notice to evacuate 30,000 people who lived in the danger zone. Not one person was hurt.
|
|
|
HUXLEY
vs
WILBERFORCE
FEUDING PARTIES
T.H. Huxley (1825–95), aka ‘Darwin’s Bulldog’ – biologist, educator
vs
Samuel Wilberforce (1805–1873), aka ‘Soapy Sam’ – Bishop of Oxford
DATE
Saturday, 30 June 1860, at the meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS) at Oxford
CAUSE OF FEUD
The descent of man
One of the most famous confrontations in science was the clash over evolution between T.H. Huxley, known as ‘Darwin’s Bulldog’ because of his tenacity in defending Darwin’s theory of evolution through natural selection, and Bishop Samuel Wilberforce, known as ‘Soapy Sam’ because of his smooth, persuasive, even slippery style in debates. This now legendary encounter is typically quoted as a milestone in the ‘triumph’ of science over religion, though many dispute this and there is a great deal of uncertainty over what was actually said.
Barking and yelping
As he knew it would, the 1859 publication of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species aroused opposition from many quarters, including many in the Church. Evolutionary theories were common currency at the time but men like William Paley had reconciled them with religious belief by suggesting that evolution was directed by some sort of cosmic guiding hand (i.e. God). What was particularly shocking about Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection was that it removed the need for a guiding intelligence directing