Aung could not believe that his father would ever be like that. He was almost sixty, and he was educated in that famous college in India—he should know better.
Aung said, “But Pho, I think you are reading the situation completely wrong. The Japanese have no real interest in helping Burma; just read what they did in Manchuria and other places they occupied. They are here only for Japan’s selfish interest; they do not care about Burma or the Burmese, Pho. The Japanese have a track record of destroying other countries and cultures. You should know that, Pho.”
His father got even angrier and barked, “I have had enough of you. Get out of my sight and get out of this home; I do not want to see your face in this house again.” Aung felt deeply hurt and departed.
When Aung was very young, he had heard stories about that Jade statue of Buddha and that Jade marriage bowl from his grandmother while sitting next to her on a sofa. She always said that those objects brought good luck and blessings to the Chaofa family. The Jade was mined by the Kachins from the Jade mines near Hpakant, and the best carvers of the day carved those. To her, those were almost spiritual and clearly objects of Shan pride; the Jade bowl was used in their family for many generations of marriages. No amount of money could replace those.
The value of those objects could not be measured in monetary terms. Those objects were part of a century of Chaofa family history. His grandmother had passed away, and his father did not seem to care about the Shan heritage. Aung could not tolerate it anymore—he knew he had to do something. After getting banished and leaving his father’s Muang, Aung wandered in the jungles for several weeks. He eventually decided that the best way to get rid of the Japanese would be to join the Kachins and their armed resistance against the Japanese occupation.
With that burning desire to expel the Japanese from his homeland, Aung joined the Kachin scouts and started assisting the Allied forces. The Kachins were already helping the British and American forces. Unlike the Shan, they were against the Japanese because of the atrocities committed by the Japanese Army against ordinary Kachin villagers. The Kachin tribal leaders never forgot that violence and never forgave the Japanese Army. As scouts and rangers, they would observe and share information on Japanese troop strength and schedules of trains with supplies and ammunition storage, as well as pinpoint targets for accurate air raids. They also helped in rescue operations behind enemy lines.
Aung decided that he would reorganize that effort and help the Allied forces in a more predictable way by getting informers employed in a Japanese base and by appointing locals as lookout and spotters. He knew his language skills would come in very handy during the war. He was fluent in Shan, Kachin, Karen, and most importantly, English. Over a period of time, he would add a band of dedicated Shan and Kachin fighters; some of those were already experienced in the guerrilla tactics.
These fighters would participate in small arms skirmishes to harass the Japanese Army in the hills—Japanese patrols were targeted often. Initially, his was a very mobile group of scouts and fighters. They never stayed in any one place for long, but their efforts were concentrated around Myitkyina in Northern Burma. Aung and his Kachin scouts chose Myitkyina because it was strategically located; it had the biggest Japanese base and the most important regional airport. The airport was used as a hub for Northern Burma by the Japanese. The British also used the Myitkyina Airport in that manner before they left Burma.
Aung knew that the biggest battle of World War II (WWII) in his homeland would be fought in Myitkyina sometime in the very near future. He wanted to influence the outcome of that battle for his people. When Aung was not in a battle or in a crossfire while scouting, he would incessantly talk about the preservation of Shan tribal heritage and culture if he found a receptive audience. He would also talk about how the Japanese were plundering rubies, sapphires, and jade that belonged to the local tribes. The Shan, Kachin, and Lisu people of the hills were being deprived in every way; the Japanese did not care about the tribes. They knew they had the Burmese tribal leaders on their side.
The Shan cause had become an obsession with Aung. He was also realizing that as a minority ethnic group, the Shan and the other tribes could not remain isolated. Their best option was to engage in the politics in Burma’s national and regional levels—they needed a seat at the table. Most of Aung’s 1942 went in scouting for the British, but the British efforts were disorganized—mostly unsuccessful because the Japanese were well settled in their defensive fortifications. The Japanese forces could not be threatened because of their control over the Irrawaddy River and the railway track. The river and the railway gave a tactical advantage to the Japanese; those were the best transportation options.
By the end of that year, it was seeming unlikely that the British would ever cross the Irrawaddy River or launch a viable attack on the city of Myitkyina. Aung’s hopes were dwindling fast because an ever-increasing number of local leaders were moving over to the Japanese side. To Aung, an Allied victory in Burma seemed like an insurmountable challenge for the British. They were not able to cope; Aung was getting very concerned about the future Burma under Japanese occupation.
Around that time, through his contacts among the locals who worked with the Japanese forces, he was hearing rumors that Colonel Suzuki was being recalled to Japan with a few of his aides. Apparently, the Japanese war office thought Colonel Suzuki and his Minami Kikan were getting a bit too cozy with the Burmese national leaders. Aung was afraid that the Japanese might take the Shan treasures with them to Japan. Aung felt helpless—all he could do was to vent his frustration to his war hardened Kachin comrades in their mountain camp. They were among the few in the whole world that understood his agony.
One day, Aung heard a rumor that the British forces were almost ready to launch an extended campaign in Burma out of Assam and Nagaland in India. His source was a general contractor in the Japanese base, so the information had to be of high quality. He hoped that the British and other Allied forces had learned from their past mistakes. From his side, he decided that he would do everything to get his Kachin scouts ready. He rounded up more scouts, imparted weapons training to them, and surveyed the Kachin Hills for hidden caves, new trails, and streams.
All those measures would come in handy during the Allied campaign. Some Kachins were formidable guerrilla fighters by then; they became very effective in training other Kachins. As a result of those initiatives, the size of the scouts’ force grew to several hundred rapidly. Next year, 1943, was very different for Aung. That year brought new promises. The first of those promises were in the form of specially trained British forces for jungle warfare. These were special forces trained as long-range penetration units that were supported by supplies dropped from the sky by parachutes. By design, they did not have any support infrastructure on the ground. These British columns would penetrate the jungle on foot, mainly relying on surprise to target enemy lines of communication, road infrastructure, and supply depots.
Their mobility in the hills was their biggest asset; they were not large in numbers but were seasoned fighters. It was neither easy nor effective for the Japanese heavy armor to run after these forces on the Kachin Hills. Some of the trails were so narrow and steep that soldiers could only manage to march in single file. Even if the Japanese patrols knew of their presence, the topography made it hard for them to take action quickly. The British forces and the scouts became very good at using the terrain to their advantage—they managed to adapt really well.
Kachins were born trackers, they used those skills really well. The special forces carried everything they had and needed for jungle warfare on their backs. That technique worked well in the steep and scrubby hillside of Northern Burma. When the supplies were parachuted to these forces, local Kachins would assist them with load carrying mules or other animals that could negotiate steep inclines. Aung thought this was payback because the Japanese had previously used the same strategy to devastating effect against the British forces there. In the early stages of the war, the British were a bit unprepared; as a result, the