But the intensification of class struggle within the country and the growing threat of new intervention by the capitalist environment in the late 1920s raised the question of accelerating the transition to socialism and boosting industrialization (creation of heavy industry as the basis of the country’s defense capability). In 1931 it was decided to accelerate the transition to socialism and to force industrialization (creation of a heavy industry as the basis of the country’s defense capacity). Stalin harshly formulated the choice: “We are -150 years behind the capitalist West. We have to go this way in 10 years. Either we will do it, for we are in doubt”. This conclusion turned out to be prophetic and was confirmed in 1941”.
The problems of industrial production development were actively covered. Theoretical discussions in the mid-20s centred on the questions of how to carry out industrialization (should we start with light industry, i.e. should we go for “chintz industrialization”), where to get sources for huge investments in heavy industry?
Economists of Marxist-Leninist direction saw in socialist industrialization practical realization of requirements of the law of preferential growth of production means of production. Such ideas were substantiated by S.Strumilin. He analyzed the rate of capital accumulation in the industry of pre-revolutionary Russia and compared it with the Soviet time. From such analysis, he concluded that the country had all the prerequisites for accelerated industrialization and for exceeding the previously known growth rates.
F.E. Dzerzhinsky, S. Ordzhonikidze, V.I. Mezhlauk, V.V. Mezhlauk actively defended the Bolshevik concept of socialist industrialization. Kuibyshev, A.I. Rykov.
They were opposed by economists, who at that time were known as “bourgeois” (B. Brutskus, L. Litoshenko, L. Yurovsky, etc.). B. Brutskus, L. Litoshenko insisted on the inadmissibility of redistribution of national income in favor of industry. L. Yurovsky proposed to achieve a balanced market by restraining capital construction. (Bukharin N.I., Preobrazhensky E.A. Ways of Development: Discussions of the 20s. – L.: Lenizdat, 1990. Lenin V.I. Draft resolution on the report on electrification // Op. cit. – _. 42. – _. 196, Trotsky’s
Archive. – M.: Terra Publishing Centre, 1990. – T. 3,4.
Stromilin S.G. Statistics and Economics. – Moscow: Science, 1979. – _. 28. His own. Problems of Economics of Labour. – Moscow: Science, 1982.
Dzerzhinsky F.E. Selected works. – T. 2. – M.: Politizdat, 1977, S. Ordzhonikidze. Articles and speeches. – T. 2. – 1926—1937: Politizdat, 1977,
Ordzhonikidze S. Articles and Speeches – T. – M.: Gospolitizdat, 1957, Mezhlauk V.I. Cheapening of construction – decisive link in the construction program of 1936.-M.: PartizdatskKVKShchb), 1935, Kuibyshev V.V. Selected works.-M.: Gospolitizdat, 1958, A.I. Rykov Selected works.-M.: Economics, 1990).
We do not tend to stick the label of “bourgeoisness” to economists L. Yurovsky and L. Litoshenko. Their proposed concept of painless and gradual progressive development of the country now looks much more attractive than the one according to which it was developed. However, our theoretical calculations allow us to conclude that this best concept of development did not sufficiently take into account the time factor. History has devoted too little time to industrialization.
Nikolai Dmitrievich Kondratyev – the biggest economist and theorist of that time – took his own position. Without opposing the course of industrialization, Kondratyev, in fact, was against the disproportionate development of major industries, as he saw it as a basis for possible future economic crises. He objected to the high growth rates and savings rates adopted, believing them to be unjustified.
N.I. Bukharin proposed to develop our industry on the basis of increasing the technical level, however, in strict compliance with both the market capacity and the financial capacity of the state. He advocated rapid but balanced growth of the heavy industry with other industries.
With many comparative shortcomings in the struggle of ideas won the plan of transformation, which was proposed by most of the country’s leadership, headed by Stalin. This plan took into account the factor of limited time.
The main mistake of Stalin’s critics is an attempt to prove their ignorance of the economic laws of development. That was a clear distortion of the truth. On the contrary, he stressed: “At our enterprises are relevant issues such as the question of economic calculation and profitability, the question of cost, the question of prices, etc. Therefore, our enterprises cannot and should not do without the law of cost”. (Yurovsky L. Modern problems of monetary policy. – _., 1926. – _. 54,
Kondratyev N.D. Problems of economic dynamics. – Moscow: Economics, 1989, Kun M. Bukharin: his friends and enemies. – Moscow: Republic, 1992, Stalin I.V. Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR. – Moscow: Gosolitizdat, 1952. – 20).
South Ural industry in the new economic policy years
In the beginning of 20th years of XX century the first concrete step in revival of economy of Southern Ural Mountains has been made. In March 1921 the X Congress of the RCP (b) took place, which took a course on a new economic policy, and by the decree from May 17 on abolition of nationalization of small enterprises each citizen was given the right to be engaged in trade, to organize small industrial enterprises with the number of workers not more than 10—15 people. The revival and development of the market and the monetary system were declared to be the main principles of the New economic policy, while in the industrial sector the transition to commercial settlement, overcoming the wage equalization, the development of cooperative and other non-state enterprises.
The first and main measure of the new economic policy was to replace food politics with a food tax, initially set at about 20% of the net product of peasant labor (i.e., requiring almost twice as much bread as food politics), and then reducing to 10% of the crop and less and took the form of money. The peasant could sell the remaining products after the prolongation of the tax at his discretion – either to the state or on the free market.
Radical transformations have taken place in industry. Senior managements were abolished, and instead trusts were created – associations of homogeneous or interrelated enterprises, which gained full economic and financial independence, up to the right to issue long-term bonded loans.
In the 1923 decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People’s Commissars the following was written down: trusts – state industrial enterprises, to which the state grants independence in the production of their operations, according to the charter approved for each of them, and which operate on the basis of commercial calculation to extract profits.
Syndicates began to emerge – voluntary trust associations on the basis of cooperation, engaged in sales, supply, lending, foreign trade operations. The board of syndicates was elected at a meeting of trust representatives, and each trust could delegate most or less of its supply and sales to the syndicate.
Sales of finished goods, purchase of raw materials and equipment were made in the full-fledged market, through wholesale trade channels. Trade and industrial enterprises started to appear in the South Urals.
In industry and other sectors, monetary remuneration of labor was restored, wage rates were introduced to exclude equalization, and restrictions were removed to increase wages as output grew. Labor armies were abolished, mandatory labor duty and basic restrictions on changing jobs were abolished.
The labor organization was built on the principles of material incentives that replaced the non-economic coercion of “military communism”.
In the South Urals industry and trade, the private sector emerged: some stateowned enterprises were denationalized, others were leased out; it was allowed to establish their own industrial