My Lord, I then proceed to the aggression in southeastern Europe against Greece and Yugoslavia, and the first moment of time in that regard is the meeting at Salzburg in August 1939, at which the Defendant Von Ribbentrop participated, when Hitler announced that the Axis had decided to liquidate certain neutrals. That is Document 1871-PS, which I now put in as Exhibit GB-142, and the passage to which I should like to refer the Tribunal is on Page 2 of the English version, two-thirds down the page in the middle of the fifth paragraph, six lines from the top. Your Lordship will find the words “Generally speaking.”
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I desire to quote from there:
“Generally speaking, it would be best to liquidate the pseudo-neutrals one after the other. This is fairly easily done if one Axis partner protects the rear of the other, as the latter finishes off one of the uncertain neutrals. Italy may consider Yugoslavia such an uncertain neutral. At the visit of Prince Regent Paul he (the Führer) suggested, particularly with regard to Italy, that Prince Paul clarify his political attitude towards the Axis by a gesture. He had thought of a closer connection with the Axis and the withdrawal of Yugoslavia from the League of Nations. Prince Paul agreed to the latter. Recently the Prince Regent was in London and sought reassurance from the Western Powers. The same thing was repeated that happened in the case of Gafencu, who was also very reasonable during his visit to Germany and who denied any interest in the aims of the Western Democracies. Afterwards it was learned that he had later assumed a contrary standpoint in England. Among the Balkan countries the Axis can completely rely only on Bulgaria, which is, in a sense, a natural ally of Italy and Germany.”
Then missing a sentence:
“At the moment of a turn for the worse for Germany and Italy, however, Yugoslavia would join the other side openly, hoping thereby to give matters a final turn to the disadvantage of the Axis.”
That demonstrates the policy with regard to uncertain neutrals.
Then, as early as September 1940 this defendant reviewed the war situation with Mussolini. This defendant emphasized the heavy revenge bombing raids in England and the fact that London would soon be in ruins. It was agreed between the parties that only Italian interests were involved in Greece and Yugoslavia and that Italy could count on German support.
Then Von Ribbentrop went on further to explain to Mussolini the Spanish plan for the attack on Gibraltar and Germany’s participation therein and that he was expecting to sign the protocol with Spain, bringing the latter country into the war, on his return to Berlin.
This is Document 1842-PS, which is the next document in the book to the one at which the Tribunal has just been looking, and the passage with regard to Greece and Yugoslavia occurs in the middle of the first page—if I might just read a very short extract:
“With regard to Greece and Yugoslavia the Foreign Minister stressed that it was exclusively a question of Italian interests, the settling of which was a matter for Italy alone and in which Italy would be certain of Germany’s sympathetic assistance.”
I don’t think I need trouble the Tribunal with the rest.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, member for the United States): I think you had better read the next paragraph.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “But it seemed to us to be better not to touch on these problems for the time being, but instead to concentrate on the destruction of England with all our forces. Where Germany was concerned, she was interested in the northern German districts (Norway, et cetera), and this was acknowledged by the Duce.”
I am very grateful to you, Your Honor. That I put in as Exhibit GB-143.
A month or two later, in January 1941, at the meeting between Hitler and Mussolini, in which this defendant participated, the Greek operation was discussed. Hitler had stated that the German troops in Romania were for use in the planned campaign against Greece. That document is C-134, which was put in as Exhibit GB-119, and therefore I do not propose to give it again but to give the Tribunal the reference to the points which are mentioned at the foot of Page 3 of the English text.
With regard to that meeting there is a cross-reference in Count Ciano’s diary, Count Ciano having attended as Italian Foreign Minister, and he recalls his impression of that meeting in the diary for the 20th and 21st of January by saying:
“The Duce is pleased with the conversation on the whole. I am less pleased. Above all, because Ribbentrop, who had always been so boastful in the past, told me, when I asked him outright how long the war would last, that he saw no possibility of its ending before 1942.”
Despite that somewhat pessimistic statement to Count Ciano, a short time later, 3 weeks later, when it was a question of encouraging the Japanese, this defendant took a more optimistic line.
On the 13th of February 1941 he saw Ambassador Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador, and that conversation appears in Document 1834-PS, which is Exhibit USA-129. That was read previously, and again I simply give the reference on Page 3 of the English version.
The second from the last paragraph dealt with the optimistic account of the military position and the position of Bulgaria and Turkey. I do not think I need read it further, but I will give the Tribunal the reference.
Then after that, in March, this defendant put forth his efforts to get Yugoslavia to join the Axis, and on the 25th of March the defendant, in a note to the Prime Minister Cvetković—and this is Document 2450-PS, which is Exhibit GB-123—gave the assurance:
“The Axis-Power Governments, during this war, will not direct a demand to Yugoslavia to permit the march or transportation of troops through the Yugoslav state or territory.”
After that, it is only fair to point out that there was the coup d’état in Yugoslavia. General Simovic took over the government; and two days after the assurance which I just read, at the meeting of the 27th of March 1941, at which this defendant was present, Hitler outlined the military campaign against Yugoslavia and promised the destruction of Yugoslavia and the demolition of Belgrade by the German Air Force. That is contained in Document 1746-PS, which is Exhibit GB-120; and that was read by my friend, Colonel Phillimore at an earlier stage so I do not need to read it again.
The final action of this defendant with regard to Yugoslavia was that after the invasion of Yugoslavia Von Ribbentrop was one of the persons directed by Hitler to draw up the boundaries for the partition and division of Yugoslavia. The preliminary directive for that is Document 1195-PS, which I now put in as Exhibit GB-144.
We now come to the aggression against the Soviet Union, and the first. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Has that been read, 1195?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, it has not. I am much obliged, Your Lordship. I will now read the relevant sentence with regard to this.
On Page 2, Section 2, Your Lordship will see the words “the drawing up of boundaries.” And in Paragraph 1 it says:
“Insofar as the drawing up of boundaries has not been laid down in the above Part I, it will be carried out by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces in agreement with the Foreign Office,”—that is this defendant—“the Delegate for the Four Year Plan,”—the Defendant Göring—“and the Reich Minister of the Interior.”
THE PRESIDENT: Who is the Reich Minister of the Interior?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think the Defendant Frick.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think it is.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am grateful to Your Lordship. I had forgotten that had not been read before.
Now then, as I say, we come to the aggression against the Soviet Union; and the first document which has not been put in so far, which I now put in as