“The demilitarized zone requires special treatment. In his speech of the 21st of May and other utterances, the Führer has stated that the stipulations of the Versailles Treaty and the Locarno Pact regarding the demilitarized zone are being observed. To the aide-mémoire of the French chargé d’affaires on recruiting offices in the demilitarized zone, the Reich Government has replied that neither civilian recruiting authorities nor other offices in the demilitarized zone have been entrusted with mobilization tasks, such as the raising, equipping, and arming of any kind of formations for the event of war or in preparation therefor.
“Since political complications abroad must be avoided at present”—I stress the “at present”—“under all circumstances, only those preparatory measures that are urgently necessary may be carried out. The existence of such preparations or the intention of making such preparations must be kept in strictest secrecy in the zone itself as well as in the rest of the Reich.”
My Lord, I need not read more. I submit that fixes Jodl clearly with knowledge of the forthcoming breach of Versailles.
My Lord, the day before the Rhineland was reoccupied on the 7th of March 1936, the Defendant Keitel issued the directive which has been read before, Document C-194, Exhibit USA-55, ordering an air reconnaissance and certain U-boat movements in case any other nation attempted to interfere with that reoccupation.
My Lords, I pass now to the 4th of February 1938, when the OKW was formed. My Lords, shortly after its formation there was issued a handbook, which is a new exhibit, from which I want to read short passages. The number of the exhibit is L-211. It is Document GB-161. Now, this is dated 19 April 1938; “top secret; Direction of War as a Problem of Organization.” I read only from the appendix which is entitled, “What is the War of the Future?”; and if the Court will kindly turn over to the second page, I am going to read, 12 lines from the bottom of the page, the line beginning “Surprise”:
“Surprise as the requisite for quick initial success will often require hostilities to begin before mobilization has been completed or the armies are fully in position.
“A declaration of war is no longer necessarily the first step at the start of a war.
“According to whether the application of the rules of warfare create greater advantages or disadvantages for the warring nations, will the latter consider themselves at war or not at war with the neutral states.”
It may, of course, be said that those were only theoretical words and they might apply to any other nation which might be minded to make war on Germany. The Court can use its judicial notice of the conditions of things in Europe in 1938 and ask itself whether Germany had any potential aggressor against her.
But, My Lord, I emphasize that passage because I submit it so clearly envisages exactly the way in which Germany did make war in 1939 and in the subsequent years.
My Lord, I now start to tread the road which has been trodden so many times and which will be trodden so many times again, the road from 1938 to 1941: the final act of aggression. My Lord, I believe that I can treat this, so far as Keitel and Jodl are concerned, in a very few sentences, because I submit that the documents which are already in, which have been read and reread into the record, demonstrate quite clearly that Keitel, as would only be expected, he being Chief of the Supreme Command of all the Armed Forces, and Jodl, as only would be expected also, he being Chief of the Operations Staff, were vitally and intimately concerned with every single act of aggression which took place successively against the various victims of Nazi aggression.
My Lord, Your Lordship has in front of you the document book and perhaps the trial brief in which those documents are set out under the heading. If I might take first the aggression against Austria, Your Lordship will remember, in Jodl’s diary on the 12th of February 1938, how Keitel, who was something more than a mere soldier, put heavy pressure upon Schuschnigg—that is Document 1780-PS, Jodl’s diary—how on the following day Keitel writes to Hitler—Document 1775-PS, Exhibit USA-75—suggesting the shamming of military action and the spreading of false but quite credible news.
Then the actual operation orders for “Operation Otto,” Exhibits USA-74, 75, and 77, all of the 11th of March 1938, are OKW orders for which Keitel is responsible.
THE PRESIDENT: What are the numbers of them?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, Documents C-102, C-103, and C-182. One of them is actually signed or initialed by Keitel, and two are initialed by Jodl. Those are the operation orders for the advance into Austria, the injunction, if the Tribunal remembers, to treat Czech soldiers as hostile and to treat the Italians as friends.
My Lord, that is the first milestone on the road, the occupation of Austria. My Lord, the second is, is it not. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Well, perhaps if you are going to pass on to another, we had better adjourn now until 2 o’clock.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
Afternoon Session
MR. ROBERTS: May it please the Tribunal, I had got to the commencement of the alleged aggression against Czechoslovakia; and the Tribunal will remember that the leading exhibit on that matter is the file 388-PS, Exhibit Number USA-26, the “Fall Grün” file. My Lords, that file, in my submission, contains copious evidence against both Keitel and Jodl, showing that they were taking the natural part of the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and the head of the Operations Staff.
May I remind the Tribunal of Item 2. I do not want to read any of these. I might just refer to the notes of a meeting on the 21st of April 1938. The important thing to notice is that Keitel and the Führer met alone, showing the intimate connection between Keitel and the Führer. And it was at that meeting that preliminary plans were discussed, including the possibility of an incident, namely, the murder of the German Ambassador at Prague.
Item 5 in that file, dated the 20th of May 1938, shows the plans for the political and the military campaign against Czechoslovakia, issued by Keitel.
Item 11, dated the 30th of May 1938, is the directive signed by Keitel for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, with the date given as the 1st of October 1938.
There are many items which are initialed by Jodl—Item 14 and Item 17, to mention only two.
Perhaps, for the purpose of the note, I should mention the others: Items 24, 36, and 37.
There is the directive, Items 31 and 32, dated the 27th of September 1938, signed by Keitel, enclosing orders for secret mobilization.
Jodl’s diary, Document 1780-PS, contains many references to the forthcoming aggression, particularly the 13th of May and the 8th of September; and there is a very revealing entry on the 11th of September in Jodl’s diary, 1780-PS, in which he says. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Will you give us the date?
MR. ROBERTS: I beg Your Lordship’s pardon; 11th of September 1938.
“In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State Hahnke, from the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, on the imminent common tasks. The joint preparations for refutation of our own violations of international law and the exploitation of its violations by the enemy were considered particularly important.”
I emphasize those words, “our own violations of international law.”
My Lords, as a result of that conference the Document C-2, which was referred to by my learned leader, Sir David, was prepared, which the Tribunal will remember has in parallel columns the possible breach of international law and the excuse which is then going to be given for it. It was referred to so recently that I need not refer to it again.
My Lords, I respectfully submit on that branch of the case