In 1806, Napoleon had also the double base of the Rhine and Main, forming almost a right re-entrant angle. He left Mortier upon the first and parallel one, while with the mass of his forces he gained the extremity of the perpendicular base, and thus intercepted the Prussians at Gera and Naumburg by reaching their line of retreat.
If so many imposing facts prove that bases with two faces, one of them being almost perpendicular to that of the enemy, are the best, it is well to recollect that, in default of such a base, its advantages may be partially supplied by a change of strategic front, as will be seen in Article XX.
Another very important point in reference to the proper direction of bases relates to those established on the sea-coast. These bases may be favorable in some circumstances, but are equally unfavorable in others, as may be readily seen from what precedes. The danger which must always exist of an army being driven to the sea seems so clear, in the ease of the establishment of the base upon it, (which bases can only be favorable to naval powers,) that it is astonishing to hear in our day praises of such a base. Wellington, coming with a fleet to the relief of Spain and Portugal, could not have secured a better base than that of Lisbon, or rather of the peninsula of Torres-Vedras, which covers all the avenues to that capital on the land side. The sea and the Tagus not only protected both flanks, but secured the safety of his only possible line of retreat, which was upon the fleet.
Blinded by the advantages which the intrenched camp of Torres-Vedras secured for the English, and not tracing effects to their real causes, many generals in other respects wise contend that no bases are good except such as rest on the sea and thus afford the army facilities of supply and refuge with both flanks secured. Fascinated by similar notions, Colonel Carion-Nizas asserted that in 1813 Napoleon ought to have posted half of his army in Bohemia and thrown one hundred and fifty thousand men on the mouths of the Elbe toward Hamburg; forgetting that the first precept for a continental army is to establish its base upon the front farthest from the sea, so as to secure the benefit of all its elements of strength, from which it might find itself cut off if the base were established upon the coast.
An insular and naval power acting on the continent would pursue a diametrically opposite course, but resulting from the same principle, viz.: to establish the base upon those points where it can be sustained by all the resources of the country, and at the same time insure a safe retreat.
A state powerful both on land and sea, whose squadrons control the sea adjacent to the theater of operations, might well base an army of forty or fifty thousand men upon the coast, as its retreat by sea and its supplies could be well assured; but to establish a continental army of one hundred and fifty thousand men upon such a base, when opposed by a disciplined and nearly equal force, would be an act of madness.
However, as every maxim has its exceptions, there is a case in which it may be admissible to base a continental army upon the sea: it is, when your adversary is not formidable upon land, and when you, being master of the sea, can supply the army with more facility than in the interior. We rarely see these conditions fulfilled: it was so, however, during the Turkish war of 1828 and 1829. The whole attention of the Russians was given to Varna and Bourghas, while Shumla was merely observed; a plan which they could not have pursued in the presence of a European army (even with the control of the sea) without great danger of ruin.
Despite all that has been said by triflers who pretend to decide upon the fate of empires, this war was, in the main, well conducted. The army covered itself by obtaining the fortresses of Brailoff, Varna, and Silistria, and afterward by preparing a depot at Sizeboli. As soon as its base was well established it moved upon Adrianople, which previously would have been madness. Had the season been a couple of months longer, or had the army not come so great a distance in 1828, the war would have terminated with the first campaign.
Besides permanent bases, which are usually established upon our own frontiers, or in the territory of a faithful ally, there are eventual or temporary bases, which result from the operations in the enemy's country; but, as these are rather temporary points of support, they will, to avoid confusion, be discussed in Article XXIII.
ARTICLE XIX.
Strategic lines and Points, Decisive Points of the Theater of War, and Objective Points of Operations.
Strategic lines and points are of different kinds. Some receive this title simply from their position, which gives them all their importance: these are permanent geographical strategic points. Others have a value from the relations they bear to the positions of the masses of the hostile troops and to the enterprises likely to be directed against them: such are strategic points of maneuver, and are eventual. Finally, there are points which have only a secondary importance, and others whose importance is constant and immense: the latter are called DECISIVE strategic points.
Every point of the theater of war which is of military importance, whether from its position as a center of communication, or from the presence of military establishments or fortifications, is a geographical strategic point.
A distinguished general affirms that such a point would not necessarily be a strategic point, unless situated favorably for a contemplated operation. I think differently; for a strategic point is such essentially and by nature, and, no matter how far distant it may be from the scene of the first enterprises, it may be included in the field by some unforeseen turn of events, and thus acquire its full importance. It would, then, be more accurate to state that all strategic points are not necessarily decisive points.
Lines are strategic either from their geographical position or from their relation to temporary maneuvers. The first class may be subdivided as follows—viz.: geographic lines which by their permanent importance belong to the decisive points[7] of the theater of war, and those which have value merely because they connect two strategic points.
To prevent confusion, we will elsewhere treat of strategic lines in their relations to maneuvers—confining ourselves here to what relates to the decisive and objective points of the zone of operations upon which enterprises occur.
Although these are most intimately connected, since every objective point ought necessarily to be one of the decisive points of the theater of war, there is nevertheless a distinction between them; for all decisive points cannot be at the same time the objective of operations. We will, then, define the first, in order to be more easily guided in our selection of the second.
I think the name of decisive strategic point should be given to all those which are capable of exercising a marked influence either upon the result of the campaign or upon a single enterprise. All points whose geographical position and whose natural or artificial advantages favor the attack or defense of a front of operations