The True Military Power of North Korea. Donald Trump. Читать онлайн. Newlib. NEWLIB.NET

Автор: Donald Trump
Издательство: Bookwire
Серия:
Жанр произведения: Изобразительное искусство, фотография
Год издания: 0
isbn: 4064066309770
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startled the United States and its allies. By mid-1950 North Korean forces numbered between 150,000 and 200,000 troops, organized into 10 infantry divisions, one tank division, and one air force division, with 210 fighter planes and 280 tanks. Soviet equipment, including automatic weapons of various types, T-34 tanks, and Yak fighter planes, had also been pouring into North Korea in early 1950. These forces were to fight the ill-equipped South Korean army of less than 100,000 men — an army lacking in tanks, heavy artillery, and combat airplanes, plus a coast guard of 4,000 men and a police force of 45,000 men.

      In a matter of days, the KPA had captured South Korea’s capital of Seoul. Using seven divisions — in its first wave and five more in its second wave, the KPA moved south pushing the Republic of Korea (ROK) forces before it. Western military experts were stunned by the KPA’s battlefield successes.

      The U.S. intelligence community was not focused on North Korea in 1950 and knew very little about North Korea or its military. In fact, prior to June 25, the United States had paid very little attention to North Korea at all. Today, in contrast, North Korea is very much a focus of a significant intelligence targeting effort.

      Experts also concur that North Korea possesses an extensive ballistic missile arsenal and significant Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capabilities. However, there is considerable disagreement over the precise number of regular and SOF forces, as well as capabilities and readiness. Moreover, analysts debate about the KPA’s doctrine and disposition, especially in regard to the offensive or defensive nature of the KPA.

      Over the past 2 decades, due largely to economic decline and lack of financial resources, as well as force improvements and urban build-up in South Korea and the continued presence of U.S. forces in South Korea, North Korea’s conventional forces have become weaker, relative to those of South Korea and the United States. As a result, any North Korean option to invade South Korea has become less credible.

      While causing tremendous damage, a North Korean attack on South Korea would most likely be defeated by a U.S.–South Korean counterattack. Nonetheless, the credibility of North Korea’s conventional military forces remains largely intact in terms of their potential to defend the state and to inflict substantial damage on South Korea — especially Seoul — which remains hostage to North Korea’s artillery massed along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

      By the same token, options for U.S. and allied forces to launch strikes against selected North Korean military targets are fraught with steep risks. The United States probably could destroy known nuclear and missile facilities in a preemptive strike, but not hidden facilities and weapons that would survive such a preemptive attack. In any event, Pyongyang would regard an attack on its strategic assets as a dire threat to its vital interests (i.e., regime survival) and could retaliate in ways that might escalate quickly to a wider conflict. The United States and South Korea would more than likely prevail in a full-scale war, but the human and material costs would be very high — even if unconventional weapons were not employed. In essence, the military standoff that marked the end of the Korean War prevails 50 years later.

      Regarding WMD, while there is general consensus that North Korea possesses a significant stockpile of chemical agents, there is serious debate about the status of Pyongyang’s biological and nuclear programs. Furthermore, there is a range of expert views of North Korea’s ballistic missile programs.

      What are North Korea’s military capabilities and intentions? What is the size of the KPA and its SOF component? Is the KPA’s doctrine offensive and how would we know if it was or not? What is the status of North Korea’s WMD programs? What kind of capabilities and doctrines does North Korea possess in terms of nuclear, chemical, and biological programs? What can be said about North Korea’s ballistic missile capabilities? How have North Korea’s chronic economic difficulties affected these capabilities and/or altered Pyongyang’s military strategies or doctrines? Is the KPA’s military readiness atrophying because of the WMD programs, whether from lack of economic resources or doctrinal decisions? What main trends are evident in the KPA over the course of its existence?

      This monograph will examine the armed forces of the DPRK, both conventional and unconventional. The official North Korean name of all branches of North Korea’s armed forces is the Chosen Inking or KPA. This monograph will address the following topics: the political context of the military in the DPRK; the origins and evolution of the armed forces; and the KPA’s command and control structure and its WMD and conventional components, including doctrines. Pyongyang’s capabilities and intentions also will be assessed.

      At the outset, it is important to delineate the scope and limitations of this monograph. Perhaps it is best to begin by stating what this is not. The monograph is not an order of battle, tactical primer, or complete military history of North Korea or detailed overview of the KPA. These can be found elsewhere. Nor is this a complete history of Pyongyang’s WMD or missile programs — these too have been covered elsewhere.

       Context and structure: a party-Military-state.

      One of the most important and perhaps least understood topics in this monograph is the politics of the military. Unlike concrete subjects such as the types and capabilities of weapon systems and number of personnel in uniform, it is an amorphous topic that is difficult if not impossible to quantify or gauge with any statistical precision.

      Institutions: The Party-Military-State (PMS). The term often used to label a communist regime is “Partystate” since the communist party apparatus of a country tends to be intertwined with and critical to functioning of the governmental apparatus. The ruling communist party in North Korea is called the Korea Workers’ Party (KWP). In fact, “party-state” is a misnomer because it excludes mention of a third key bureaucratic actor: the armed forces. A more appropriate hyphenation therefore is “party-military-state (PMS).” The DPRK also has been labeled a “garrison state.” In such a state, the “consuming focus” is girding for war and “all efforts are directed toward building and supplying a powerful and well-equipped military.” And the highest status and prestige belongs to the soldier.

      Indeed, the KPA is the fourth largest military in the world in terms of men and women in uniform, with possibly over 1.2 million personnel. But this statistic does not reflect adequately the size of the armed forces relative to the size of North Korea. If measured in terms of soldiers per thousand population, the comparative size of the KPA readily becomes more apparent. At 44.3 per thousand population, North Korea is by far the largest military in the communist bloc past or present, not to mention in the larger contemporary world.

      In addition, North Korea has almost 7 1/2 million paramilitary reserves. This means that some 40 percent of the populace serve in some military or paramilitary formation. In short, the DPRK is undoubtedly the “most militarized state on earth.”

      The military in a PMS is a highly-privileged institution usually possessing prestige and resources on a par with the Party. Indeed, it is sometimes described as “state within a state” to the extent that it is often “buffered” or protected from domestic or foreign shocks. The KPA’s situation in North Korea appears to be an extreme instance of a military’s power and influence. The exalted and central position held by the armed forces in the DPRK appears unparalleled in the annals of an established communist regime. While the power of the military invariably is high during a communist movement’s struggle for power and in the early years of a communist regime, this usually lessens over time. In North Korea, the power and influence of the KPA has only increased in recent years and may have replaced the KWP as the dominant political force in the DPRK. This is the result of a concerted effort by North Korean dictator, Kim Jong Il, to rely heavily on the armed forces at the expense of the KWP. Since 1998, the so-called “Military-First” Policy has resulted in the KPA becoming “the most significant political actor” in the DPRK with top priority for resources.

      Dictators and Marshals: Father and Son. In partymilitary-states, the dictator seeks to maintain close — often hands-on — control of the armed forces. This was true in countries such as the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and remains true in China and Cuba. It also is true in North Korea. Like Stalin, Mao, and Castro, Kim Il Sung undertook purges of military leaders and promotions of those faithful to him, all to