Appendix J - Movement Techniques and Battle Drills
Footnotes
Authorization Letter
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
Combat forces need accurate and timely intelligence about enemy forces, terrain, and weather. Commanders must make fast and accurate decisions to have the right combat force at the right place and time. Their decisions are partly based on information gathered for intelligence purposes. Long-range surveillance units are trained and equipped to gather this information.
Section I. OBJECTIVE
Human intelligence is a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources (JCS Pub 1–02). Human intelligence has always been a primary source of information within the intelligence collection system. Frontline soldiers and reconnaissance patrols have always provided combat information to tactical commanders. Commanders at all levels need this type of information. The long-range surveillance teams are a primary source of human intelligence.
1–1. INFORMATION GATHERING
Information is collected from every source and disseminated immediately as combat information, or it is first processed into intelligence. Collection of information is one phase of the intelligence cycle. The cycle consists of direction, collection, processing, and dissemination. These phases may be conducted both sequentially and concurrently. While information is being processed, additional information is being collected. At the same time, the intelligence staffs plan and direct the collection effort to meet new requirements. Data gained from the intelligence cycle, coupled with existing data, enable intelligence staffs to predict battlefield events and enemy intentions. By comparing time with actual events, the G2 can provide the commander timely, complete, and accurate intelligence.
1–2. HUMAN INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES
Long-range surveillance units provide the corps with a dedicated company and the division with a dedicated detachment. These units are specially trained and equipped to collect human intelligence about forces deep in the enemy's rear. LRS units are part of the overall intelligence collection process. They augment and complement other collection systems that are more vulnerable to limitations such as weather, range, terrain masking, and enemy countermeasures. LRS units also allow corps and division commanders to gather timely information that does not need lengthy processing and analysis.
a. The employment ranges for the LRSU missions depend on METT-T, operational tempo, and support considerations. In a fast-paced battlefield environment, the depth of LRSU employment is greater because the area of interest is larger. Long-range surveillance detachment teams operate forward of battalion reconnaissance teams and cavalry scouts in the division area of interest. The long-range surveillance company teams operate forward of the LRSD teams and behind most special operations forces. (See Table 1–1.) The duration of an LRS mission depends on equipment and supplies the team must carry, movement distance to the objective area, and resupply availability. LRSU teams normally operate up to seven days without resupply depending on terrain and weather. Teams may be deployed longer in special cases. Operations other than war are likely to be nonlinear, with no identifiable forward line of own troops. Surveillance must extend in all directions. Deployment considerations are adjusted with the political and geographical effects included. The specific area of operations changes as additional maneuver units are sent into the area of operations.
b. LRS teams are organized, trained, and equipped to enter enemy areas to observe and report enemy dispositions, movements and activities, and battlefield conditions. The teams' missions, targets, and objectives are based on the intelligence requirements of the commander. Teams infiltrate selected areas by air, ground, water, or stay-behind. While avoiding contact with the enemy and local civilians, these teams observe. They may emplace a variety of unattended sensors and special-purpose equipment to detect, observe, and monitor enemy activities. They perform other specified collection tasks as well. LRS teams are not intended, and lack the capability, to conduct direct-action missions. Their mission of limited reconnaissance and stationary surveillance is different from the missions of most special forces and rangers.
c. Teams operating in the corps or division area of interest use highly developed infantry and ranger skills to infiltrate enemy-controlled areas, evade enemy rear-security operations, then exfiltrate with or without assistance. These infantry and ranger skills are needed for survival and to complete the mission. Teams also have expert information-collection skills, and they know enemy organizations, tactics, and equipment. They are also experts in using communication systems. These skills are attained through individual, institutional, and unit (collective) training programs. (See Appendix A for information on personnel recruitment and selection.)
1–3. ARMY OPERATIONS DOCTRINE
The most pressing concern of a corps or division commander engaged in combat is knowledge of the enemy to his front or to his flanks, and how that enemy may affect his mission. The commander must surprise the enemy and catch him at a disadvantage as often as possible. To do so, the commander must see well forward and know the areas of operation and interest. He must also know the enemy's capabilities, strengths, location of reinforcements, density of air defense, and activities. This information is obtained through intelligence activities that provide the basis for tactical and operational decisions. Conduct of Army operations is based on timely intelligence from organic and higher sources at corps. Real-time human intelligence information is needed to complement electronic and imagery intelligence systems. The LRSUs at corps and division play an active part in the Army operations by providing that information. FM 100–5 states that success on the battlefield depends on all commanders knowing and implementing the five basic tenets of Army operations doctrine: initiative, agility, depth, synchronization, and versatility.
a. Initiative. Initiative sets or changes the terms of battle by action. It implies an offensive spirit in all actions. It means departing from planned actions when an opportunity presents itself to hasten mission accomplishment. The LRSUs provide the corps and division commanders near real-time information on the enemy. This information does not need lengthy processing and analysis, thus enabling commanders to take the initiative when the opportunity presents itself.
b. Agility. Agility involves thinking and acting faster than the enemy. It involves the mental, command and control, and organizational ability to evaluate METT-T factors and then shift rapidly to destroy the enemy. The LRSUs provide commanders timely information that enables them to act swiftly and take advantage of the enemy situation. Because of the communication systems that LRSUs use, and mobility restrictions, LRS teams are not responsive to changes in the mission once deployed.
c. Depth.