Figure 37. Refueling a Soviet Mi-17 at K2.
Air Campaign and CSAR Go Hand in Hand
COL Frank Kisner, with the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) staff, arrived aboard two MC-130P tanker aircraft from the 9th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) shortly before the first C-17s began landing. Kisner directed his pure Air Force staff from the 16th Special Operations Wing (SOW) to establish a JSOTF headquarters and to begin planning for the personnel recovery mission—recovering downed aircrews in Afghanistan. The 16th SOW colonel took command of the JSOTF and became the senior American envoy to the Uzbek government officials. Kisner controlled everything at K2 and named the base “Camp Freedom.” His top priority was to conduct full mission profile rehearsals of aerial refueling before the CENTCOM air campaign began.
Figure 38. Night Stalker view of the C-130P trailing refuel lines and probe basket.
Figure 39. Trail aircraft view of MH-47E refueling.
Figure 40. MH-47E hooked up for aerial refueling.
Making Camp Freedom a Fully Operational Base: K2, Uzbekistan
The key to command, control, and operations is communications. Thirty-five soldiers from A Company, 112th Signal Battalion, were quite surprised when they arrived shortly after dark on 6 October. Because their C-17 aircrew had warned them to be prepared for a hostile environment, they donned full combat gear and stood with their weapons at the ready, expecting the worst when the aircraft ramp was dropped. Then, instead of a hostile environment, the “charged-up,” battle-ready soldiers faced a female Air Force captain, the JSOTF chief of personnel, CPT Childs (pseudonym), and Air Force MAJ Victor Mercado (pseudonym), the chief of communications. The surprised troops were welcomed to Camp Freedom and then ushered to a customs tent for in-processing. This was the standard procedure for most of the early chalks. For some unknown reason, neither the C-17 aircrews nor the inbound troops ever received the truth about the real threat at K2.
Figure 41. 112th Signal Battalion satellite antennas.
The personnel who would establish the SOCCENT Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC) headquarters, the command element responsible for the CSAR mission, followed the signalers. When MAJ Wes McKellar (pseudonym), D Company, 2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR, arrived, he remarked, “You know you’ve won the Cold War when you walk out the back of a C-17 carrying an American flag, loaded weapons, and have Soviet helicopters flying CAP [overhead air cover].”
Figure 42. K2 buildup.
Figure 43. MH-47E landing at K2.
LTC James Brinks (pseudonym), commander, 2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR, had been tasked to command the JSOAC. Having an Army aviator in charge of a JSOAC in combat was a first. With no experience in the battalion, MAJ Mark Henderson (pseudonym), the operations officer (S3), had his hands full. Thus, in the first few days, during the simultaneous “standup” of JSOTF-North and the JSOAC, the 160th SOAR officers and NCOs worked for both staffs to support the personnel recovery mission that had to be in place to begin the air campaign. Learning curves were steep, but being ready to perform the personnel recovery mission drove the collective effort. Within days, SOF air assets to support the mission included two MC-130P tankers from 9th SOS, a number of special tactics squadron (STS) teams from the 23rd STS, a joint Army-Air Force staff, and four MH-47E Chinooks and two MH-60L Direct Action Penetrators (DAPs) from 160th SOAR. When the strategic bombing campaign was moved up to begin on the evening of 7 October, the urgency became acute. The JSOTF and JSOAC had to be ready to support the air campaign despite the disorderly airflow.
Figure 44. MH-60L DAPs.
Northern Air Campaign CSAR = MH-47Es
The compressed time line drove the 160th SOAR “helicopter buildup” teams, the D Company mechanics, the maintenance test pilots, and the B Company crew members to attack the aircraft like “ants on a Twinkie.” Despite the fatigue and jet lag from the long journey, the buildup crews performed exceptionally well. Quality control NCOs who certified every completed maintenance task found only three minor errors during the night helicopter buildups. MH-60L DAP crewmen and mechanics unloaded their helicopter gunships to prevent damage when it became evident that the Air Force TALCE and C-17 loadmasters were unfamiliar with these aircraft. Thus, within 24 hours, the JSOAC had an immediate reaction force.
Figure 45. Aircraft maintenance was a crucial factor for success.
When the rest of the helicopters arrived the next day, the mechanics and aircrews had to forego their rest and subsist on short catnaps until all four Chinooks and the two DAPs had been built up, test flown, and made mission ready. Within 48 hours, the entire Army helicopter fleet had been made ready for war. Exhausted maintenance crews fell asleep alongside helicopters on the guano-covered floors of concrete bunkers. When they awoke the next day, they were covered with dust and debris from a sandstorm.
The 160th SOAR MH-47E Chinook and MH-60L DAP Black Hawk pilots and aircrews spent the first week in Uzbekistan rehearsing combat search and rescue (CSAR) scenarios. LTC Brinks, the JSOAC commander, believed that it was imperative that his staff, the 160th SOAR enlisted planners, and the aircrews could seamlessly exercise their mission responsibilities. He knew from experience during Operation DESERT STORM that time was the critical element in successfully recovering a downed pilot or aircrew in northern Afghanistan. His acceptable standard was to launch a rescue within an hour of notification, and it was met.
Building Camp Freedom at Double Time
The Air Force TALCE unloaded C-17 aircraft as fast as it could, dumping cargo pallets anywhere and everywhere. Just as the flood of arriving personnel and equipment threatened to overwhelm the infrastructure and resources of the Uzbek base, soldiers from the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion (SOSB) arrived. COL Kisner’s first words when he met MAJ Charles Mahoney (pseudonym), A Company commander, were, “Boy, am I glad to see you. We have some problems.” After receiving a quick rundown, Mahoney, remembering the capabilities of the Air Force base support packages, did a quick triage of the K2 maelstrom and dispatched teams to provide urgent care in the critical areas.
Figure 46. 528th SOSB initial logistics chaos.
Military theorist Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini defined logistics