More important is the fact that the popular asspnt is in both cases of the same nature. In the democratic state, as in the Trade Union, the eventual judgment of the people is pronounced not upon projects but upon results. It avails not that a particular proposal may have received the prior
Representative Institutions 6i
authorisation of an express popular vote ; if th e results are
not ■■;iirVi^ as tVip p enplis. Hp-si rp, thp p Y prnt-ivp wt1t~n <;?)- rnnHniip
to rece ive their .s upport. Nor does this, in the democratic state any more than in the Trade Union, imply that an all-wise government would necessarily secure this popular assent If any particular stage in the march of civilisation happens to be momentarily distasteful to the bulk of the citizens, the executive which ventures to step in that direction will be no less ruthlessly dismissed than if its deeds had beei?_ evil. All that we have said as to the logical futility of the Referendum, and as to the necessity for the representative, therefore applies, we suggest, even more strongly to demo- cratic states than to Trade Unions. For what is the lesson . to be learned from Trade Union history ? (The Referendum, introduced for the express purpose of ensuring popular assent, has in almost all cases failed to accomplish its object This failure is due, as the reader will have observed, to the constant inability of the ordinary man to estimate what will be the effect of a particular proposal. W h at D emoeraey^^ requir es is assent tn rf.xul fr • Tnhnf ih« -f?i>fiatiM,liJM^gviii>t is 'a ssent to proiectsT ~\^o Trade Union has, for instance, deliberately desired^ laankruptcy ; but many Trade Unions have persistently voted for scales of contributions and benefits which have inevitably resulted in bankruptcy. If this is the case in the relatively simple issues of Trade Union admini- stration, still more does it apply to the infinitely complicated questions of national politics.
But though in the case of the Referendum the analogy is sufificiently exact to warrant the transformation of the empirical conclusions of Trade Union history into a political generalisation, it is only fair to point out some minor differences between the two cases. We have had occasion to describe how, in Trade Union history, the use of the Referendum, far from promoting popular control, has some- times resulted in increasing the dominant power of the permanent civil service, and in making its position practically! impregnable against any uprising opinion among its con-
62 Trade Union Structure
stftuents. This particular danger would, we imagine, scarcely occur in a democratic state. In the Trade Union the Executive committee occupies a unique position. It alone kas access to official information ; it alone commands expert professional skill and experience ; and, most important of all, St. monopolises in the society's official circular what corre- 'sponds to the newspaper press. The existence of political parties fairly equal in knowledge, ability, and electoral organisation, and each served by its own press, would always save the democratic state from this particular perversion of the Referendum to the advantage of the existing government. But any party or sect of opinion which, from lack of funds, education, or social influence, could not call to its aid the forces which we have named, would, we suggest, find itself as helpless in face of a Referendum as the discontented section of a strong Trade Union.
We have seen, moreover, that there is in Trade.Union government a certain special class of questions in which-the Referendum has a distinct use. Where a decisioiL will involve at some future time the personal co-operation_of the members in some positive act essentially optional in its nature—still more where that act involves a voluntary personal sacrifice, or where not a majority alorie~^but practically the whole body of the members must on.paiiTof failure join in it—the Referendum may be useful, not as a legislative act, but as an index of the probability that the members will actually do what will be required of ffiem. The decision to strike is obviously a case in point. Another instance may be found in the decisions of Trade Unions or other bodies that each member shall use his municipal or parliamentary franchise in a particular manner. Here the success or failure of the policy of the organisation depends not on the passive acquiescence of the rank and file in acts done by the executive committee or the officers, but upon each member's active performance of a personal task. We cannot think of any case of this kind within the sphere of the modern democratic state. If indeed, as Mr. Auberon Herbert
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proposes, it were left to the option of each citizen to determine from time to time the amount and the application of his
contributions to the treasury, the Chancellor of the Exchequer
would probably find it convenient, prior to making up the estimates, to take a Referendum as a guide to how much would probably be paid. Or, to take an analogy very near to that of the Trade Union decision to strike, if each soldier in the army were at liberty to leave at a day's notice, it would probably be found expedient to take a vote of the rank and file before engaging in a foreign war. In the modern democratic state, however, as it actually exists, it is not left to the option of the individual citizen whether or not he will act in the manner decided on. T he su ccess or failure of t he policy does not there fr"-" Ae-^c^-nA r.n obtaining universal assent and personal participation in tha ar t itself. Whether thg^ citizen likes it eve nnt-, \\e- Tc -<a<: M -n | i HllHi1 tn pay the t axes and obey ^he laws whirh ha^re been H p ri deH on by the co mpetent au thority. Whether or not he will maintaia that authority i n power, will depend no t on His original impulsive judgment as to the expedien cy_o f the ta x or the law, but oiT ^s deliberate approval or disapproval of the subse ^uenfTesul ts.
If 'Trade Union history throws doubt on the advantages of tKe~Eeiefendum, still less dofes it favor the institution of the delegate as distinguished from the representative. Even in the"comparatively simple issues of Trade Union admini- stration, it has been found, in practice, quite impossible to obtain definite instructions from the members on all the matters which come up for decision. When, for instance, the sixty delegates of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers met in 1892 to revise the constitution and trade policy of their society, they were supposed to confine themselves to such amendments as had previously received the sanction of one or other of the branches. But although the amendments so sanctioned filled over five hundred printed pages, it was found impossible to construct from this material alone any consistent constitution or line of policy. The delegates were
>^'4 Trade Union Structure
necessarily compelled to exercise larger freedom and to frame a set of rules not contemplated by any one of the branches. And this experience of the Engineers is only a type of what has been going on throughout the whole Trade Union world. The increased facilities for communication, on the one hand, and the growth of representative institutions, on the other, have made the delegate obsolete. Wherever a Trade Union has retained the old ideal of direct government by the people, it has naturally preferred to the Delegate Meeting the less expensive and more thoroughgoing device of the Referendum. For the most part the increasing complication and intricacy of modern industrial affairs has, as we have seen, compelled the substitution of representative institutions. These con- siderations apply with even greater force to the democratic state. )
r>. Trade Union history gives, therefore, little support to the Referendum or the Delegate Meetjng, and points rather to government by a Representative Assembly as the kst word of democracy.^ It is therefore important to see whether these Trade Union parliamAits have any lesson for the political student. The governing assemblies of even the most democratic states have, unlike Trade Union parliaments, hitherto been drawn almost exclusively from the middle or upper classes, and have therefore escaped the special difficulties of communities of wage-earners. If, however, we assume that the manual workers, who number four-fifths of the population, will gradually become the dominant influence in the elector- ate, and will contribute an important and increasing section of the representatives, the governing assemblies of the Coal-
" There are two elements co-existent in the conduct of human affairs—policy
and administration—but, though the confines of their respective jurisdictions overlap, the functions of each must