THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it must have been. They put "8" instead of "6."
DR. SEIDL: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. SEIDL: "I know that probably nobody has correctly understood my coming; but in view of the extraordinary step that I have taken, that can by no means be expected. Therefore I would like to begin by explaining how I came to do this."
I continue on Page 94:
"The idea came to me in June of last year, during the time of the French campaign, while visiting the Führer. ..."
I believe I may omit the following incidental remarks and continue quoting further:
"I must admit that I came to the Führer convinced, as we all were, that sooner or later in the end we would surely conquer England, and I expressed the opinion to the Führer that we must naturally demand from England the. restitution of property-such as the equivalent of our merchant fleet, et cetera-which had been taken from us by the Versailles Treaty."
I turn to Page 95:
"The Fuhrer then immediately contradicted me. He was of the opinion that the war could possibly 'be an occasion for coming to an agreement with England for which he had striven ever since he had been politically active. To this I can testify, that ever since I have known the Führer, since 1921, the Führer has always said that an agreement between Germany and England had to be achieved. He said he would bring this about as soon as he was in power. He told me at that time in France that one should not impose any severe conditions, even if victorious, on a country with which one desired to come to an agreement. Then I conceived the idea that if this were known in England, it might be possible that England also might be ready for an agreement."
I turn now to Page 96 of the document book.
"Then, at the conclusion of the French campaign came the Führer's offer to England. The offer, as is known, was refused. This made me all the more firm in my belief that under these circumstances I had to execute my plan. During the subsequent period came the air war between Germany and England, which, on the whole, meant heavier losses and damages for England than for Germany. Consequently, I had the impression that England could not give in at all without suffering considerable loss of prestige. That is why I said ID myself, 'Now I must realize my plan all the more, for if I were over in England, England could be enabled to take up negotiations with Germany without loss of prestige.'"
I turn now to Page 97 of the document book. After a short incidental remark by Dr. Mackenzie, Hess continued:
"I was of the opinion that, apart from the question of the terms for an agreement, there would be still in England a, ' certain general distrust to overcome. I must confess that I faced a very grave decision, the gravest in my life, of course, and I believe I was aided by continuously keeping before my inner vision the picture of an endless row of children's coffins with the mothers weeping behind them on the German side as well as on the English side...
"THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, have you got the original document there before you?
DR. SEIDL: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Might it be handed up?
DR. SEIDL: Yes.
[The document was handed to the President.]
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.
DR. SEIDL: ". . . and vice versa, the coffins of mothers with the children behind them.
"I want to mention certain points which, I believe, have a certain importance from the psychological point of view. I must go back a bit. After Germany's defeat in the World War, the Versailles Treaty was imposed on her, and no serious historian is today still of the opinion that Germany was responsible for the World War. Lloyd George has said that the nations stumbled into the war. I recently read an English historian, Farrar, who wrote about Edward VII and his policy at that time. This historian, Farrar, lays the main guilt for the war, on the policies of Edward VII. After her collapse Germany had this treaty imposed upon her, which was not only a frightful calamity for Germany but also for the whole world. All attempts of politicians, of statesmen in Germany, before the Führer came to power-that is to say, when Germany was a pure democracy-to obtain any sort of relief failed."
I forego the reading of the following part of the minutes literally.
A conversation followed on various points. Among other things the subject of the conversation then was the air strength of Germany at that time and the preparations with regard to the building of U-boats. I do not believe that these questions are relevant in the present connection, and so I shall turn at once to that part of the minutes where mention is made of the proposals which Hess made to Lord Simon. This is on Page 152 of the document book. From the minutes we can see 'that Hess had previously written down the proposals which he wanted to submit. He gave these notes to Dr. Mackenzie and Mr. Kirkpatrick, who then read and translated them, and now I quote on Page 152, at the bottom of the page, literally: "Basis for an understanding." And here I have to ask the Tribunal to turn from Page 152 of the document book to Page 159 of the document book because the first point in the proposal obviously has been presented in the wrong fashion. On Page 159, about the middle of the page, there is a statement by Dr. Mackenzie which expresses the first point correctly, and I quote:
"In order to prevent future wars between the Axis and England, the limits of the spheres of interest should be defined. The sphere of interest of the Axis is Europe, and England's sphere of interest is the Empire."
I ask now that you turn back, namely to Page 153 of the document book. Here we find on the last line the second point of the proposals which Hess made. Dr. Mackie is reading:
"2. Return of German Colonies."
I turn to Page 154 of the document book and begin to quote at the top of the page-it is possible that the figure "2" is inadvertently repeated here in the document hook. It should be:
"3. Indemnification of German citizens who before or during the war had their residence within the British Empire, and who suffered damage to life and property through measure of a Government of the Empire or as a result of pillage, riot, et cetera; indemnification of British subjects by Germany on the same basis.
"4. Armistice and peace to be concluded with Italy at the same time." I Then there is a personal remark by Hess as follows: "The Führer in our conversation repeatedly presented these points to me in general as the basis for an understanding with England."
I shall not read any further excerpts from these minutes.
I forego the reading a$ the other passages marked in red. The conference was terminated by a statement made by Lord Simon to the effect that he would bring the proposals made by Hess to the knowledge of the British Government. That was Exhibit Number H-15.
Your Honors, the Defendant Rudolf Hess is accused in the Indictment of helping the Nazi conspirators to seize power and of furthering the military, economic, and psychological preparations for the war as mentioned under Count One of the Indictment; of participating in the political planning and preparation of aggressive wars and of war in violation of international treaties, agreements and promises, as mentioned in Counts One and Two, and of participating in the preparation and planning of foreign political plans of the Nazi conspirators as listed under Count One.
That accusation is the nucleus of the Indictment against Rudolf Hess. It is therefore my duty to discuss also briefly in evidence the circumstances which in 1939 led to the outbreak of war. In that respect I have the following to say: On 23 August 1939, at Moscow a non-aggression pact was concluded between Germany and the Soviet Union, which has already been submitted by the Prosecution as Exhibit GB-145 (Document TC-25). On the same day, that is to say but 1 week before the outbreak of the war and 3 days before the planned attack on Poland, these two nations made another secret agreement. This secret agreement essentially contained the definition of the spheres of interest of both nations