The Complete Works. Henry Cabot Lodge. Читать онлайн. Newlib. NEWLIB.NET

Автор: Henry Cabot Lodge
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isbn: 9788027241767
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the Constitution did better; and Sir George Collier's ships certainly did not distinguish themselves when in chase of Old Ironsides. So with the Hornet in her two encounters; no one can question the pluck with which the Penguin was fought, but her gunnery was as bad as that of the Cornwallis subsequently proved. And though the skirmish between the Peacock and Nautilus is not one to which an American cares to look back, yet, regarding it purely from a fighting stand-point, there is no question which crew was the best trained and most skilful.

      LIST OF SHIPS BUILT IN 1815.

Name. Rate. Where Built. Cost.
Washington 74 Portsmouth $235,861.00
Independence 74 Boston 421,810.41
Franklin 74 Philadelphia 438,149.40
Guerrière 44 " 306,158.56
Java 44 Baltimore 232,767.38
Fulton 30 New York 320,000.00
Torpedo "

      These ships first put to sea in this year. For the first time in her history the United States possessed line-of-battle ships; and for the first time in all history, the steam frigate appeared on the navy list of a nation. The Fulton, with her clumsy central wheel, concealed from shot by the double hull, with such thick scantling that none but heavy guns could harm her, and relying for offensive weapons not on a broadside of thirty guns of small calibre, but on two pivotal 100-pounder columbiads, or, perhaps, if necessary, on blows from her hog snout,—the Fulton was the true prototype of the modern steam ironclad, with its few heavy guns and ram. Almost as significant is the presence of the Torpedo. I have not chronicled the several efforts made by the Americans to destroy British vessels with torpedoes; some very nearly succeeded, and although they failed it must not be supposed that they did no good. On the contrary, they made the British in many cases very cautious about venturing into good anchorage (especially in Long Island Sound and the Chesapeake), and by the mere terror of their name prevented more than one harrying expedition. The Fulton was not got into condition to be fought until just as the war ended; had it continued a few months, it is more than probable that the deeds of the Merrimac and the havoc wrought by the Confederate torpedoes would have been forestalled by nearly half a century. As it was, neither of these engines of war attracted much attention. For ten or fifteen years the Fulton was the only war-vessel of her kind in existence, and then her name disappears from our lists. The torpedoes had been tried in the Revolutionary War, but their failure prevented much notice from being taken of them, and, besides, at that time there was a strong feeling that it was dishonorable to blow a ship up with a powder-can concealed under the water, though highly laudable to burn her by means of a fire-raft floating on the water—a nice distinction in naval ethics that has since disappeared. 429

      AMERICAN VESSELS DESTROYED, ETC.

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      BRITISH VESSELS DESTROYED, ETC.

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      In summing up the results of the struggle on the ocean it is to be noticed that very little was attempted, and nothing done, by the American Navy that could materially affect the result of the war. Commodore Rodgers' expedition after the Jamaica Plate fleet failed; both the efforts to get a small squadron into the East Indian waters also miscarried; and otherwise the whole history of the struggle on the ocean is, as regards the Americans, only the record of individual cruises and fights. The material results were not very great, at least in their effect on Great Britain, whose enormous navy did not feel in the slightest degree the loss of a few frigates and sloops. But morally the result was of inestimable benefit to the United States. The victories kept up the spirits of the people, cast down by the defeats on land; practically decided in favor of the Americans the chief question in dispute—Great Britain's right of search and impressment—and gave the navy, and thereby the country, a world-wide reputation. I doubt if ever before a nation gained so much honor by a few single-ship duels. For there can be no question which side came out of the war with the greatest credit. The damage inflicted by each on the other was not very unequal in amount, but the balance was certainly in favor of the United States, as can be seen by the following tables, for the details of which reference can be made to the various years:

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       430

      In addition we lost 4 revenue-cutters, mounting 24 guns, and, in the aggregate, of 387 tons, and also, 25 gun-boats, with 71 guns, and, in the aggregate, of nearly 2,000 tons. This would swell our loss to 12,105 tons, and 526 guns; 431 but the loss of the revenue-cutters and gun-boats can fairly be considered to be counterbalanced by the capture or destruction of the various British Royal Packets (all armed with from 2 to 10 guns), tenders, barges, etc., which would be in the aggregate of at least as great tonnage and gun force, and with more numerous crews.

      But the comparative material loss gives no idea of the comparative honor gained. The British navy, numbering at the onset a thousand cruisers, had accomplished less than the American, which numbered but a dozen. Moreover, most of the loss suffered by the former was in single fight, while this had been but twice the case with the Americans, who had generally been overwhelmed by numbers. The President and Essex were both captured by more than double their force simply because they were disabled before the fight began, otherwise they would certainly have escaped. With the exceptions of the Chesapeake and Argus (both of which were taken fairly, because their antagonists, though of only equal force, were better fighters), the remaining loss of the Americans was due to the small cruisers stumbling from time to time across the path of some one of the innumerable British heavy vessels. Had Congressional forethought been sufficiently great to have allowed a few line-of-battle ships to have been in readiness some time previous to the war, results of weight might have been accomplished. But the only activity ever exhibited by Congress in materially increasing the navy previous to the war, had been in partially carrying out President Jefferson's ideas of having an enormous force of very worthless gun-boats—a scheme whose wisdom was about on a par with some of that statesman's political and military theories.

      Of the twelve 432 single-ship actions, two (those of the Argus and Chesapeake) undoubtedly redounded most to the credit of the British, in two (that of the Wasp with the Reindeer, and that of the Enterprise with the Boxer), the honors were nearly even, and in the other eight the superiority of the Americans was very manifest. In three actions (those with the Penguin, Frolic, and Shannon) the combatants were about equal in strength, the Americans having slightly the advantage; in all the others but two, the victors combined superiority of force with superiority of skill. In but two cases, those of the Argus and Epervier, could any lack of courage be imputed to the vanquished. The second year alone showed to the advantage of the British; the various encounters otherwise were as creditable to the Americans at the end as at the beginning of the war. This is worth attending to, because many authors speak as if the successes of the Americans were confined to the first year. It is true that no frigate was taken after the first year, but