This notion of a prospective U.S.–China conflict is an argument commonly made by realist scholars or power transition theorists. According to these scholars, a structural dilemma exists when an emerging power rises to challenge the incumbent power, making war or conflict more likely to break out. Harvard scholar Graham Allison calls this the “Thucydides trap”,6 and it has been suggested that the U.S. and China are headed toward this trap as both “contest for supremacy” in Asia.7
While not set up to address the debate on U.S.–China power transition, Dan Liu’s Chapter 4 looks at one possible factor in mitigating great power competition, one that relates to role of ideas — specifically, China’s New Security Concept. The concept calls for the rejection of zero-sum, Cold War security thinking in preference for “mutual trust, mutual benefits, equality and coordination” in regional security approaches. Liu’s chapter shows how China has tried to actualize its New Security Concept and temper regional concerns through its growing involvement in bilateral and multilateral confidence-building measures (CBMs). The latter form of CBMs, in particular, has become increasingly important in China’s periphery diplomacy. The author also discusses obstacles facing China’s efforts to increase mutual trust and confidence with its neighbors.
Northeast and Southeast Asia
The second part of the book dives deeper into China’s diplomacy with the “traditional” periphery of East Asia. Northeast Asia is the regional focus of Chapters 5 and 6. Ru Sun examines China’s evolving policy in the Korean peninsula, noting that while its relations with the South (ROK) have moved forward, dynamics with the North (DPRK) have become more strained. Beijing has been particularly frustrated by Pyongyang’s pursuit of its nuclear and missile program, and has publicly backed UN Security Council’s resolutions that impose sanctions on the DPRK. This tougher Chinese response does not mean, however, that Beijing has fundamentally shifted its policy toward North Korea. The DPRK is still significant for China’s strategic interests, and Beijing continues to see negotiations as the best way to promote enduring stability in the Korean peninsula. The recent rapid thaw of the relationship between China and DPRK seems to suggest that the fundamentals underlying the relationship remain intact.
In Chapter 6, Yunxiang Liang discusses the complex dynamics between China and Japan. The history issues as well as rising national-isms in both countries have challenged this relationship, while the disputes over maritime boundaries in the East China Sea and the sovereignty of the Diaoyu–Senkaku islets have added further complications in recent years. These complications make it even more important, Liang argues, for both countries to resolve their differences through diplomacy and dialogue. The Sino-Japanese Four Point Consensus that was reached in November 2014, for example, is a right step in that direction. Liang suggests that the France–Germany example in Europe may be a possible model of regional cooperation that could help China and Japan achieve positive breakthroughs in their relationship. The slow improvement in Sino-Japanese relations apparently points to this direction.
Following the examination on China’s Northeast Asia relations, the book turns its regional focus toward Southeast Asia. In Chapter 7, instead of dealing with China’s relations with ASEAN countries in a bilateral fashion, Zhimin Lin explores Beijing’s engagement with ASEAN — the most important institution in the region. He argues that ASEAN countries serve as a litmus test of how well or difficult it is for China to manage relations with its neighboring countries. China’s engagement with ASEAN and its affiliated institutions has helped create a new model for China to manage its relations with neighboring countries. In this endeavor, China developed an approach of regionalism that is different from both the American and European ones. Instead of focusing on security and formal agreements, China’s institutional engagement with ASEAN is more open-ended and informal. The challenge for Beijing is whether such an approach is sufficient to manage conflicts rising from competing interests. The tension and subsequent gap between China and ASEAN on the issue of South China Sea highlight China’s dilemma in engaging ASEAN countries.
This is exactly the focus of Chapter 8. In that chapter, Penghong Cai analyzes China’s strategic relations with ASEAN countries, noting the security dimension of this relationship has generally lagged behind its economic facet. The escalation of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, differences in perceptions over China’s intentions and its maritime behavior, the growing capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy as well as the U.S.’s Asia strategy are some key factors that have led to a more complicated security landscape between China and ASEAN countries. While China will not give up what it considers to be its legitimate security and territorial interests in maritime Southeast Asia, it will also not turn away from cooperative and “soft power” solutions to strengthen regional stability.
One of these soft power responses in Southeast Asia is discussed in Chapter 9. Qichao Wang highlights the series of coproduced documentary films that detail and illustrate the cooperative aspects — people-to-people relations, cultural ties, economic transactions, etc. — of relations between China and the Mekong river countries (Cambodia, Myanmar, Lao, Vietnam and Thailand). According to him, the documentary series significantly improved the image of China in the Mekong river countries and greatly facilitated the cultural exchanges between China and these countries. Wang’s contribution is unique in that it presents a view of China’s periphery diplomacy from a “media” perspective, and draws attention to the lesser-explored subject of China’s soft power projection in Southeast Asia.
South Asia
China’s complex and expanding relations in South Asia are explored in the third thematic segment of the book. Gancheng Zhao provides a broad strategic analysis of developments in Sino-Indian relations in Chapter 10. Zhao suggests that the shifting complexities of China–India relations can be traced to the shifting mutual perceptions of both Asian powers even as these perceptions are continually shaped by changes in the global strategic milieu and their respective global “status”. For Beijing, India has grown in strategic importance and is now a central component of its periphery diplomacy. China sees relations with India as a “litmus test” for a successful periphery diplomacy (particularly in its western periphery), and in that respect, has continued with efforts to “make India a strategic partner”. There have been a number of convergent areas which bind both sides closer strategically, including growing bilateral trade ties, cooperation in international organizations or groups such as BRICS, and reform of the global economic and financial architecture, among others. At the same time, issues such as the long-standing border dispute, military dynamics, trading imbalance, contestation over water resources, and China’s expanding presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region, are some divergent aspects that continue to cast a shadow on the bilateral relationship.
One of the more contentious aspects — the border demarcation dispute — is examined in further depth by Nazia Hussain in Chapter 11. This enduring dispute, in