Reform And Development In China: After 40 Years. Группа авторов

One of the reasons why the local cadres engage in collusive behavior, Zhou Xueguang points out, is that the criteria on which their behavior is being judged is not always clear. If higher-ups have multiple goals — say, environmental protection, economic growth and the “well-being” of the population — understanding the criteria for promotion becomes even more difficult, and the personalization of bureaucratic relations intensifies. One way to deal with this uncertainty over goals is for the local cadres to pick the policy goals that he believes the superordinate cares about most — especially if that goal aligns with his own personal interests. Thus, there is a systemic tendency toward selective policy implementation.⁹

      The problem of alignment between the goals of the center and the interests of the local cadres becomes particularly severe when they diverge. The policy of fangquangrangli 放权让利 that was followed in the 1980s was very good at stimulating economic growth, but it also setup centripetal forces that loosened the center’s control. The tax-sharing system that was implemented in 1994 and the elimination of the agricultural tax and miscellaneous fees in 2006 were intended to strengthen the center’s control (which they did in fiscal terms), but they deprived the localities of revenues while still expecting them to develop the economy. It is not surprising that local cadres found new sources of revenue, exacerbating cadre-mass relations and worsening the problem of corruption.

      In recent years, there has been a debate about whether promotions are based on personalistic considerations (such as patron–client ties) or on merit. Given that local level cadres find the criteria for promotion less than clear, that the differentiation between levels of the bureaucracy is not large enough to constrain behavior, and that misbehavior is rarely sanctioned, the incentives to develop informal ties and to promote people on the basis of them, at least in part, are very strong. The evidence of the sale of office also suggests that control over promotion is highly concentrated and not subject to effective oversight. Although merit may enter consideration for promotion, it seems pretty clear that it is not the only consideration.

      I think that one way to conceive of the difference between the cadre system in China and a Weberian-style bureaucracy is to think of the difference between “cadres” and “administrators.” Is the term “cadre” simply a translation of the term “administrator” or “bureaucrat”? I don’t think that anyone who has looked at the Chinese political system would argue that it is. What distinguishes a cadre from a bureaucrat is first of all the very personal relationship between the superordinate and the subordinate. Ultimately, it is the superordinate who judges the behavior of the subordinate, and this makes satisfying the demands of the superordinate the primary consideration, guiding the subordinate’s behavior. Second, and in tension with this first characteristic, the subordinate is given a great deal of leeway to achieve whatever tasks have been assigned. Note the difference between “tasks” and “job descriptions”; bureaucrats have job descriptions, cadres have tasks. Tasks are policy goals, such as “grow the economy” and do not necessarily come with the resources necessary to accomplish them. It is up to the subordinate to figure out how to complete the tasks. And that means that the subordinate must have a great deal of discretion, indeed, of arbitrary power. Without that arbitrary power, the cadre would just be a bureaucrat. This suggests that in contrast to the separation of person and office that characterizes Weberian-style bureaucracies, that person and office really are one and the same, at least during the period in which one holds office. This is really quite different either from traditional systems in which one holds office by virtue of characteristics possessed by the individual (such as aristocratic blood) and from Weberian-style separation of person and office. As long as the cadre system holds, cadres can perform their jobs more or less well and more or less honestly, but they will not become bureaucrats. And the party system will not become a Weberian-style bureaucracy.

      All this raises an interesting question about the changes that seem to be going on now. There are two changes that seem to affect the party system. The first is the separation of the local court system out from the party committee at the same level, with finances coming directly down from the province. The idea would be that this would make court judgments less susceptible to interference and hence more predictable. The other is that the Discipline Inspection Commissions one level above are to take charge of corruption investigations, thus tightening vertical supervision. These reforms are intended to reduce the scope of the local party secretary’s power. Will this turn cadres into bureaucrats? I don’t think so. At best, it will reduce corruption at the local level, and to the extent it does, one can only hope that it succeeds. But it is not intended to build a Weberian-style bureaucracy, so it will not lead to the sort of “institutionalization” that some people have been discussing.

      The conclusion is that the term “institutionalization” has been used widely in the literature without examining what this term means. Looking at the cadre system in China, we may indeed find that it is younger and better educated than in previous years, but I find no evidence to persuade me that China’s bureaucracy is becoming increasingly Weberian over time. Indeed, the demands of the “party controls the cadres” (dang guan ganbu 党管干部) principle sets up tensions between hierarchical control and the need for collusive behavior, between demands for impersonalism and the need for personalism, and the priority of loyalty (both personal and political) over merit that make it unlikely that the cadre system will over time evolve into a Weberian bureaucracy. Indeed, as outside observers, it is important for us to recognize that efforts to professionalize the bureaucracy are indeed subversive of party control.

      ¹Lee, Hong Yung. 1991. From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China. Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 405.

      ²O’Brien, Kevin J. and Li, Lianjiang. 1999. “Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China,” Comparative Politics. Vol. 31, Issue 2: 167–186.

      ³Burns, John P. and Xiaoqi, Wang. 2010. “Civil Service Reform in China: Impacts on Civil Servants’ Behavior,” The China Quarterly. Issue 201: 58–78.

      ⁴Zhou, Xueguang. 2010. “The Institutional Logic of Collusion among Local Governments in China,” Modern China. Vol. 36, Issue 1: 47–78.

      ⁵O’Brien, Kevin and Li, Lianjiang, Rightful Resistance.

      ⁶Minzner, C.F., 2009. “Riots and cover-ups: Counterproductive control of local agents in China”. U. Pa. J. Int’l L. Vol. 31: 53.

      ⁷Changping, Li. Woxiangzonglishuozhenhua.

      ⁸Zhu, Jiangnan. 2008. “Why Are Offices for Sale in China? A Case Study of the Office-Selling Chain in Heilongjiang Province,” Asian Survey. Vol. 48, Issue 4: 558–579.

      ⁹O’Brien, Kevin and Li, Lianjiang. 1999. “Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China,” Comparative Politics. Vol. 31, Issue 2: 167–186.