However, even though Walzer defends relatively strong rights to restrict entry, he also acknowledges that states have obligations of mutual aid (or good Samaritanism) that require states to admit the desperately needy in certain cases, such as when strangers are seeking refuge. On the good Samaritanism account, positive assistance is morally required if there is urgent need and the costs or risks to the would-be helper are low. Walzer applies this reasoning to groups but with important qualifications. Political communities must take in needy strangers under certain conditions, and this invites further analysis of our responsibilities in such cases.
When strangers are in need, just what are our obligations? For some strangers in need, we can supply resources where they are. In the case of refugees, however, what they need is access to our territory, for instance when they are victims of political or religious persecution. In some cases, there is a causal connection between our actions and their status as refugees now. An example of this would be the United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War which created a large refugee population. Following Walzer’s line of argument, the United States had a stronger obligation to admit those refugees than other nations who were not involved. The United States in fact did resettle a large number of refugees from Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam in the wake of that war, settling close to one million refugees at that time.
What about when the number of refugees is very large? Walzer admits that there are limits to our collective liability to take in needy strangers, but it is difficult to know how to specify such limits. Ultimately, the right to restrict entrants remains an important aspect in our ability to have communal self-determination and to preserve our cultural identity. We continue to discuss issues concerning refugees in the next chapter, but for the purposes of this chapter it is important to appreciate that Walzer recognizes significant limits on the right to self-determination, even while he defends such rights.
Another important constraint on the right to self-determination concerns the situation of migrant workers. Walzer argues that a state may not admit guest or migrant workers to labor in the country without offering them a pathway to citizenship. Not to allow access to citizenship for such workers would be highly exploitative and would violate the ideal of self-determination. The processes of self-determination through which a state shapes its internal life must be equally open to all who live in the territory, work in the local economy, and are subject to its local laws. We consider the rights of migrant workers in more detail in chapter 7. For now, once again, we should appreciate that Walzer’s defense of the right to self-determination also includes some important normative constraints.
2.1.2 Freedom of association
Christopher Wellman’s prominent argument for strong rights to restrict immigrants relies crucially on the importance of freedom of association. He argues that legitimate states (i.e. ones that respect basic moral rights) have a right to political self-determination and that freedom of association is a crucial component of self-determination. Freedom of association entails that states also have a right to refrain from associating and so a right to deny prospective immigrants entry to their territory. In short, a state has the right to exclude those with whom it does not wish to associate.
The central arguments proceed through analogies with the importance that freedom of association has for individuals and groups. So consider how important freedom of association is to most people. We commonly think that you should be free to decide who your friends are and, if you choose to marry someone, who that will be. Such freedoms are central rights that are integral to living a self-determining, autonomous life. Consider also how important freedom of association is to clubs. They have the right to decide who should be a member and on what terms. Similarly, states should have such freedoms that are just as crucial to their rights to be self-determining. Imagine if they had no control over which migrants could join their community and so were denied freedom of association. This would deprive them of a crucial aspect of the right to determine the shape and character of their community and would undermine their abilities to be self-determining. The right to freedom of association also includes the right to refuse to associate with others. Legitimate political states may refuse to associate with immigrants who they do not wish to join their political communities, just as you have a right to refuse to associate with people whom you don’t wish to befriend. So, in short, just as individuals may permissibly choose whom (if anyone) to befriend or marry and clubs may determine who should be a member, groups of fellow citizens are entitled to determine whom (if anyone) to admit to their country and to whom entry should be denied.
In addition to the case Wellman makes for self-determination grounded in the importance of freedom of association, he also argues against proponents of more open borders. For instance, while egalitarians make a powerful case for being concerned with the global disadvantaged, there is insufficient reason for that concern to take the form of open borders. Opening borders is neither the only nor even the best way to assist the global poor. These are issues I consider further in later sections.
Many of Wellman’s arguments proceed by analogy with how freedom of association operates for individuals and small groups. However, one might challenge whether we can infer anything about the state from those examples. In the case of friendships, marriages, or religious associations, we have intimate or expressive associations in which freedom of association might matter a great deal (Fine 2010: 353). However, with states we have qualitatively different kinds of groups. In the case of states, freedom of association does not matter in the same kind of fundamental way and so cannot carry the argumentative burden required to exclude prospective immigrants.
One way to deepen the argument in response to such concerns might be to argue that there is something special about our association with others, namely in what we have created together and to which we therefore have a right. Ryan Pevnick’s arguments might be construed in this light.
2.1.3 Ownership of institutions
On Ryan Pevnick’s account (2011), citizens have rights of ownership over the fruits of their collective efforts. The rights arise from the fact that the citizens have labored to produce many of the desirable features of their state. They have raised the revenue required to build valuable public goods, such as basic infrastructure, a system of education, good support for maintaining and regulating an effective market, and so on. Citizens have also invested their own labors in creating and maintaining strong institutions, which then become an important asset in the flourishing communities that many immigrants wish to join. Citizens make all sorts of ongoing contributions to maintaining these institutions, for instance, by paying their taxes and obeying laws and hence contributing to the maintenance of important practices necessary for their ongoing flourishing. And so, because of citizens’ important valuable input into creating and sustaining these institutions, they have relevant ownership claims over them which entitle citizens to decide who may have access to the resources they have created, just as with other legitimate property rights. In short, citizens have special claims to the institutions of their states and important rights to exclude outsiders.
So, on this account, when citizens construct schemes for mutual benefit, such as pension programs or publicly provided healthcare, they gain control over the benefits and resources that these schemes create. After all, it is their efforts and contributions that have generated the central resources that make those states desirable immigration targets.
If Pevnick’s arguments are compelling, then there is a kind of collective ownership