In their contests with the Orders, the tribunals were apt to exhibit the same unscrupulous spirit as in those with other contestants. In Majorca Doctor Ramon Sureda, canon, chancellor and judge of competencias, was likewise conservator of the Military Orders. In 1657 he complained that, in conflicts of jurisdiction, the inquisitor would not form competencias with him in order that the papers might take the regular course of transmission for settlement by the Suprema and Council of Orders. The king and queen therefore, as administrators of the Orders, instructed him in such case to send to the inquisitor three successive messages and report them and their replies to the Council; if, in spite of this, the tribunal continued to prosecute the case, he was to proceed against the inquisitor and the viceroy was to render him all proper support. The inquisitor ingeniously evaded this in the case of Gaspar Puygdorfilio, a Knight of Santiago, in 1661, by refusing to receive any messages, saying that he received them only from the viceroy. Sureda’s report of this was left unnoticed and the inquisitor adopted the same device, in 1662, in the case of Francisco de Veri, a Knight of Montesa, prosecuted for wounding a familiar who had drawn a sword upon him. He refused to receive messages and proceeded to sequestrate Veri’s property, including his crops and cattle. To save them from destruction the viceroy interposed and the Council of Orders appealed to the queen, as administrator of the Order, to take some action that should enable such questions to be settled peaceably, but apparently without result.[1204]
MILITARY ORDERS
As though the exempted classes were not numerous and troublesome enough, there was a project, in 1574, of adding another which, if carried into effect, would have altered the destiny of Spain by subjecting it eventually to the Inquisition and reducing the nominal monarch to the position of a roi fainéant under a Mayor of the Palace. It is a most impressive illustration of the spirit of the age that such a project should have been formulated, that it received enthusiastic support and that a sovereign so jealous of his prerogative as Philip II should have even allowed it to be debated, much less have let it assume a menacing shape and have given it serious consideration. A Military Order was to be established under the name of Santa María de la Espada Blanca, with a white sword as a symbol, like the red sword of Santiago. At its head was to be the inquisitor-general, to whom all members were to swear allegiance and whose orders in peace and war all were to obey. To him likewise they were to assign their property, receiving back at his hands what was necessary for their support, and after death their widows were to be pensioned by him. They were to be exempt from all jurisdiction save his, which was to be delegated to priors appointed in all the provinces. The ostensible object was the defence of the faith and of Spain, for which they were at any time liable to be called to the field, or to serve in garrison, under the orders of the inquisitor-general. Thus the Inquisition was to be furnished with an organized force, sworn to blind obedience and released from all other obligations. The only requisite for membership was limpieza, or purity of blood, free from all taint of Judaic or Moorish contamination, or descent from those who had been sentenced for heresy. At this period limpieza was becoming a popular mania; the cost of proving it through four generations was considerable, and there was strong temptation in the promise that the expenses of all applicants would be defrayed from the common fund.
The project may seem to us too wild to merit a thought, but it responded so perfectly to the temper of the time that it was enthusiastically adopted by the provinces of Castile, Leon, Biscay, Navarre, Aragon, Valencia, Catalonia, Asturias and Galicia. Procurators from these provinces submitted it to Philip for his approval and were supported by representatives of forty-eight noble houses and of the archiepiscopal sees of Toledo, Santiago, Seville, Saragossa, Valencia, Tarragona and Granada. It was debated earnestly and at much length, but the argument of Pedro Vinegas de Córdova decided its fate. He pointed out the troubles which were already arising on the subject of limpieza, causing jealousies, hatreds and contentions, to be increased enormously if the population was thus to be divided into two classes; also the fact that the royal courts would have left to their jurisdiction only the New Christians, while the Old Christians would have their special judges and, if the comparatively few existing familiars caused such all-pervading troubles, what the effect would be of increasing without limit the number of the exempt. On the one hand the ambitious and able men among the New Christians, being thus cast out, would foment disaffection and disturbance; on the other, if the old Military Orders had been a source of danger to the monarchy, what would be the effect of creating a new one, united and vastly more numerous and subject as vassals to an inquisitor-general, whose power was already so great, and who would control the property and have jurisdiction over all members, while in case of rebellion the frontiers and strongholds would be in his hands? This reasoning was unanswerable; Philip ordered all papers connected with the project to be surrendered; he imposed perpetual silence on its advocates and wrote to the ecclesiastical and secular bodies to abandon it, for justice and protection would never be lacking.[1205]
We shall probably do no injustice to the Inquisition in attributing to the profits accruing from the exercise of its temporal jurisdiction the ruthless vigor with which the tribunals sought to vindicate and extend it. The remarks of the Visitor Cervantes with regard to Barcelona, in 1561 (p. 468), indicate how lucrative it could be made and how welcome was the addition of fees and fines to the somewhat meagre salaries of the officials. This explains the reckless violence which became habitual in the conduct of quarrels, because this not only was an assurance to the parties concerned as to the vigor with which they were defended, but it also served to discourage the secular authorities from resisting encroachments. It also explains the multiplication of the unsalaried officials such as familiars, commissioners and their notaries, assessors, deputies etc., which no laws or Concordias or regulations could restrain, for each one was a possible source of profit to the tribunal and a probable cause of disturbance in his vicinage, through the comfortable assurance of immunity from the law.
EVILS OF THE SYSTEM
The natural result of this was that unprofitable business was neglected for profitable, and the suppression of heresy was postponed to the trial of civil and criminal cases which yielded fees. We have seen how Cervantes reported that in Barcelona this seemed to be the real duty of the tribunal and that there was nothing else to be attended to; his animadversions produced no amendment and, in 1567, de Soto Salazar repeated the complaint.[1206] This continued unchecked. The project of reform presented to the Suprema, in 1623, expresses the wish that other tribunals would follow the example of Saragossa, where one of the inquisitors was delegated every four months to conduct this business, so that prisoners on trial for heresy could have their cases despatched and not be kept languishing interminably in prison, which, as we shall see, was one of the sorest abuses inflicted on them.[1207] This pious wish was fruitless and the records of the Inquisition for the following century show how large a portion of its activity was devoted to these cases and to the competencias incessantly springing from them.
One feature which aggravated the oppression in these matters, especially in civil suits, was not only the favoritism which inevitably inclined the tribunal to the side of its own people, but the fact that the inquisitors were usually strangers, unfamiliar with the local laws and customs peculiar to each province, which they presumed to interpret and enforce. This justified the frequent demands that inquisitors should be natives—demands which received no attention, for the appointing power thought only of their qualifications as judges of the faith while, to the mass of the population, their duties in this respect were of small account in comparison with their activity in their temporal jurisdiction. Another well-grounded source of complaint was that the inquisitorial habits of secrecy could not be wholly overcome; the parties and their counsel were not allowed to be present, as in the royal courts; witnesses were examined by the inquisitor on lists of interrogatories furnished to him, and there was no cross-examination; written arguments were presented to him which he handed to the other side for reply and the procedure, in both civil and criminal cases, was assimilated as nearly as might be to the secret trials for heresy which was the inquisitorial ideal of the dispensation of justice. The cases were decided by the inquisitors in session together, on a majority vote. In the sixteenth century there was no appeal to the Suprema, even when the vote was not unanimous, but, in 1645, a writer assumes that either side could appeal.[1208]
We have seen how tenaciously the kingdoms of Aragon struggled against the evils of the system. Castile felt them equally but