IV. But now two things will chiefly be desiderated, which now we own in our testimony, for which many have died, that seem not to be confirmed by or consistent with the testimony of this period. One is, that we not only maintain defensive resistance, but in some cases vindictive and punitive force, to be executed upon men that are bloody beasts of prey, and burdens to the earth, in cases of necessity, when there is no living among them. This principle of reason and natural justice, was not much inquired into in this time; when the sun was up, whose warmth and light made these beasts creep into their dens, and when they, being brought under subjection, could not force people into such extraordinary violent courses when the ordinary and orderly course of law was running in its right channel. Yet from the ground of their ordinary procedure, military and civil, against such monsters, we may gather the lawfulness of an ordinary procedure in a pinch of necessity, conform to their grounds: I hope to make this evident, when I come ex proposito to vindicate this head. But there is another thing that we own, which seems not to have been known in these days, viz. That when we are required to own the authority of the present dominator, we hold sinful to own it. Yet we find these reverend and renowned fathers owned King Charles I. and did not refuse the succession of Charles II. I shall answer in order. First, As to King Charles I. there was a great difference betwixt him and his sons that succeeded; he never declared parliamentarily that neither promises, contracts, nor oaths should bind him, as the first of his perfidious sons did; it might have been then presumed, if he had engaged so far for promoving the work of God, he would have been a man of his word (for to say a king of his word, is antiquitate in a good sense, except that it means he is as absolute in his word as in his sword, and scorns to be a slave to it.) Neither professed he himself a papist, as the second son hath done: Again it must be granted, that more might have been comported with in the beginning, when there were some hopes of redress, than after such process of time; whereby now we see and feel beyond all debate, that the throne stands and is stated, not only in opposition to, but upon the ruins of the rights and privileges both of religion and liberty. But was not the equivalent done by the church, anno 1648, when they refused to concur with that unlawful engagement, for restoring of the king, 'till security be had, by solemn oath under his hand and seal, that he shall for himself and successors, give his assent to all acts and bills for enjoining presbyterial government, and never make opposition to it, nor endeavour any change thereof? July ult. 1648. sess. 21.' But it will be laid, that in their renewing the covenant that year, they did not leave out that article. True, thereby they stopped the mouths of their adversaries; and then they were not without hopes, but that in his straits he might have proved a Manasseh taken among the thorns. And the covenanters at that time, not being clear that he had done that which ipso jure made him no magistrate, chused rather, while matters stood so, to engage to maintain him, than simply to disown him (which yet our forefathers did upon smaller grounds many times) in the hopes of being prevailed with at last. But when they saw that this proved ineffectual, therefore at the coronation of the new king they made the covenanted interest the sole basis upon which alone authority was conferred upon him. For the second, though they did not refuse the succession of Charles the Second (which was their blame and our bane, of which we may blush this day) yet we find many things in that transaction which justify our disowning of him, and condemn the owning of the present possessor. (1.) In that seasonable and necessary warning, July 27, sess. 27. 'whereas many would have admitted his majesty to the exercise of his royal power, upon any terms whatsoever: the assembly declares first; that a boundless and unlimited power is to be acknowledged in no king nor magistrate; neither is our king to be admitted to the exercise of his power, as long as he refuses to walk in the administration of the same, according to this rule. Secondly, that there is a mutual stipulation and obligation between the king and the people, as both of them are tied to God, so each of them are tied to one another, for the performance of mutual and reciprocal duties; accordingly kings are to take the oath of coronation, to abolish popery and maintain the protestant religion: As long therefore as the king refuses to engage and oblige himself for security of religion and safety of his people, it is consonant to scripture and reason and laws of the kingdom, that he should be refused. Thirdly, in the league and covenant the duty of defending and preserving the king, is subordinate to the duty of preserving religion and liberty: And therefore, he standing in opposition to the public desires of the people for their security, it were a manifest breach of covenant, and a preferring the king's interest to the interest of Jesus Christ, to bring him to the exercise of his power. Fourthly,
Автор: | Shields Alexander |
Издательство: | Bookwire |
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Жанр произведения: | Документальная литература |
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isbn: | 4064066172411 |
1645, sess. 18.—'Unless men will blot out of their hearts the love of religion and cause of God, and cast off all care of their country, laws, liberties, &c. (all being in visible danger of present ruin and destruction) they must now or never appear actively, each one stretching himself to, yea beyond his power. It is not time to dally, or go about the business by halves, nor be almost, but altogether zealous: Cursed is he that doeth the work of the Lord negligently. If we have been forward to assist our neighbour kingdoms, shall we neglect to defend our own? Or shall the enemies of God be more active against his cause than his people for it? God forbid.' In another seasonable and necessary warning, July 27, 1649, sess. 27. they say, 'But if his majesty, or any having or pretending power and commission from him, shall invade this kingdom, upon pretext of establishing him in the exercise of his royal power; as it will be an high provocation against God, to be accessory or assisting thereto, so it will be a necessary duty to resist and oppose the same.' These fathers could well distinguish, between authority and the person abusing it: and were not so loyal, as now their degenerate children are ambitious to shew themselves, stupidly stooping to the shadow thereof, and yet will be called the only asserters of presbyterian principles. But we find, they put it among the characters of malignants, to confound the king's honour and authority with the abuse and pretence thereof, and with commissions, warrants, and letters, procured from the king by the enemies of the cause and covenant, as if we could not oppose the latter, without incroaching upon the former. But here an objection or two must be removed out of the way before we go forward. One is, from the third article of the covenant; where there seems to be a great deal of loyalty, obliging to defend the king's majesty, his person and authority, in the preservation and defence of the true religion and liberties of the kingdoms, 'that the world may bear witness with our consciences of our loyalty, and that we have no thoughts or intentions to diminish his majesty's just power and greatness.' I answer, there is indeed a deal of loyalty there, and true loyalty, because lawfully limited, being qualified with, and subordinate unto the preservation and defence of the true religion and liberties of the kingdom (as the makers of the covenant do expound it, in the assembly's declaration against the unlawful engagement, July ult. 1648, sess. 21.) not that reverse loyalty, which makes duties to God conditional and limited, and duties to the king absolute and unlimited, as our loyalists do now. And I wish others were free of it, who have sworn oaths of unlimited allegiances to maintain the king in any power unto which his force aspires; and to justify this their loyalty, will bring in this article of the covenant with a distorted sense, reading it backward, 'that we in the preservation and defence of religion must preserve and defend the king:' As if religion obliged to defend him, do what he will. It were better such pretended covenanters denied the covenant, than to be such a reproach to it, in wresting its genuine sense. But I have adduced the sense of the best interpreters of it, the general assembly. Next when they entered under the bond of this covenant, they did it with a purpose to oppose all his invasions upon religion and the liberties of the people, and to vindicate these precious interests from his usurpings, into a state of liberty: And shall we imagine, that that very oath of God did lay upon them or us an obligation to defend the person who is a destroyer of all these, contrary to the very nature of the oath, contrary to the hope of the covenanters, and contrary to their subsequent practice? But then it will be urged, why then was that clause cast into the covenant? I answer we have not the same cause to keep it, as they had some cause to put it in, with accommodation to the present possessor of the sovereignty. The owning of it in our circumstances would be as great a reproach to us, as the want of it was to them in theirs. They put in the words to prevent the world's mistake, and to remove that odium industriously heaped upon the heads of whose hearts were associate in the defence of religion and liberty, therefore they would profess they would not be disloyal while he was for God. And a defiance may be given to clamour, and calumny itself, to give one instance of the defect of performance hereof, while he went not about to ruin those things, incomparably more precious than his person or authority, and in ruining whereof no person can retain authority.