Just Deserts. Daniel C. Dennett

skeptic Derk Pereboom, the following incompatibilist intuition about determinism: “An action is free in the sense required for moral responsibility only if it is not produced by a deterministic process that traces back to causal factors beyond the agent’s control” (Pereboom 2001: 34).

Second, so-called folk intuitions about free will indicate that ordinary people (or the “folk” as philosophers like to call them) think that their choices aren’t determined. As the experimental philosopher Shaun Nichols explains: “It is not just that they don’t have the belief that their choices are determined. Rather, they positively think that their choices are not determined. And this belief is implicated in their thoughts about free will” (2012: 203). For instance, when presented with a description of a deterministic universe, most participants say that in that universe, people don’t have free will (see, e.g., Nichols and Knobe 2007). More specifically, in one classic study, participants were given descriptions of a deterministic universe (A) and another universe (B) in which everything is determined except human choices. Participants were asked, “Which of these universes is most like ours?” More than 90 percent of the respondents said that universe (B) – the indeterministic universe – is most like our own (Nichols and Knobe 2007: 669). Additional empirical findings indicate that, not only do people tend to believe that they possess indeterminist free will, people’s experience of choosing and deciding is that they possess such indeterminist (or libertarian) freedom (see Deery et al. 2013). And, even when people seem to express compatibilist intuitions, there’s evidence that this is largely explained by the fact that people import an indeterministic metaphysics into the deterministic scenarios they are given when making judgments about free will and moral responsibility (see Nadelhoffer et al. 2019). There is converging evidence, then, that ordinary thinking is at least partly or largely indeterminist.* This provides reason to think that the everyday conception of free will is not compatible with determinism (or at least that people’s intuitions are unclear and confused). So, even if every-day folk tend to think that our ordinary desert practices are justified, this may be because they falsely presuppose that indeterminism is true.

Given these empirical findings, I have four questions for you. First, how do you explain the widespread folk tendency to believe in indeterminist free will? Second, why think your compatibilist conception of free will is the one the folk care about? Third, if it’s not the one the folk care about, why should we think that it’s the only sense that matters to the free will debate? And lastly, are you at least willing to admit that your account is a revisionist one, i.e. it seeks to defend a notion of free will that is different than the one ordinary people believe in?

      I have other concerns regarding determinism as well, but perhaps I should pause here and let you respond.

Dennett: I’ll briefly answer your four questions, leaving the details for later in the debate. First, the widespread folk tendency to believe in indeterminist free will is due to misunderstanding. I will point out the mistakes of imagination that have led us to this curious state. For instance, determinism does not prevent you from making choices, from turning over a new leaf, from becoming less impulsive, from rethinking decisions, from learning from your mistakes, from resolving to do better and succeeding – or from taking advice on how to think about free will! If that’s news to you, you have been mis-imagining determinism and you have lots of company. Second, I think my compatibilist conception of free will is the one the folk care about because it is not inflated. When people think something is really important – and free will is really important – they tend to exaggerate their account of what it is or must be; they don’t just want powers, they want superpowers, or so they think. Third, the reason I think my conception of free will is the only kind of free will worth wanting is that I’ve been asking very smart people for decades if they can tell me why anybody should care about any concept of free will other than mine, and nobody yet has come up with a good answer. Why, for instance, would anyone want the ability to make “contra-causal” or strictly undetermined decisions? I can readily imagine good reasons for wanting to be able to fly by flapping one’s arms, or the ability to travel to another galaxy, or to time-travel – what a trip that would be! – or, getting closer to home, the ability to undo a deed one regretted, but the attractions of indeterminism of choice have yet to be defended – I’ll discuss later an apparent defense that proves (to me) that the quest is superstitious at best. Mostly people just assume that an inflated concept of free will is the only one worth thinking about – “Accept no substitutes! Look out for Dennett’s bait-and-switch move!” Fourth, I am not just willing but eager to “admit” that my account is a revisionist one, that seeks to defend a notion of free will that is different than the one ordinary people believe in. One of the besetting foibles of much contemporary philosophy is its regressive reliance on everyday “intuitions” as the touchstones of truth.

      Caruso: Thank you again for your candor and for acknowledging that your account of free will is a revisionist or reformist one. To be clear, I do not reject your account of free will because it seeks to revise or reform our traditional notion of free will. I acknowledge that a revisionist account of free will is a legitimate position. Instead, I reject it because it fails to preserve the kind of control in action (i.e. free will) required for moral responsibility in the basic-desert sense. That is, I hope to show in the arguments to come that if an action is produced by a determinist process that traces back to causal factors beyond the agent’s control, then it would be wrong to hold that agent morally responsible in the desert-based sense – the sense required for an agent to justly deserve to be praised and blamed, punished and rewarded. But perhaps we should delay no longer and just get directly into the argument. What do you say?

      Dennett: Yes, let’s get on with it.

      1 * (Nichols 2004, 2012; Nichols and Knobe 2007; Feltz and Cokley 2009; Feltz, Perez, and Harris 2012; Deery et al. 2013; Knobe 2014; Nadelhoffer et al. 2019; Rose and Nichols 2013; Sarkissian et al. 2010)