Hear-Confirm-Understand-Decide-Respond Model
Sociologists exploring the phenomenon of a community’s response to a warning have offered a number of important insights about how warning messages are received and processed. Much of the research on warnings examines the social-psychological response by individuals during the period of hearing a warning until acting or choosing not to act as a consequence (Sorensen, 2000). Theory has sought to explain the warning process and improve practice by structuring messages more strategically and by integrating warning systems. These approaches seek to understand warnings as more than a simple stimulus response phenomenon but as a complex social process that involves interpreting, personalizing, assessing, and confirming the risks and warnings (Mileti, 1995). These processes – both for natural hazard events, such as earthquakes and floods, and technology-based risks, such as nuclear plant accidents – have been described by Mileti and Fitzpatrick (1992), Mileti and Peek (2000), and Sorensen (2000). Warnings, like all human communication, begin with message creation by a sender and message reception by a receiver, who then interprets and responds. Mileti and Sorensen (1990) describe a process of “Hear-Confirm-Understand-Decide-Respond” as fundamental to risk communication in the public response component of public warnings. This framework is consistent with basic models of communication, including reception, interpretation, and response, but has been adapted specifically to the processing of public warning messages.
Mileti and Peek (2000) argue that a public warning system consists of three interrelated subsystems: a detection subsystem, a management subsystem, and a public response subsystem. The detection subsystem consists of the processes of initially identifying a hazard and the potential for severe harm. In many cases, detection occurs through some formalized monitoring system managed by a government agency or organization. In other cases, risks are identified through more informal means. Risk detection is a complex process involving the integration and interpretation of information, often from diverse sources. A number of factors affect the warning system, including the level of noise, failures in foresight, inability to interpret risk cues, breakdowns in vigilance, and various forms of distraction (Seeger et al., 2003). The management subsystem refers to the decision-making processes involved in weighing the risks and determining protective warnings and actions. These processes are most often managed by a response agency or organization and rely heavily on subject matter experts. As described earlier, the implications of issuing warnings are often weighed in a cost-benefit analysis before decisions are made to issue a warning. Public warnings often have significant costs including economic costs associated with social disruption. Risk communication in the detection and management of subsystems typically takes place among officials, often with little direct inclusion of the public. Risk communication in the public response subsystem includes warning the public and takes account of public perceptions, processing of messages, and actions. This final public response system is critical in that public actions, such as evacuations, shelter in place, or boil water, are often the central strategy for mitigating and limiting harm.
Some of the theories that could be employed to understand the public response subsystem include the extended parallel process model (EPPM), fear appeals, the health belief model, and the theory of reasoned action. The health belief model, for example, explains health behaviors as a function of individual perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs (Rosenstock, 1966). Attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions about risk can similarly influence risk mitigation behaviors such as evacuations or shelter in place. The EPPM begins with the assumption that threat is a primary motivator of action. Fear is an emotion while threat is a cognitive response. The EPPM seeks to incorporate the drive for defensive action through behavioral change as well as the ability to take the action (Roberto et al., 2009; Witte, 1992). These and similar approaches seek to explain how information is processed and how messages may influence behavior and thus complement the Hear-Confirm-Understand-Decide-Respond model.
Applications of the Hear-Confirm-Understand-Decide-Respond Model
Mileti’s warning process model has been very influential in the examination of basic questions regarding warning communication. Many of these investigations have used case studies and survey methodologies to examine warning systems for natural disasters such as earthquakes, tornadoes, and potential radiological events. For example, Aguirre et al. (1991) examined the warning system failures associated with the 1987 Saragosa, Texas, tornado that killed 30 people and injured 121. It was found that hearing a warning is facilitated if it occurs in one’s native language, if a strong social network is present, and if the message comes from officials. Mileti and Darlington (1995) investigated the public’s response to earthquake warnings in the San Francisco area, a region prone to earthquakes. They found the public is more likely to hear and respond to a warning message when it is delivered through multiple channels. Clarity of the message also facilitates understanding. The public is likely to respond to a warning message if it is delivered by a credible official source and/or consists of credible information. Mileti and O’Brien (1992) tested propositions of the model following the Loma Prieta earthquake and found general support of the theory, although some variability existed between pre- and post-impact warnings. Sorensen (1984) evaluated the effectiveness of warning systems for nuclear power plants. Among the problems associated with the 1979 Three Mile Island accident was an ineffective public warning system. Sorensen concluded that people are more likely to hear a warning message about an emergency at a nuclear power plant if they are at home at the time of delivery, and they are more likely to respond if that message comes from a scientific source. Thus, the basic structure of this approach has received support.
This framework is sufficiently general to encompass a number of subprocesses. For example, Sorensen (2000) and Mileti and Sorensen (1990) have described 11 communication factors associated with the eventual behavioral response, namely: electronic channel, media, siren, personal versus impersonal messages, message specificity, number of channels, frequency, message consistency, message certainty, source credibility, and source familiarity. Other factors include demographic variables (age, gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, family size, parenthood), attitudes and experiences (knowledge and attitudes about risks, fatalistic beliefs), and structural and community factors (community involvement and planning). The range of factors influencing warning systems is thus quite complex, involving a diverse message, audience, and social variables.
These factors influence the warning process at many points. For example, communication variables such as channel influence both risk identification and risk assessment. Consistency of message, specific information, frequency, and credibility are all factors associated with the persuasiveness of a message in terms of risk identification and assessment. Decisions about risk reduction, feasibility, and, ultimately, the protective response may be influenced by factors such as message specificity and message certainty.
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Hear-Confirm-Understand-Decide-Respond Model
The Hear-Confirm-Understand-Decide-Respond model is a useful and comprehensive way of framing warning messages within larger systems and more general models, and it accommodates basic principles of communication effectiveness. Its predictive value, as research has shown, is in demonstrating that basic principles