Out of the Ether. Matthew Leising. Читать онлайн. Newlib. NEWLIB.NET

Автор: Matthew Leising
Издательство: John Wiley & Sons Limited
Серия:
Жанр произведения: Ценные бумаги, инвестиции
Год издания: 0
isbn: 9781119602941
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is required to be regulated from its moment of creation, whether that's through an initial public offering or a secondary offering.

      Yet selling ether to the pubic in a crowdsale is a great way to raise money. So that's just what the Ethereum cofounders did. The Ethereum crowdsale in 2014 was one of the most successful at the time, netting over $18 million. By then the money was desperately needed to continue to develop Ethereum, but we'll get to that part later.

      This dilemma of raising money to fund development was hardly unique to Ethereum. What about all the other applications people wanted to build? By late 2015 the crypto world was exploding with new projects that seemed to be sprouting up daily. Every one of them needed to raise money in one way or another if it was going to have a shot at succeeding.

      The way the Ethereum community solved this fundraising dilemma circa late 2015 starts with a theoretical physicist named Christoph Jentzsch. It ends with something that sounds straight out of futurist nineteenth-century science fiction – a decentralized autonomous organization, or DAO, which is basically a corporation that runs entirely from a codebase, meaning no humans are involved once it's deployed. DAOs are also very difficult to govern once deployed. In between Jentzsch and the DAO is a startup called slock.it, which Jentzsch cofounded. Their product was called a smart lock, or a slock. (I always think of Evil Dead II when I hear the word slock, thinking of S-Mart. “Shop smart. Shop S-Mart.”)

      It was a clever idea, and Jentzsch and his partners had some fun when they unveiled slock.it at the first Ethereum developer conference in London in November 2015. Jentzsch gave a live demonstration in which he unlocked a slock that controlled a teakettle: pay the slock some ether and the power turns on to heat the water. As the audience watched, miners on the Ethereum blockchain verified the transaction. A few minutes later the kettle boiled and Jentzsch's partner Stephan Tual came on stage to pour himself a cup of tea. The look on Tual's face as he poured the boiling water was knowing but also held an air of wonder – like, can you fucking believe what we just did?

      Slock.it hoped to connect the Ethereum blockchain to the Internet of things, or IoT, the catchall phrase used to describe the system that controls your smart refrigerator and smart thermostat.

      Yet to make slock.it a reality and not just a demo, the startup needed money. So Jentzsch set the hook.

      “I hope those things were amazing to you, but we have just another thing, a really cool thing,” Jentzsch said to his London audience. He then introduced his idea for having a decentralized autonomous organization act as a fundraising mechanism. The idea of a DAO wasn't Jentzsch's – that honor belongs to Dan Larimer, another early blockchain pioneer. Vitalik Buterin had also long been fascinated by DAOs, which he mentioned prominently in his 2013 Ethereum white paper, “Ethereum: The Ultimate Smart Contract and Decentralized Application Platform.” Now, though, Jentzsch said the way to raise money – not just for slock.it, but for any developer team that wanted to work with Ethereum – was with a DAO.

      Jentzsch's idea proved to be more successful than his wildest dreams. The DAO became so popular, in fact, that it turned into a nightmare for the German. Instead of collecting the $5 million Jentzsch had expected, ether users poured $150 million into its coffers. Another way of measuring the DAO is that it held 11.944 million ether, which fluctuates in value, meaning the DAO's total holdings rose or fell according to the cryptocurrency's price. By Friday, June 17, 2016, it had ballooned to $250 million. It made Christoph physically ill, and his health and family life suffered. And it only got worse when hackers broke into it on that day.

      ●●●

      One of the curious aspects of the DAO attack is that it stopped. The thief was inside, the mechanism for changing the code of the DAO was complicated and risky, and the Ethereum community might not have been able to mobilize in time to save the money that hadn't yet been stolen. Given enough time, the thief should have been able to drain every cent. But he didn't. Sure, $55 million had been snatched, but there was about another $200 million left. Why leave that on the table?

      The best theory I've heard is that it has to do with the mechanics of the attack contract used – that is, the smart contract the thief wrote to steal the ether. The theory is that while the contract would work for several hours, it would also have a tendency to break after a certain time. And while you could try to launch the attack again once the original contract had broken, getting all the necessary variables lined up again could take time or simply not work again.

      In any case, the original DAO attack lasted a bit more than seven hours. A total of 3.689 million ether was stolen.

      Four days after the first attack, a second started. The mechanics were all the same; the only difference was the location where the stolen ether was sent.

      The Ethereum community didn't take this lying down. From the first moments of the DAO attack on June 17, people tried to discover who was behind the hack and to figure out what to do about it. They would fight this. These were the people who had written the DAO code as well as other developers and programmers who had made a career out of working with Ethereum. A driving force in the group was Griff Green. One of the first employees at slock.it, Griff had realized early on the mysterious power of DAOs. Only he called them decentralized autonomous corporations at first, as in a paper he wrote on them for his master's degree in cryptocurrencies from the University of Nicosia.

      If you meet Griff and for some reason don't like him, there's something wrong with you. He's a hugger, first and foremost, and an all-around genuine person. He was the mayor of Ethereum at this point in time; he knew just about everyone and was heading up slock.it's communication and community outreach. From the attack's inception, Griff helped recruit other Ethereum community members to form a kind of emergency response team. The beginning days were almost entirely organized via a Skype chat that they named Robin Hood.

      “The Robin Hood Group was just a shit show,” Griff told me in 2017 when I was writing the magazine story. “I hope the movie portrays it better than it actually was.”

      He's being modest; what the group did to save the remaining money in the DAO was amazing. Another member was Alex Van de Sande, whom everyone calls avsa, after his online name. While Griff was in rural Germany when the DAO was attacked, avsa was in his apartment in Rio de Janiero.

      The Robin Hood Group (RHG) also included a few extremely good coders, like Lefteris Karapetsas and Jordi Baylina. They quickly figured out how to replicate the attack so they could break into the DAO in order to “steal” the rest of the funds to keep them safe (hence the name).