The Tribalization of Europe. Marlene Wind

settings over centuries – above all in war. And yet there is little discussion of the belligerent tone of identitarian figures from secessionists to Brexiteers. When Brexiteers argue that the UK is too culturally and historically distinct from the rest of Europe to be a mere subject of a European Union.¹¹ Or when they argue (as Boris Johnson has done on several occasions) that the UK would have been reduced to a vassal state if the “surrender bill” of Theresa May – Johnson’s predecessor – had ever been adopted. Secessionists in Catalonia equally make these kinds of allegations. For instance, when they claim that the Catalans’ language, history, and culture are so specific – and so frequently suppressed – that they require not only their own state, but also – in the interim – the near-eradication of the Spanish language from the Catalan schooling system.¹² As Nacho Martín Blanco, a member of the Catalan parliament, has put it: “Catalonia has the dubious honor of being the only place in the Western world where the majority of the population do not even have the option of enrolling their children in schools that teach in their native language.”¹³ Even in the Basque Country, another of Spain’s troubled regions, things have not gone this far.

      Replacing politics with identity or culture is an extremely potent but also explosive weapon. Potent because, by putting identity and ethnic/cultural belonging above all, it posits the existence of a deeper, more innocent, purer stratum beyond the political. And dangerous because its proponents refuse to acknowledge the political nature of their positions, which naturally would make them an object of discussion.

The tribalism and ethnocentrism we face cannot, however, be reduced to secessionist movements or radical Tories’ views of the EU–UK relationship. It is far more wide-ranging than that.

      Tribal rhetoric and identity politics are systematically employed by illiberal demagogues like Viktor Orbán, who touts Hungary’s cultural uniqueness while attacking foreigners, Jews, LBGTQ activists, and anything that reeks of cosmopolitanism. He presents the liberal elite as the enemy – reckless globalists imposing multicultural values and tolerance on innocent nativist Hungarians.

      Orbán presents the nation’s distinctiveness – reinforced with Christianity, to get the older generation on board – as something precious to be shielded from an invasive disease. Hungarian society was full of hope thirty years ago, when it broke free from the Soviet yoke. Under Orbán, it has not only embraced identity politics full force, but even turned its back on the core values of democracy.

      The purpose of the identitarian projects I have so far described is to transform identity from a passive, historical sentiment to an active weapon against more inclusive forms of nationhood (such as Spanish unity), Europeanization, or globalization. With Europe’s current immigration debacle, which has called the otherwise successful Schengen open-border regime into question, new walls and fences are again being built and campaigned for.

      Notes

1 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Verso, 1991. 2 Uffe Østergaard, “Why Globalism Cannot Extinguish the Feeling of National Belonging” (in Danish), October 2, 2016, https://videnskab.dk/kultur-samfund/nation (my translation from Danish). See also his Hvorhen Europa?, Djøf, 2018. 3 E. Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870–1914, Stanford University Press, 1976. 4 J.H.H. Weiler, “Secessionism and Its Discontents,” in C. Closa (ed.), Secession from a Member State and Withdrawal from the European Union, Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 26. 5 See A. Chua, “Tribal World,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2018. 6 See S. Schackle, “The Problem with Identity Politics: Q&A with Asad Haider,” New Humanist, July 13, 2018. 7 See J. Macwhirter, “‘Quislings, Collaborators and Traitors!’ British MEP Attacks Remainers for Stalling Brexit,” Express, May 31, 2018. 8 See T. Garton Ash, “Liberal Europe Isn’t Dead Yet. But its Defenders Face a Long Hard Struggle,” The Guardian, July 9, 2018. 9 See Chua, “Tribal World.” Her recent, commendable book is A. Chua, Political Tribes: Group Instinct and the Fate of Nations, Penguin, 2018.10 See A. Adonis, “Traitors? No, the Lords are the Voice of Reason on Brexit,” The New European, April 21, 2018.11 A good example is Michael Gove defending British identity politics in a speech in Westminster on May 21, 2018. See comments on Gove’s “identitarian” speech in N. Malik, “Gove’s ‘Identitarian’ Speech Shows How Toxic He Has Become,” The Guardian, May 22, 2018.12 Today Spanish is taught as a foreign language in Catalan state schools, which means two hours a week in elementary school and three hours a week in secondary school, the same as English. See P. Álvarez, “Spanish Government Plans to End ‘Catalan-Only’ School Language Policy,” El Pais, February 16, 2018.13 Here cited in A. Wong, “Is Catalonia Using Schools as a Political Weapon?” The Atlantic, November 3, 2017.