From this perspective, technological duality is a potential that the system as a whole tends to valorize. This transversality of technologies between various products is essential in this model. Generic technologies must be rapidly disseminated within companies and knowledge sharing is consequently a key factor for system success. According to some authors, it may be interesting to shift from a market-based Smithian model, to a Schumpeterian model of “cognitive capitalism”, based on a network organization facilitating “permanent innovation”.
Serfati (2008) introduced the expression “French meso-system of armament” (FMSA) to study the specific case of France. This approach between the microeconomic and macroeconomic levels points out the interactions between three main actors: the General Directorate for Armament (Direction générale pour l’armement (DGA)), large contractors and technological agencies such as the French National Aerospace Research Center or the Atomic Energy Commission (Commissariat à l’énergie atomique (CEA)). It is possible to study the commercial and non-commercial interactions within FMSA and the rest of SNI. As far as duality is concerned, this approach enables an analysis of relations in the design of technologies, such as the relations between technology, economy and society. Due to the influence exerted by a country’s history, its international relations, industrial sectors and technologies, entrepreneurial culture and the history of techniques, it is unlikely that a single optimal model for organizing technology transfers will be defined.
Moreover, the analysis made by Serfati (2008) notes that, despite the transferability of certain technologies between defense and civilian sectors, military innovation did not always play by the rules of duality. The case considered, commonly quoted as an example, is that of the development of the Internet in the United States, where the actors in the defense sectors did not support knowledge dissemination in the civilian sector. To deal with this type of behavior, she pointed out the positive role that IPR can play in an innovation system, particularly in the case of duality.
Indeed, according to Serfati, there are two advantages to using mechanisms for the protection of intellectual property in defense programs. First, this encourages civilian companies to participate in defense programs, as they see these mechanisms as a means to protect their interests. Second, by formalizing knowledge and rendering it accessible, mechanisms such as patents contribute to speeding up knowledge dissemination (anyone can study the patent and acquire the knowledge it contains), even if there is a cost to using this knowledge (Serfati 2005). Serfati adds however that the efficiency of IPR depends on how the rest of the system is organized, particularly by the development of public–private partnerships. The latter enable the management of competence transfers from a defense ministry to private companies, according to the PFI (Public–Private Finance Initiative) model (Bellais 2005). This offers a solution to problems related to information asymmetry and minimizes the systemic risk related to the financial power of the defense ministry, which can impose its demands on the contracting groups, particularly in terms of knowledge dissemination (Serfati 2005).
Within the framework of duality, the national scale is considered, as defense innovation problems are still mainly a national challenge to the present day. In the works of Guichard and Heisbourg (2004), duality is described as a “way to manage research, innovation and production of defense systems that aims to generate economies of scale, variety and externalities with the civilian sector” (p. 97). This management model places great emphasis on dual policy. It is a means to use a synergistic potential of defense innovation and civilian innovation by joint actions, coordination processes and incentive mechanisms (Guichard 2004a). This approach to duality management involves a governance that brings together public authorities, private companies and research centers.
Furthermore, Guichard (2004a) shows that this duality is managed by three different structures. They correspond to different levels of technological proximity, each entailing different recommendations in terms of governance of the innovation system:
– convergence: technical characteristics and performances involving the convergence of norms, and certification processes;
– integration: for disjoint products, requiring the implementation of common processes (within companies, to reduce the costs of varieties, and within the research system) by means of a collaboration structure;
– transposition: from a technological module or from a military product to a civilian product or vice versa. This involves passing from the preparation of defense systems to the insertion of civilian subsystems and the search for market opportunities for the defense subsystems.
This systemic approach indicates, among others, the complexity of civilian–military relations. Implementing public policies appears to be essential for organizing this relation. These public policies have two apparently contradictory objectives. The first is to continue mastering the technological flows in a more open world and the second is to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by this world.
Finally, in relation to the implementation of duality, Guichard underlines the role of dual policies. She develops the principles of action for the actual implementation of such policies. The first element highlighted deals with the norms and standards that must be harmonized between the two sectors, both at the national and supranational levels within international authorities. Then she underlines the importance of procurement agencies (DGA in France) in the organization of duality. In a dual system, these institutions are located at the interface between the actors of the civilian innovation system, on the one hand, and the actors of the defense innovation system, on the other hand2. To facilitate interactions, they must structure the R&D programs in which cooperation is possible. For a dual actor, the success of such a procedure depends on its capacity to maintain and develop scientific and technical competences in order to be able to evaluate research and development programs. Finally, she notes that the integration of the production system depends on higher flexibility and coordination within it. This is accompanied by the implementation, consistently throughout the system, of dual research centers, such as the Dual Use Technology Center (DUTC) in Great Britain (aimed at the collaboration between universities, defense or civilian manufacturers on the same technological subjects; Molas-Gallart and Sinclair 1999), the technology broker, or to support a stronger involvement of defense in the civilian innovation networks. This was expected to facilitate technology and information transfers between the two worlds.
The systemic perspective facilitates the understanding of duality effects. They can be classified into several categories: direct, indirect, second order, informational and organizational effects, as defined by Cowan and Foray in 1995. This classification makes it possible to measure these effects and compare them depending on various objectives, for example convergence or divergence of economic and security effects (Chu and Lai 2012).
Public policy implications for duality go beyond the national innovation perspective. When public policy apprehends foreign trade from the perspective of duality, this intuitively raises the question of the risk involved by technology dissemination, which is higher due to their “trivialization”. The impact of this risk depends on the type of technology (Alic 1994). The most obvious risk is that of nuclear proliferation (Meier and Hunger 2014), but there are studies related to many other fields. Evaluating this risk involved by all the technologies referred to as “dual” was a question raised very early on (Bonomo et al. 1998; Tucker 1994). Trajtenberg (2006) observed the effects of military R&D