It marked the first time the United Nations had adopted a human rights treaty.
Nobody who was familiar with the genocide convention was unfamiliar with the man behind it. The New York Times praised the success of Lemkin’s “15 year fight.” When reporters looked for Lemkin after the vote to share his triumph, they could not find him. “Had he been in character,” remembered John Hohenberg of the New York Post, “he should have been strutting proudly in the corridors, proclaiming his own merit and the virtues of the protocol that had been his dream.”39 But he had gone missing. That evening journalists finally tracked him down, alone in the darkened assembly hall, weeping, in Rosenthal’s words, “as if his heart would break.”40The man who for so long had insisted on imposing himself upon journalists now waved them off, pleading, “Let me sit here alone.”41 He had been victorious at last, and the relief and grief overwhelmed him. He described the pact as an “epitaph on his mother’s grave” and as a recognition that “she and many millions did not die in vain.”42
Lemkin was struck that night with a vicious fever. Two days later he was again admitted to a Paris hospital, where he remained confined for three weeks. Although the doctors thought he was suffering complications stemming from his high blood pressure, they struggled to make a firm diagnosis. Lemkin offered his own account of his ailment: “Genociditis,” he said, or “exhaustion from work on the Genocide Convention.”43
Unfortunately, though Lemkin could not know it, the most difficult struggles lay ahead. Nearly four decades would pass before the United States would ratify the treaty, and fifty years would elapse before the international community would convict anyone for genocide.
Chapter 5 “A Most Lethal Pair of Foes”
Lemkin’s Lobby
Never in history had states even resolved to prevent atrocities. But enforcement was another matter entirely. Lemkin needed to make two things happen. First, twenty UN member states that had voted for the ban in the General Assembly had to ratify it domestically in order for the treaty to become official international law. And second, the United States, the world’s most powerful democracy, would have to take the lead in enforcing the genocide ban. In the absence of U.S. participation, the League of Nations had been impotent, and the sponsors of all new initiatives at the nascent UN were determined to involve the United States at every turn. “This treaty is like a ship carrying survivors,” Lemkin wrote to himself. “It cannot be permitted to sink.”1
When it came to tallying twenty domestic ratifications, Lemkin again became a one-man, one-globe, multilingual, singleissue lobbying machine. Sifting through Lemkin’s papers, one is awed by the quantity of correspondence he maintained. He sent letters out in English, French, Spanish, Hebrew, Italian, and German. Long before computers or photocopiers, he handcrafted each letter to suit the appropriate individual, organization, or country. Occasionally, Lemkin commandeered a student assistant from Yale Law School or a volunteer from one of the Jewish groups with which he periodically allied himself, but these helpers rarely lasted under the employ of such a stringent taskmaster. Lemkin used friends, friends of friends, and acquaintances of acquaintances to familiarize himself with a country. When he wanted to know which buttons to press in Uruguay, a country he had never visited, he sent an elaborate set of questions to a distant contact. He inquired into the status of its ratification drive and asked how it approved international treaties. He wrote to the leaders of the most influential political parties, the heads of the private women’s or civic groups, and the editors of prominent newspapers. He usually asked his contact to gauge the influence of the local Jewish community. He varied his pitch. If a country had not yet ratified the convention, he appealed for haste in doing so and often attached sample legislation from Denmark, an early implementer. If a country had experienced genocide in the past, he reminded its citizens of the human costs of allowing it. But if a country had committed genocide in the past, as Turkey had done, Lemkin was willing to keep the country’s atrocities out of the discussion, so as not to scare off a possible signatory.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
Approved and proposed for signature and ratification or accession by General Assembly resolution 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948 Entry into Force 12 January 1951, in Accordance with Article XIII
The Contracting Parties,
Having considered the declaration made by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 96 (I) dated 11 December 1946 that genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world,
Recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity, and
Being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international cooperation is required,
Hereby agree as hereinafter provided:
Article 1
The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.
Article 2
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
1 Killing members of the group;
2 Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
3 Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
4 Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
5 Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Article 3
The following acts shall be punishable:
1 Genocide;
2 Conspiracy to commit genocide;
3 Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
4 Attempt to commit genocide;
5 Complicity in genocide.
Article 4
Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.
Article 5
The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention, and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.
Article 6
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which