The Squeeze: Oil, Money and Greed in the 21st Century. Tom Bower. Читать онлайн. Newlib. NEWLIB.NET

Автор: Tom Bower
Издательство: HarperCollins
Серия:
Жанр произведения: Зарубежная деловая литература
Год издания: 0
isbn: 9780007388875
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Dutch shareholders owned only 10 per cent of the stock, and over 50 per cent was owned by shareholders in the US and Britain, the Dutch directors disproportionately dominated the company, encouraging its fragmentation between different cultures – Dutch, British and American – and also between the different departments – upstream, downstream and chemicals. To his credit, by May 1994 Herkströter, unlike his more conservative Dutch directors, recognised Shell’s sickness. Calling together 50 executives to review the company’s financial performance, Herkströter concluded that Shell had become ‘bureaucratic, inward-looking, complacent, self-satisfied, arrogant … technocentric and insufficiently entrepreneurial’, all of which was stifling efficiency and the search for new oil. The same sclerosis undermined his authority when Greenpeace boarded the Brent Spar.

      ‘People realise this is wrong,’ explained Peter Melchett, Greenpeace’s executive director. ‘It is immoral. It is treating the sea as a dustbin.’ Greenpeace’s accusation had aroused public antagonism against Big Oil. All the oil majors were linked with Shell as untrustworthy, environmental spoilers. Across Germany, Shell’s petrol stations were boycotted. In Holland, managers reported that a similar boycott was crippling their operation. The decentralised company had never anticipated that a decision in one country could trigger violent protests in another. Even though the directors knew that Melchett lacked any evidence to undermine Fay’s honest explanation that the platform’s tanks had been cleaned in 1991, the oil executive’s humiliation on BBC television had echoed across Europe. Like his fellow directors, Herkströter was destabilised by accusations of Shell’s dishonesty and by angry disagreements between the company’s managers. In particular, Herkströter was stunned when Shell staff in Germany leaked material to the media to embarrass the company’s senior executives in Holland.

      In the House of Commons, British prime minister John Major, unaware of Shell’s internal warfare, solidly defended the corporation. As he spoke, Herkströter and his fellow directors, shaken by the boycott and the demand by European politicians, especially Helmut Kohl, Germany’s chancellor, that Shell abandon its plans, collapsed. Just after Major’s public justification of the disposal of Brent Spar, Shell’s board in The Hague capitulated. ‘They caved in under pressure,’ complained Michael Heseltine, the secretary of state for trade and industry, outraged after Fay telephoned and ordered the British government to cease interfering in his company’s business.

      The platform was towed to Erfjord, near Stavanger, and dismantling started in July 1995. Melchett was invited to inspect the contents of the tanks, and was shown to have been mistaken. ‘I apologise to you and your colleagues over this,’ he said publicly after negotiations. ‘It was an honest mistake,’ said Paul Horsman, the leader of Greenpeace’s campaign. Although Shell was vindicated, Herkströter did not recover from the stumble. Shell’s directors were exposed as weak – one even said, ‘Greenpeace did a wonderful job’ – while Greenpeace, refusing to concede the high ground, invented a more serious campaign to recover its credibility.

      In 1995, the jewel in Shell’s crown was Nigeria. Signed in 1958, Shell’s original deal with the country was hugely profitable. The corporation paid the Nigerian government $2 for each barrel, regardless of the world price, until it reached $100. Thereafter, the royalty was $2.50. Beyond that minimal amount, Shell pocketed the remainder. War and corruption had eroded that windfall over the years. Historically there was no reason why 240 ethnic groups, Christian and Muslim, could exist within a single nation of 140 million people. Oil underpinned the artificial unity that had been constructed by the British colonial government, and keeping that fragile coalition together was the central government’s priority. Any threat of succession was unacceptable, especially that declared in 1967 by General Ojukwu, the leader of the oil-rich eastern region of Biafra. Knowing that the country would disintegrate without oil, the government in Lagos launched a war to crush the rebels. Over three years, Biafra and Shell’s operation were devastated. The recovery after 1970 had been sporadic. The new income created a mirage of universal wealth. If oil sold at $25 a barrel, each Nigerian citizen would benefit, although by only 50 cents per week at most. But even those profits were wasted by the government on white-elephant projects, including an outdated steel mill purchased from Russia. Simultaneously, the new wealth sucked in imports and destroyed local jobs. To alleviate the social upheaval, Shell built hospitals, schools and social centres. Contrary to advice, Shell’s local country chairmen refused to consult the aid agencies and non-governmental organisations about these projects. Rashly, Shell’s executives assumed that the government would provide teachers, doctors and nurses.

      By 1992 Shell’s 5,000 Nigerian staff, 20,000 contractors and 270 expatriate staff had rebuilt most of the wells, replaced equipment destroyed during the war and sought to compensate for losses. But, in the rush for oil, Shell applied standards that would have been unacceptable in Europe or America. Toxic gas was flared from the wells, and oil spills, seeping across farmland and rivers, remained untreated. Nevertheless, only one million barrels of oil a day, half of Nigeria’s capacity, was produced, and even that was affected by corruption. Every year the company’s auditors arrived from Europe to unearth endemic corruption among the company’s local employees. Systematically, some of Shell’s Nigeria managers gave contracts to friends and received backhanders, or paid inflated invoices and pocketed the cash. The auditors found hefty sums paid for ‘travel expenses’ to politicians and government officials and their families. Usually the same expenses were also paid by the government, and the officials kept the difference. At the top level, vast sums of money received from Shell in royalties and taxes were diverted by Nigeria’s politicians and officials to private offshore bank accounts. Brian Lavers, Shell’s country chairman until 1991, had been under pressure to pay bribes to government officials and local chiefs. To avoid participating in any illegal activity, Shell’s board agreed to pay middlemen, farmers and tribal chiefs as ‘consultants’ and for ‘services’ to build social amenities including schools, roads and cinemas. Beyond the company’s control, these were constructed for inflated prices, allowing Shell’s local managers and their friends to steal considerable sums of money. Despite his equally fierce opposition to the Nigerian government’s corruption, Philip Watts, Lavers’s successor, had no alternative but to reluctantly agree under pressure in 1991 to expand Shell’s operation in the country. The company increased the number of rigs searching for oil from seven to 22, agreed to pay higher royalties and, critically, agreed in return for a bonus to increase the country’s officially registered oil reserves from 16 billion barrels to 25 billion barrels. ‘I arrived in this job,’ said Watts, ‘absolutely determined to make a difference on issues I felt strongly about. You’re talking to someone who was in the eye of the storm.’

      Bureaucracy, inflation, ageing equipment, pollution and soaring taxes amid general lawlessness were just part of Watts’s inheritance. Watts, a seismologist, had worked in Borneo, the Gulf of Mexico, the North Sea and Holland before arriving in Nigeria. Intelligent and opinionated, he was intolerant of those he disdained, not least the local criminals. Oil had turned Nigeria into a magnet for villainy. In the Niger delta, 40,000 square miles of swamps and creeks where the Niger flows into the Atlantic, gangs of Ogoni tribesmen were systematically drilling into Shell’s pipelines to divert up to 80,000 barrels of oil every day into barges moored on the creeks. The cargoes were sold to untraceable tankers, chartered by European traders, anchored in the delta or offshore and resold to uninquisitive refineries, especially in nearby Ghana. The European traders could also be the victims. Lured by a succession of telephone calls, a Glencore representative arrived in Nigeria carrying a suitcase filled with several million dollars in cash to buy oil. After the suitcase was handed over, the ‘sellers’ disappeared. If that misfortune gave Watts wry amusement, the Ogoni gangs’ activities caused headaches. Explosions while siphoning oil caused numerous deaths, and the thefts from pipelines caused spillage across farmland and in rivers. The environmental damage placed Shell under pressure to pay compensation to farmers, which in turn encouraged some of them to sabotage pipes in order to claim compensation. Attempts by Watts to crack down on corruption, theft and sabotage endangered Shell’s employees. Increasingly, they could only work if protected by armed militias. Continued civil unrest forced many oil wells to close down. 2,470 security officers were employed to protect the operational staff. Although Shell’s directors