Soon after the decollectivization campaign, the honeymoon between the populist and capitalist factions came to an end. The scholars and policy makers in the capitalist faction mainly focused on the development of capitalist relations of production in the rural areas (that is, “efficient scale farming”), and they often tended to overlook the suffering and dispossession of the small peasant families during the process. The national policy became more urban and industry-oriented after the mid-1980s; the rural-urban income gap increased dramatically; and public investment in rural areas dropped significantly from the level of the Maoist period.46 In1999, a local cadre, Li Changping, wrote a famous letter to Premier Zhu Rongji, stating that “the life of the peasants is extremely hard, the rural areas extremely poverty-stricken, and the prospect of agriculture extremely precarious.”
Those on the populist side do not oppose capitalism in principle, but they are more cautious about its disastrous impacts and, to some extent, represent its humane side: equal rights for urban and rural residents, tax cuts for peasants, price protection for agricultural products, and other welfare policies for the countryside. In the view of Wen Tiejun, a leading scholar in the populist camp, the Chinese intellectual should “deconstruct” the concept of modernization in order to protect the “unavoidable” petty peasant rural economy.47
The split redefined the mainstream political spectrum from the 1980s onward. On rural issues, the supporters of the capitalist solution became the right wing, while the populist opposition—however mild—formed the left wing. Sometimes, the populists and socialists have even found common ground in opposing policies of the capitalists. For example, on the issue of land privatization, those supporting socialism strongly defend the last remaining legacy of collectivization; the capitalist faction favors complete rural land privatization to facilitate land concentration; and the populist faction favors a more gradual approach and also supports maintaining a de jure collective ownership of land to protect the de facto small ownership.48
The contemporary historical process of agrarian change could be understood as a dynamic compromise between the populist and capitalist factions but with heavier weight on the latter. Since the beginning of this century, the populists, claiming that they represent the voices from below, have succeeded in persuading the central government to provide certain welfare supports and tax reductions for rural residents.49 Yet the capitalist faction, representing “efficiency” and “advanced forces of production,” has also won the upper hand on crucial issues. For example, the Third Plenary of the CCP’s 17th Central Committee in 2008 passed a resolution on rural development that explicitly encouraged peasants to trade land use rights to concentrate land for more large-scale efficient agricultural production.
Despite any possible differences, the two factions share in common the denial of any socialist rural project. After all, the populist faction does not really oppose the market and capitalism, and the capitalist faction is not arguing for the immediate abolition of small producers.
Again, the political subtlety in China in the second phase has found its counterparts and connections in other countries, although often in a twisted way. According to Brass, the rhetoric of the latter half of the twentieth century held that the new rural movements in Latin America and other developing countries abandoned the means of mass mobilization and the goal of socialism.50 As for the actual ongoing highly political and anti-neoliberal peasant movements in Mexico, Brazil, and other countries, Petras and Veltmeyer note that the mainstream either perceives the movements in recent decades as premodern, arguing that the homogenous peasantry was fighting a losing battle; or treat the struggles as postmodern, seeking cultural and ethnic identities.51 In fact, Chinese intellectuals like Wen Tiejun also explicitly refer to these movements as evidence of support for the populist notion of a homogenous above-class peasantry. As in China, the political and academic mainstream in other third world countries has managed to take socialism off the agenda, leaving the neoliberal capitalist program (the right) and a populist program (the left) to occupy the political center stage. Keep in mind that the two visions are not mutually exclusive. To paraphrase Brass, neoliberalism accepts small peasants as long as agricultural goods are produced efficiently for the market.
If we consider the overall effect of agrarian change, we can find its entanglement within the larger global context of neoliberalism. Decollectivization and the changes that followed led to the largest migration in human history, creating a new working class for the urban industries (the number of migrant workers was more than 280 million in 2016).52 This huge reserve army further disempowered the old urban working class and facilitated the massive privatization of the last two decades. Globally, the world labor force saw a significant expansion in the last few decades, owing to the radical reversal in agrarian relations: depeasantization in the peripheral countries by means of agribusiness as well as integration of the labor force in former socialist states into the world economy.53 Obviously, the increase in the global reserve army greatly contributes to the power of the world capitalist class and plays a crucial role in the neoliberal order. And Chinese agrarian change has been an integral part of the entire process.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
China’s changing agrarian relations have always been an important part of the world-historical process. In the Maoist era, the struggle was primarily between the pro-collective (socialist-oriented) faction and the anti-collective (both capitalist and populist-oriented) faction. In the post-Mao era, the tensions within the anti-collective camp have taken center stage, with their resolution largely in favor of capital. The pattern in China shares similarities with other countries, but it has its particularities, mainly owing to Maoist radical policies.
As we can see, since the end of the Maoist era, China has been gradually integrating itself into the contemporary capitalist world, not only in economic terms but also politically and in terms of scholarly work. In other words, contrary to mainstream claims of “Chinese exceptionalism,” China has, in fact, become more and more “normal” compared to other developing countries in terms of agrarian relations (and overall social relations) as it has digressed from Maoist radicalism.
With decollectivization and further neoliberal reforms, the current Chinese state faces a dilemma in representing capitalist class interests and simultaneously maintaining legitimacy among peasants and workers. On the one hand, the dominant interests of the urban capitalist class and the multinational businesses require a consistent supply of workers and land, thus implying the further consolidation of rural land and development of capitalist relations. On the other hand, the government needs to appease the peasants and workers by protecting them from dispossession and sweatshops. Another aspect of the state’s legitimacy concerns is the need to guarantee a high level of food sufficiency. China’s increasing food demand is so large that it cannot be met by international food market, which contributes to the state’s hesitancy in pursuing any dramatic changes in the countryside. The result of this dilemma remains to be seen, but the chance of a peaceful solution is slim. China could find itself in both political and economic crisis if the labor supply begins to decrease and labor’s bargaining power begins to increase, or if the state cannot address the concerns of the working class.
Future socialist projects can draw at least two lessons from Chinese agrarian history. First, without democratic control of the state by the workers and peasants, the already challenged socialist project (or any progressive project) will be even more fragile. This has been the case with China and many other countries that have gone the full circle in their agrarian relations. Second, the struggle for socialism is a long-term project, with contradictions and opposition along the way. When the Chinese Revolution succeeded in 1949, Chairman Mao declared that we had only finished one step in the Long March. This is indeed so. To paraphrase an ancient Chinese saying, building socialism is like rowing against the current, and no advance means retreat.
Agricultural Productivity and Decollectivization