One has to do with the allocation of economic resources within the socialist camp, and stems essentially from the vast differences in the degree of economic development attained by the individual socialist countries. To put it in its simplest terms, the question is, how much aid should the economically most advanced members of the socialist camp—primarily the Soviet Union but also Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and Poland—give other less (and very much less) developed socialist countries? Clearly, no such problem would exist, if all socialist societies were about equally rich or if all were about equally poor. It should also be clear that at the present time an even proximate equalization of per capita incomes between the haves and the have-nots in the socialist camp is entirely impossible. It would drastically reduce the living standards of the, say, 250 million people living in the better-off parts of the socialist world, and even if such a move could substantially accelerate the growth of the worse-off parts inhabited by over 700 million people, it would be politically and socially wholly unfeasible, would be, indeed, suicidal to socialism in the more fortunate nations.
This issue was obviously not on the agenda as long as the Soviet Union and other European socialist countries were in the throes of reconstruction from the economic catastrophe caused by the war, and could furnish no more than symbolic assistance to the worst situated arrivals in the socialist camp. It became more urgent in the middle 1950’s by which time the Soviet Union had made major strides in its economic reconstruction and advancement, and embarked—after the death of Stalin—on a course of a far-reaching economic and political liberalization. In the economic realm this implied a shift from the earlier policy of austerity and limitation of current consumption for the sake of the highest attainable rates of investment and growth, to a marked increase in the supply of housing, manufactured consumer goods, and food to the Soviet people who had suffered grievous privations during the prewar era of industrialization and were forced to make even more enormous sacrifices during the shattering years of the war. In the area of politics it meant a drastic change in the general atmosphere prevailing in Soviet society, the elimination of political repressions, and a break with the rigid dogmatism which affected all aspects of Soviet life during the rule of Stalin. As far as international relations are concerned, the new course involved a major effort to arrive at some accommodation with the United States with a view to the preservation of peace, to a reduction of the burden of armaments, and to securing a relaxation of international tensions necessary for the consolidation and progress of socialist societies in the Soviet Union as well as in the countries which entered the road to socialism after World War II. Indeed, the advancement and increasing welfare of these socialist societies were pronounced to be one of the most important leverages for the further expansion of socialism in the world. In what appeared to be a repudiation or at least an important modification of the conventional theory of imperialism, the new Soviet leadership declared such an accommodation to be not impossible in view of the radical shift in the world’s balance of power caused by the rapidly mounting strength of the socialist bloc and the progressive disintegration of the imperialist control over colonial and dependent countries. In fact, the latter process was to be accelerated by the extension of economic and political aid to the newly emerging nations.
Various aspects of this new course were met with skepticism in China and other socialist countries still struggling desperately with the initial, most formidable, hurdles on the road to economic development. The disagreement involved the timeliness and wisdom of the liberalization program in the Soviet Union in the light of the needs of the entire socialist camp, the appraisal of the “appeasability” of the imperialist powers, and the judgment on what constitutes the best strategy in the struggle against imperialism and for peace and socialism.33
But while increasingly pronounced in the course of the last few years, it was not until the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1961 that the controversy erupted into a publicly acknowledged major conflict. Although still retaining its original roots, the dispute became acerbated by a number of developments. In the last couple of years, for reasons which it would take us too far afield to discuss, the economic development of China has suffered a serious setback,34 and accordingly its need for large-scale economic assistance from the Soviet Union has greatly increased. Soviet policy at the same time remains committed to continuing on the road to further liberalization. This was solemnly proclaimed in the program of socialist construction in the Soviet Union adopted by the Congress, which provides for spectacular increases not only of the gross national product of the USSR in the next twenty years, but also for a significant reduction of the number of working hours of Soviet workers and for a vast improvement of the general living standard of the Soviet people. The question naturally arises whether it is necessary to set the Soviet welfare targets as high as they are fixed in the new Program, whether the policy adopted with regard to the rates of growth of the entire economy combined with somewhat less ambitious goals in terms of consumption would not leave more room for a program of large-scale assistance to other socialist countries. In other words, does not the Soviet Party leadership take a too narrow, “nationalist” view of the needs and requirements of the entire socialist camp and focus too much on the rapid betterment of the economic situation of the Soviet people? And would not more rapid progress of the Chinese, North Korean, North Vietnamese, and other underdeveloped socialist economies have a larger impact on the world as a whole, and on the peoples in the non-socialist underdeveloped countries in particular, than the Soviet Union’s “attaining and surpassing American standards of living” in twenty years, as envisaged by the new Program, rather than in, say, the thirty years that it would take if a larger slice of its national product were devoted to the advancement of other socialist societies?
These questions translate themselves into political terms. As mentioned earlier, the Soviet Union’s departure from the policies of austerity and curtailment of consumption for the sake of rapid growth goes hand in hand with the accelerated drive of “de-Stalinization,” with the reduction and progressive abolition of the system of political repression which was largely due to the earlier regime of belt-tightening and maximal exertion. It goes without saying that nothing could be more welcome to a socialist than the evolution of the Soviet Union into a socialist democracy with the highest attainable levels of welfare and enjoying an ever wider degree of individual freedom. Neither the Chinese, who remained remarkably free of Stalin’s abuses of power, nor any other socialists to my knowledge, have objected to the elimination and drastic suppression of all the aberrations and crimes committed by Stalin and his henchmen. What is at issue therefore is not “de-Stalinization” per se, but the abandonment of the policy of “forced marches” which is so prominently associated with the name of Stalin. Neither China nor some other socialist countries are as yet economically ready for the “thaw”; and, not being economically ready, they cannot afford the liberalization, the relaxation of the pressures on consumption, and all that goes with them which in the Soviet Union are at the present time not only feasible but constitute major steps towards the economic, political, and cultural advancement of Soviet society. In explaining to their peoples their policy of rapid industrialization, collectivization of agriculture, and ineluctable limitation of consumption, the socialist governments of China and some other socialist countries made extensive use of the Soviet example and of the authority of Stalin who was universally considered to be the chief architect of the Soviet successes. The dramatic overthrow of that image of Stalin at a time when the policies which he symbolized cannot yet be discarded, constitutes undoubtedly a severe political shock to those socialist governments which are still confronted with the kind of obstacles which the Soviet Union by now has been able to overcome.
Similarly, in their international relations, China and other socialist countries of Asia find themselves in a position quite different from that of the Soviet Union and the European socialist countries. With important parts of their countries still under the control of the enemy, politically discriminated against, militarily threatened and economically blockaded by the imperialist powers, the socialist countries of Asia are much less able and willing