Coupled with the Sure Start programme, was the National Children’s Fund programme. Launched in 2000, this programme set out to tackle social exclusion and poverty among 5–13 year-olds. With a total of £960 million allocated between 2000 and 2008 this programme targeted the lower end of social exclusion, when children were identified as requiring intervention to prevent escalation of issues that did not require professional or institutionalised services. In this context, preventative services have been widely assumed to be an area best addressed by the voluntary sector, and therefore distribution of this budget targeted supporting voluntary sector providers in delivering these services (Artaraz et al, 2007; Morris et al, 2009). This assumption is thought to have been ‘fed perhaps by the level of responsiveness and flexibility shown by the voluntary and community sector to venture in the “new frontier” of preventative services defined by the (then) current child welfare agenda’ (Artaraz et al, 2007: 308). When the National Children’s Fund programme came to an end in 2008, budgets were pooled within the local authorities and distributed against local priorities outlined in the local Children and Young People’s Plan. Multi-agency working became a common phrase under Labour with the ‘duty to cooperate’ enshrined in the Children Act 2004 section 10, which saw the formation of Children’s Trust Boards in all local authority areas and, in most areas, subsequent Local Children’s Trusts Boards established under these to represent the local communities. Each Children’s Trust Board had to produce and monitor a local Children and Young People’s Plan. However, as we explore in subsequent chapters, this intensive focus on and funding for local support was short lived.
Contemporary preventative services, coalitions and the Conservatives
In this chapter we explore contemporary children’s services, discussing how the persuasive logic of prevention has been adopted in more modern service delivery. Focusing specifically on the early 2010s, we map the shift from the Conservative flagship project of the Big Society, to the renewed localism project of the Civil Society Strategy. The links between the societal hardening of focus, from universal provision to the targeting of preventative services will be delineated, and the role of the voluntary sector in the delivery of these services will be discussed. The aim is to highlight the lived realities of service delivery for children, which will then be discussed over the remainder of this book.
The Big Society to civil society
The Big Society was promoted by the Conservative government as a solution to the financial crisis which had gripped the UK and much of Europe since 2008. In 2009, David Cameron initially outlined the Conservative’s vision for the ‘Big Society’ in his Hugo Young Memorial Lecture, controversially presenting Labour as ‘big government’ but still following themes that resonated with the ‘third way’. At that time, Cameron suggested: ‘Because we believe that a strong society will solve our problems more effectively than big government has or ever will, we want the state to act as an instrument for helping to create a strong society … Our alternative to big government is the Big Society’ (Cameron, 2009).
The concept of the Big Society remained confusing. It was an integral part of the Conservative/Liberal Democrats Coalition’s plans, on their election in 2010, for public sector service provision retraction and emphasised the voluntary sector and ‘civil society’ delivering public services in a more cost-efficient manner during an economic downturn. For the Conservatives, the Big Society focused on providing answers to the central problems that they argued faced Britain under Labour rule. Citing the financial crisis, decreases in employment and increases in poverty, they argued that Britain was ‘broken’ financially, socially and politically (Evans, 2011). The concept of the Big Society suggested that by supporting civil action and community spirit, the Big Society could mend Britain socially. By finding cheaper alternatives in the delivery of services in the public sector and helping the unemployed back to work the Big Society could mend Britain financially. Finally, by empowering the voters to hold those in power to account, the Big Society could mend Britain politically (Evans, 2011).
The Coalition was keen to demonstrate that the Big Society was a shift away from the previous government’s concept of the third sector. This was highlighted by a change in language, dropping the rather condescending term ‘third sector’ as Cameron (2009) referred to it and adopting an ideologically driven narrative that discussed the voluntary sector as the ‘first sector’ and more commonly ‘civil society’. Following this the Office for Third Sector was quickly renamed the ‘Office for Civil Society’ (OCS). Though retained in the Cabinet Office its primary functions were to enable voluntary sector organisations to work with the state, allowing the free flow of resources to the sector and make the management of these organisations easier. Some new forms of funding emerged including the establishment of the Big Society Bank and Social Impact Bonds. However, the 2010 public spending review triggered a number of major spending cuts that would directly affect the voluntary sector. For example, the OCS had its budget cut by 60%, the loss of quangos such as Capacitybuilders and the Commission for Compact; horizontal funding programmes developed by Labour such as Futurebuilders, the Social Enterprise Investment fund and Change up came to an end and there was a significant cut in support for strategic infrastructure partners. Prior to feeling the impact of the public spending review, the voluntary sector had already experienced £118 million worth of cuts in funding from local authorities in England between May and September of 2010 alone, with many more following (Alcock et al, 2012). The voluntary sector was being simultaneously encouraged to tender to deliver services on behalf of local authorities and the government, while being warned about being too ‘dependent’ upon government funding and therefore at risk in an economic downturn (Evans, 2011). According to the NCVO Almanac (2014) between 2010/11 and 2011/12 the total funding allocated by government to the voluntary sector fell by 8.8% in real terms. This was a funding reduction of £1.3 billion, in which social services organisations, and education and training organisations saw the largest reductions of £361 million and £230 million respectively. Health organisations experienced a slightly smaller loss and only international organisations saw a slight overall increase.
Arguably used to differentiate the public spending cutbacks from those of the 1980s (Bach, 2012), the term ‘Big Society’ has appeared at times to attempt to become all-encompassing, to represent both public spending cuts and to commission ineffectively run public services out to voluntary sector providers and social enterprises. The rhetoric surrounding the Big Society has been used to ‘soften’ an otherwise harsh image of the Conservative party (Albrow, 2012), communicating to a wider audience and attempting to show an empathetic and understanding Conservative party. Within this, there was the suggestion of rebuilding civic duty and voluntary action to fill in any voids. However, there was no single definition or shared understanding of the term ‘Big Society’. Indeed, the House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee (PASC, 2011) highlighted lack of understanding surrounding the concept of Big Society and furthermore drew attention to the potential negative impacts for the voluntary sector including loss of sector independence. Furthermore, the committee drew attention to the questionable nature of the voluntary sector being the ‘cheaper’ alternative (PASC,