Chapter 9 looks at the shift inward to “homegrown terrorism” at the end of the decade and outlines the part played by President Obama and the Democratic Party in creating an opening for the far right. The chapter focuses specifically on the controversy generated by the proposal to build an Islamic community center two and a half blocks from the site of the former World Trade Center. The misnamed “Ground Zero mosque” controversy showed the dynamic at work: while the far-right Islamophobes sparked hatred against Muslims, liberals and Democrats fanned the flames. The net result strengthened the racist bigots and enabled a surge in Islamophobia not seen since 9/11. This was the first palpable victory for the Islamophobic and Zionist right, which had been involved in various campaigns since 9/11. The politics of liberal Islamophobia at the top of society enabled the extreme Islamophobia of the right.The far right was then able to capitalize on this atmosphere of racism, building its own ranks through the mechanics of scapegoating. Similarly, politicians used Islamophobia to garner votes and political leverage.
Chapter 10 looks specifically at the right-wing Islamophobic warriors— the new McCarthyites—and their connections to the security establishment, the media, the academy, and the political class. In this chapter I argue that the right-wing Islamophobes are not a fringe minority but rather part and parcel of the structures of mainstream American society. Like Senator Joseph McCarthy before them, the new McCarthyites play a collective role in ramping up fear and hatred against Muslims, with the full consent of both the Republican and Democratic parties. Just as McCarthy was enabled by a political system that found his antics useful in the prosecution of the Cold War, the new McCarthyites of today are useful in pushing the envelope and advancing the War on Terror.
Finally, the conclusion looks at ways in which Islamophobia can be fought and resisted. I argue that Islamophobia is about politics rather than religion per se; it therefore needs to be fought on that terrain. There was much hope in the Muslim American community and among sections of the left that an Obama presidency would mitigate, if not eradicate, anti-Muslim racism. Yet, as this concluding chapter shows, this hope for change did not materialize: Obama wholeheartedly adopted and codified Bush-era policies. After years of betrayals by the Democratic Party, sections of the Muslim American community, along with their allies in the antiwar movement and other social movements, came together to push back against anti-Muslim racism. Local movements to defend unjustly targeted Muslim Americans started to coalesce into a nation-wide movement. The NYPD’s harassment of Blacks and Latinos were connected by Muslim rights organizers with the anti-Muslim surveillance campaign, forging bonds of multiracial solidarity. I conclude by advancing the argument that it is only through such efforts, and through a politics of international solidarity that links domestic attacks on Muslims with the goals of imperialism, that Islamophobia can be successfully defeated.
I could not have picked a better year than 2011 to work on this book. The early part of the year saw the birth of the “Arab Spring”: in a matter of weeks, ordinary people in Tunisia and Egypt deposed long-hated US-backed dictators. The ensuing media coverage in the United States exposed Americans to images of Arabs and Muslims they had never seen before, at least not on such a consistent basis. The self-activity of ordinary Arabs and Muslims went a long way toward shattering long-held Islamophobic stereotypes; pro-union protestors in Madison, Wisconsin, carried picket signs that read “Hosni Walker” and “Fight like an Egyptian.” In a few short months, people in the Middle East and North Africa did more to combat Islamophobic caricatures through their activities than all of the books that have been written on the subject. And so it is to the brave women and men of the Arab Spring that I humbly dedicate this book.
Acknowledgments
Over the last decade I have been fortunate to interact with many intelligent, passionate, and wonderful people who have pushed me to think about this topic in ways that I would not if I had written this book sealed off in an ivory tower. Every question, every comment, and every interaction with hundreds of people at talks, meetings, and workshops in the United States and abroad has impacted and shaped this book. And so I must begin by acknowledging them, even if I cannot list every single person by name.
Those who have labored intensely on the book include, first and foremost, Paul D’Amato, the managing editor of the International Socialist Review. Earlier versions of some of the chapters appeared in the ISR, and they benefited from Paul’s labyrinthine knowledge of all things important (and unimportant!). He also read chapters 1, 2, 3, and 7 and offered useful feedback. Ahmed Shawki, the editor of the ISR and another incredible thinker, must be thanked for his support of the project and for catching several errors. Lance Selfa read chapters 4, 7, and 10, and his deep knowledge of the US political establishment was invaluable. Two amazing lawyers, Steve Downs and Amna Akbar, read and vetted chapter 8 on the legal apparatus. A version of chapter 3 was published in the Journal of Communication Inquiry; my thanks again to the anonymous reviewers.
I must also thank Yoshie Furuhashi, my friend from graduate school, for publishing my first article on Islamophobia in MRZine. She informed me that it received more than ten thousand hits in the first few days. I took this as a sign that I should perhaps continue to write about the topic. I want to also thank my students Hoda Mitwally and Bryan Sacks for being so willing to help me dig up a reference or cross-check a fact. And last but not least, my copy editor, Sarah Grey. Anyone who has worked with a good copy editor knows how important and integral they are to the process—Sarah was the best. While everyone named here engaged with and shaped the book in ways big and small, what errors remain are of my own doing.
Finally, a big thanks to all my dear friends for their kindness and support during a rough year, particularly Helen Scott, Megan Behrent, Anjali Ganapathy, Srinivas Reddy, Ashley Smith, Sarah Grey, Joe Cleffie, Susan Menahem, Lee Wengraf, Susan Dwyer, Virginia Harabin, and Regina Marchi.
Chapter 1
Images of Islam in Europe
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, sales of the Koran shot up dramatically in the United States. People who otherwise would not have had much interest in Islam turned to its holy book to find explanations for why the attacks had occurred. What prompts this automatic association between the actions of some individuals and their religion? Arguably no one turned to the Bible, either the Old or New Testament, to understand why Timothy McVeigh bombed a federal building in Oklahoma City. Why then are Arabs and Muslims seen primarily through the lens of Islam?
To answer this question we must turn to the dominant images of Islam and Muslims in the West. In particular, this chapter looks at the ways in which ruling elites in Europe throughout history have constructed particular images of the “Muslim enemy” to advance their political ambitions. In short, the history of “Islam and the West,” as it is commonly termed, is a story not of religious conflict but rather of conflict born of political rivalries and competing imperial agendas.
This is not to suggest, however, that the encounter between “East” and “West” has always been bitter and hostile. I put “East” and “West” in quotes to recognize the fact that there is no monolithic East, just as there is no singular West. Rather, the peoples who lived in the geographic locations that we call Europe and the Near East in the period under study in this chapter, from the eighth to the eighteenth centuries, were marked by cultural, linguistic, ethnic, class, national, and other forms of difference. This chapter, like the book as a whole, eschews a simplistic understanding of Europe and the Near East as “rival systems” based on religious affiliation.
The West, therefore, has had not just one image of Islam but multiple images. For instance, ordinary Europeans who encountered their counterparts in the Near East sometimes found much to admire and respect; yet it would