How America was Tricked on Tax Policy. Bret N. Bogenschneider. Читать онлайн. Newlib. NEWLIB.NET

Автор: Bret N. Bogenschneider
Издательство: Ingram
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Жанр произведения: Бухучет, налогообложение, аудит
Год издания: 0
isbn: 9781785274299
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      The source of federal revenue to fund future Social Security benefits is presumed to be federal income taxes from high-income persons, even though the federal government today receives most of its revenue from a combination of wage and income taxation. The assumption makes it possible to discuss transfer payments as relating to hypothetical taxes paid by the wealthy in a future period, even though transfer payments today are made by workers—and will likely always be made by workers. This method also simply ignores the fact that the federal government runs a deficit now and presumably will run a larger deficit at the time future transfer payments should be made. So, even if progressive tax rates meant that the wealthy were funding the tax base, indeed this would not mean that the wealthy were funding the federal budget, since the federal budget might be funded by borrowing from either past or future workers.

       Deception #5. Statutory tax rates, not effective tax rates, are what’s important to tax policy

      The misleading aspect of this discourse has to do with the effective tax rate. In tax parlance, the term “effective tax rate” refers to the tax rate after all incentives or reductions are considered. In this case, a large corporation may receive incentives that reduce the effective tax rate from the statutory rate to some lesser amount, and that amount is the corporate tax rate. Of course, the effective tax rate is a function of many different tax deductions from the statutory rate or other incentives. Estimating the effective tax rate requires having knowledge of the amount of income and the amount of deductions and other incentives available to a taxpayer, such as a large corporation. Most of the time, neither of those variables is known by anyone inside or outside the corporation until the time that the corporate tax return is prepared after the close of the tax year. Therefore, it is entirely possible that a high statutory tax rate (e.g., 35 percent) could apply to the corporation but it has a low effective tax rate because of available tax incentives and other deductions. This was broadly true of the US corporate tax system even before the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017; the effective tax rate on US multinational firms was quite low, most scholars thought no higher than 21 percent.

      Therefore, the US corporate tax rate was not properly described as high. The average effective tax rate for large corporations was somewhere between 10 percent and 21 percent at the time of the reforms. The effective corporate tax rate in the United States was actually relatively low in comparison to other countries. The relatively low rate was due to various factors, including specific incentives contained within the tax code itself. For example, prior to the corporate tax cuts, the US corporate tax system was structured to allow for three things: (1) broad deferral of large corporations’ offshore earnings until profits were repatriated, if ever, (2) a lack of tax enforcement on intercompany transfer pricing (so firms were freely able to shift profits into tax havens or other favorable jurisdictions) and (3) no enforcement of the accumulated earnings tax for large multinational corporations. All of this meant that corporations were not required to pay dividends, which might have triggered additional tax at the shareholder level. Thus, the system was quite favorable for large corporations because it was unlikely that corporate earnings would be taxed much, if at all.

      The pertinent question, then, is why would anyone talk about tax policy in terms of statutory tax rates rather than effective tax rates? Large corporations have smart tax advisors, so ought to be able to estimate the effective tax rate for their potential earnings. Those tax advisors would be aware that the statutory tax rate would not be the rate they would be required to pay on any future profits. Yet most of the discussion at the time was a superficial treatment of statutory tax rates; very little discourse reached an analysis of corporate effective tax rates.

      For their part, economists have long recognized that the most important statistic for tax policy is likely the effective tax rate, not the statutory tax rate. The use of effective tax rates is extremely problematic for economic theorizing, however. Data on effective tax rates is not readily available to economists, and it would always be firm-specific anyway. Absent a solution, this makes it nearly impossible to say anything precise about tax policy by way of economic theory.

      A solution was nonetheless identified within economic theory to render it relevant to tax policy notwithstanding an inability to know what effective tax rates actually are. Economists simply invented as a solution the “marginal tax rate,” which is nearly always equivalent to the statutory tax rate. The “marginal tax rate” is a hypothetical rate that the firm would pay on an extra dollar of earnings above what the company is expected to earn. In economic theorizing, it is posited that firm-level decisions relate to the marginal tax rate, or the tax rate on “extra” or incremental earnings arising from new investments. The marginal tax rate is generally presumed by economists to be equal to the statutory tax rate. This means that in the formulation of tax policy economists generally posit that large corporations will make decisions based on the full statutory rate rather than the average effective tax rate. So, cutting tax rates for large corporations could therefore be seen as potentially beneficial even where the large corporation is not currently paying much (or any) taxes because corporations might be expected to take investment decisions under the countervailing premise that they would estimate taxes on earnings from that “extra” profit from investment and reduce the expected rate of return by the amount of “extra” taxes to be paid. In any case, economists are comfortable speaking about tax policy in terms of statutory tax rates rather than effective tax rates, because it is simply presumed as a matter of economic theory, without any evidence of course, that firms would expect to pay the statutory tax rate on any incremental earnings from new investment. That view is wrong most of the time because firms typically make decisions about business investments considering the average effective tax rate, not the marginal or statutory tax rate. In actual practice out in the real world, the CEOs of large corporations are infamous for signing the papers on major investment or M&A (Mergers and Acquisitions) decisions without consulting the tax department in advance. The typical example (often discussed by tax professionals with a chuckle or sigh) is the CEO who agrees to do